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Abstract
In the first chapter, we offer a new way of examining the relationship between
bilateral FDI flows and economic growth in the long-run using a unique dataset.
Moreover, we provide a three-regime analysis under the North-Emerging South-
South framework to highlight heterogeneity in parameters based on income levels.
The framework also allows us to show an evidence of a positive association be-
tween bilateral FDI flows and business cycle synchronization especially for the
North & North and Emerging & Emerging country pairs. Our comprehensive
analysis addresses issues regarding sample selection, endogeneity, cross-sectional
dependency, and co-integration.
In the second chapter, we show that the efficacy of fiscal decentralization in
enhancing economic growth or labor productivity growth depends on whether
taxes are collected at the central level or at the sub-national level. To empirically
examine the differential effects, we introduce a distinct measure of fiscal decen-
tralization that serves as a proxy for taxes collected at the sub-national level. In
addition to proposing a new measure, our analysis examines the long-run associ-
ation between fiscal decentralization and economic or labor productivity growth;
considers heterogeneity in parameters by federalism status and income levels;
identifies sources of growth; and incorporates nonlinearity to show that neither a
complete revenue decentralization nor centralization is optimal.
x
In the third chapter, we provide a novel approach of estimating a regime-
switching nonlinear and non-Gaussian state space model based on a particle
learning scheme. In particular, we extend the particle learning method in Liu and
West (2001) by constructing a new proposal distribution for the latent regime in-
dex variable that incorporates all available information contained in the current
and past observations. The Monte Carlo simulation result implies that our ap-
proach categorically outperforms a popular existing algorithm. To demonstrate
the model, the proposed algorithm is used to analyze the underlying dynamics of
U.S. excess stock return.
xi
Chapter 1
Bilateral Foreign Direct
Investment, Economic Growth,
and Income Convergence: A
North-Emerging South-South
Analysis
The motivation for trade and investment between high-income countries is well
documented in the Linder [1961] hypothesis. That is, a similar willingness to pay
for higher quality goods, where products from high-income countries are of higher
unit values, drives up the trade volume between rich countries [e.g., Hallak, 2006,
Feenstra and Romalis, 2012, Dingel, 2016]. Moreover, Fajgelbaum et al. [2014]
contend that the Linder hypothesis also holds for the multilateral foreign direct
investment (FDI) flows, where the product quality and income level relationship
that affects high trade volumes between rich countries also affects dynamics of
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foreign investment. This implies that FDI flows between high-income countries
dominates the volume of multinational investment. According to this theory,
thus, the trade and financial exchanges between two high-income countries (i.e.,
North-North) must be high and prevalent.1
Since the era of capital account liberalization starting from the 1980s and
1990s, however, bilateral FDI flows from a southern country to a northern country
and vice versa have deepened the asymmetry in global financial transactions.
For instance, FDI flows from Sweden to South Korea (i.e., North-South FDI)
increased from 0% in 2003 to 2.43% in 2012 as a share of Korea’s total FDI inflows
(UNCTAD, 2013). Similarly, the share of FDI flows from China to the United
States (i.e., South-North FDI) in US’s total FDI inflows increased from 2.3% in
2003 to 4.6% in 2012. Moreover, the traditional method of bifurcating income
levels into North and South is insufficient: the surge of emerging South markets
has significantly increased the range of income levels within the South which
requires a more refined categorization of the North-South. The North consists
of high-income OECD countries, whereas the South includes underdeveloped or
developing nations. However, numerous countries have transitioned from the
South to an Emerging South category, where income and development levels are
much different. Thus, we divide countries into three regimes based on income
levels: North, Emerging South, and South (i.e., NES framework).
Within the NES framework, we analyze the impact of bilateral FDI flows
on income growth and business cycle synchronization. Whereas there is evidence
that FDI flows may have a quantifiable impact on growth [e.g., Borensztein et al.,
1998], the relationship is not strictly homogeneous. The efficacy of FDI as a
1Empirically, the North is defined as high-income OECD nations, and North-North refers
to the direction of investment from a northern country to another northern country.
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growth enhancing factor can vary for several reasons: the country of origin’s
investment motivation, the destination country’s absorptive capacity, types of
FDI (e.g., Greenfield versus M & A or horizontal versus vertical) and the sector
of investment. We are particularly interested in the conditional impact of FDI on
income growth related to the investment motivation and the absorptive capcaity.
We also examine the association between bilateral FDI flows and business cycle
synchronization. This has been overlooked in the literature even though foreign
investment is as important of a convergence factor as trade due to an increased
global financial integration.
The motivation for FDI versus trade flows can be quite different as techno-
logical progress in response to the exposure to new ideas and opportunities from
diverse foreign investors is a main motivation of FDI flows, whereas geographic
proximity or physical transportation costs are common determinants of trade
flows. For instance, Disdier and Head [2008] show a highly persistent evidence
that the volume of intensity of trade between two countries is lower when their
geographic distance is further. Moreover, Hsu et al. [2011] contend that bilateral
FDI flows tend to replace trade volumes when the physical cost of transportation
is a major concern.
To analyze the heterogeneous relationship between bilateral FDI flows and
income growth and business cycle synchronization, we use a sample of 9,591
country-pairs over the period 1990-2012. It is important to acknowledge that the
volume of FDI flows between country-pairs is not randomly determined, a clas-
sic example of sample selection bias. Financial transactions between high-income
countries are more frequently observed and the transactions have higher intensive
margins than between countries with high and low income levels. Therefore, we
apply a Heckman-style two-stage sample selection model to address the sample
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selection bias. Furthermore, the relationship between bilateral FDI flows and
income growth or business cycle synchronization is highly endogenous. Endo-
geneity bias can occur if countries with similar income levels are more likely to
invest in each another, and reverse causality can occur if fast growing countries
receive more FDI flows. We mitigate endogeneity with instrumental variables
(IV) and two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) approaches.
Our analysis contributes to the literature in three major ways. First, we ex-
amine a long-run relationship between bilateral FDI flows and economic growth
through an alternative empirical approach. Empirical specifications in the ex-
isting literature often examine the short-run dynamics of FDI flows. Changes
in technological progress and human capital of host countries in response to in-
creased capital flows are, however, a long term process. Second, we establish
the relationship between bilateral FDI flows and business cycle synchronization
which has been overlooked in the literature. Third, we account for heterogeneity
in parameters between the North and the South, while decomposing the South
into Emerging South and non-emerging South (i.e., NES framework) in response
to numerous fast-growing developing countries.
1.1 Related Literature
1.1.1 Motivations for North-North Flows
The Linder [1961] hypothesis provides an explanation for the high volume of trade
between high-income countries. An intensive trade volume between two high-
income countries are motivated by their similar levels of per capita income and
similar demand structures given that the demands for goods are non-homothetic.
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Analogously, Krugman [1980] posits that countries with similar local consumption
patterns intensively trade with one another through the home-market effects.2 A
large literature, including Bergstrand [1990], partially confirms a Linder-type
hypothesis for trade through a synthesized framework.
While the motivation for the high volume of trade between high-income coun-
tries is widely analyzed, only recently has there been attempts to explain the
high volume of FDI between high-income countries. Applying the concept of
non-homotheticity in local demands and the home-market effects used in the
trade literature, Fajgelbaum et al. [2014] show that the same relationship can
also explain the trend in FDI flows. Firm-level data on multinational activities
show that more extensive and intensive FDI flows are common between countries
with a similar per capita income level if the local demand structures are simi-
lar. Accordingly, bilateral FDI country-pairs are symmetric in each region such
that North-North FDI flows are prevalent. Similarly, Markusen and Venables
[2000] develop a model in which firms operating in a capital-intensive industry
have an incentive to open foreign production facilities in countries where the
cost of capital is cheap. A large volume of North-North FDI flows exists in the
aggregate level when multinationals in the capital-intensive industry are most
prevalent in capital-abundant countries. The symmetry also holds for the quality
of goods that each region produces. Alfaro and Charlton [2009] show that multi-
national firms from high-income countries specialize in producing high-quality
goods. Conversely, multinational firms from low-income countries specialize in
producing low-quality goods. They conclude that South-South FDI flows occur
mostly in labor-intensive industries.
2The home-market effects refer to the concentration of certain industries in markets with
lower transportation costs in relation to returns to scale.
5
1.1.2 Motivations for North-South Flows
Explaining the increased flows between asymmetric regions is a formidable task
because economic variables other than income levels and factor endowments play
a role in determination of foreign capital transactions. Similar to an argument
in Helpman et al. [2007], one possible reason for an increase in North-South FDI
flows is that multinationals from the North are searching for a higher expected
return when investing in developing countries, away from the already capital-
saturated industrialized countries. A recent surge in competition among host
countries to attract more foreign investments through legislative changes and
bilateral investment treaties may have also contributed to the rapid growth of
FDI flows. On the other hand, an increase in South-North FDI flows can be
partially attributed to multinationals in a southern country investing more in
northern countries which have financial and political stability. Transportation
costs heavily affect the volume of bilateral trade, bilateral FDI flows are not
necessarily restricted by the physical moving cost. Thus investors can allocate
their assets outside of the borders with less restrictions.
1.1.3 Economic Effects of FDI Flows
The symmetry and asymmetry in bilateral investments have several economic
implications, including long-run economic growth in the host country and busi-
ness cycle synchronization between the capital origin and host countries. Within
the endogenous growth framework, FDI flows can have a long-run effect on eco-
nomic growth of a host country through spillover effects, technology transfers,
and knowledge diffusion [e.g., Borensztein et al., 1998]. The diversity of capital
goods such as a FDI-led capital accumulation can positively affect technologi-
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cal progress through a capital deepening process [e.g., Shell, 1966]. Since the
endogenous models regard technological progress as the main factor of long-run
growth, an increase in FDI flows has a permanent effect on per capita income
growth. Investments from multinational enterprises of northern countries, for in-
stance, pave the way for introducing cutting-edge technology in the host country
at a lower cost, resulting in more efficient technology spillovers. Consequently,
the effectiveness of FDI flows would depend on the host country’s level of human
capital [e.g., Borensztein et al., 1998] and absorptive capacity [e.g., Durham, 2004,
Girma, 2005].
1.1.4 North-South FDI Flows
Positive Effects
There are both positive and negative effects from North-South FDI flows. Dahi
and Demir [2017] provide a comprehensive review of a such effect. We point out
some of the major effects of the North-South FDI transactions. Regarding the
positive effects, FDI flows from the North to the South can facilitate a transfer of
cutting-edge technology and result in productivity spillovers to the South. The
spillovers include adoption of more sophisticated management techniques of the
North and an exposure to international markets, allowing the South to “catch-
up” with the technological level of the North. These spillovers are expected to
be significant considering the large productivity gap between the North and the
South [e.g., Panagariya, 2000].
The high potential for the technological diffusion can result from the exploita-
tion of economies of scale and faster upgrading in productivity and skills [e.g.,
Schiff and Wang, 2008]. That is the Southern producers have additional benefits
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via improvements in efficiency and the quality supplied. The South has an ad-
vantage in adopting technologies from the North more efficiently and less costly
because of a variety of technologies in the North that the South can utilize. Fur-
thermore, Krugman et al. [1995] show that the catching-up effect is magnified
when there is an opportunity for vertical specialization and value-chain fragmen-
tation. Similarly, Hallak [2006] and several others suggest that the improvements
in productivity and product quality are possible when the importers’ incomes are
higher. That is, the exported products from the South to the North will be of a
higher quality than the products from the South to the South.
The North-South integration can also have a positive impact on institutional
quality. The North-South FDI flows can improve the institutional quality of the
South as the North requires stricter investment binding agreements. Conditional
requirements such as anti-corruption laws and demands for better rule of law are
channels through which the North-South integration can have a positive effect on
the South’s institutional quality. Similarly, investors from the North can lobby
and put pressure the policy-makers from the South to impose measures to improve
the institutional quality of the South to ensure a sound investment environment
[e.g., Kwok and Tadesse, 2006].3
Negative Effects
Because the levels of human capital and absorptive capacity are insufficient in
most developing countries, Amsden [2001] contends that the benefits of foreign
investments are only marginal. Several other studies are also skeptical of the
effectiveness of North-South FDI. A substantial fraction of investment flows is
low quality: investment is of low quality when the majority of investment flows
3See Demir [2016] for a further review on the topic.
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is related to raw materials and intermediate goods [e.g., Alfaro and Charlton,
2009]. Furthermore, Nunn [2007] shows that countries with an incomplete con-
tract environment are more likely to receive foreign investments of low quality
since they require less relationship-specific capitals. Similarly, Alfaro et al. [2008]
attribute low-income countries’ arm’s-length trade and high-income countries’
relationship-specific activities as the main determinants of quality differentiation
in FDI flows. Countries with good institutional qualities receive more sophis-
ticated and specialized inputs. Better governance is positively correlated with
high quality FDI flows. In the same way, Alfaro and Charlton [2009] show that
a significant share of ownership of firms that control final or penultimate stages
of production is located in northern countries, whereas the production of raw
materials and intermediate goods is situated in southern countries. Often, the
host country’s effort to establish an extra binding agreement by signing bilateral
investment treaties is ineffective because the agreement does not often apply to
low quality FDI inflows.
Burgstaller and Saavedra-Rivano [1984] also emphasize concerns over profit
repatriation or capital flight. Multinationals from the North taking the profits
earned in southern countries back to their home countries, correlated with the
South’s limited ability to levy taxes on capital earnings of foreign investments.
If the frequency and the amount of the capital leaving the host country is high
and large, this type of behavior could have a detrimental consequence on the
host country due to its unstable financial foundation. Consequently, Dutt [1996]
and many others suggest that the North-South relationship can result in un-
even development in the South, favoring only the terms of trade and skill-biased
technological changes in the North.4 A majority of the South’s industry would
4See Darity and Davis [2005] for a further review.
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specialize in primary and labor intensive products, resulting in slow economic
growth. Moreover, a strong dependency on the North’s economy is detrimental
and not sustainable to the economic growth of the South.
The colonial ties between the North and the South, where the structure favors
the activities of the North, prevent a freer and more efficient movements in capital
flows. Due to a systematically higher entry barriers, investors from the South
are restricted with a fruitful investment opportunities. Acemoglu et al. [2001]
suggest that these long-standing colonial ties have a negative and significant
effect on institutional quality of a Northern country. The residual effects of
the Northern colonialism prevents proper institutional developments, democratic
process, and human capital growth. Therefore, the North-South integration needs
a consideration merely more than the volume of the capital flows.
1.1.5 South-South FDI Flows
Positive Effects
Given the grave consequence associated with profit repatriation, Aleksynska and
Havrylchyk [2013] argue that South-South FDI flows may be more appropriate
for creating an economic space in which technological transfers and adoptions
for the host country is more stable. Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc [2008] and Demir
and Hu [2016], for instance, present evidence that multinationals from the less
developed countries have an advantage when investing in other southern markets
because they are already accustomed to poor governance and bad institutions.
Prior experiences with poor economic environments can help them compete and
operate in any adverse environments.
In addition to the benefits from the comparative advantage of the South-
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ern investors, the South-South relationship can increase economic stability, away
from the business cycles of the North [e.g., Darity and Davis, 2005]. Instead,
similarities in domestic demands, preferences, incomes, endowments, cultural
characteristics, and institutional components between two Southern countries
can facilitate income growth and convergence [e.g., Bergstrand and Egger, 2013].
Consequently, these similarities allow for product upgrading and export diver-
sification by serving the markets with a relatively homogeneous preference as
the South’s home [e.g., Amighini and Sanfilippo, 2014]. Moreover, because of
the smaller differences in investment leverages and bargaining power, the South-
South preferential trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties are more
balanced in terms of negotiation power and terms of trade Dahi and Demir [2013].
Negative Effects
Despite numerous benefits of the South-South integration, many have faulted
the increasing South-South FDI flows for undermining the North’s effort to en-
hance investment environments for the South.5 Particularly, the dominant role
that Chinese FDI outflows plays in the rest of the South has been a major con-
cern. Scoones et al. [2016], for instance show that numerous African countries
have experienced de-industrialization and returned back to commodity focused
economies due to the rise of China. There is also a growing evidence that a few
Emerging South dominates the volume and terms of FDI to the rest of the South,
jeopardizing investment stability and economic growth of the host countries [e.g.,
Ros, 2013]. Furthermore, some of the Chinese investments in Africa resemble a
neo-colonial behavior of resource extraction and exploitation [e.g., Jauch, 2011].
The most critical implication of the South-South relationship is the limitation
5For a detailed discussion, see Demir [2016].
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and ineffectiveness of the South-South FDI flows. The South-South integration
may not result in a fruitful outcome because the volume and quality of FDI flows
of the South are marginal and low. The lack of absorptive capacity and insufficient
adaptive capabilities of the South still applies even if another Southern country
tries to improve technological progress. Demir and Duan [2018], for instance,
find no substantial effect of South FDI flows affecting TFP of other Southern
countries.
The negative effects are often magnified when the South-South FDI flows
contain uneven elements. In particular, the uneven development between the
Emerging South and South create problems for the development in the South.
The most prime example of such a phenomenon is the China-Africa FDI relation-
ship. Labor exploitation and neocolonialism-type practices by Chinese investors
in many African countries is one of main problems that was pointed out for hav-
ing an adverse impact on economic growth [e.g., Jauch, 2011].6 Similarly, Cabral
et al. [2016] show that investors from Brazil, an Emerging South, heavily invest
in Africa but the outcome on growth is minimal because the Brazilian investors
also face the same type of constraint as a typical Northern investors would.7
1.1.6 FDI Flows and Economic Growth
Despite the recent concern over the efficacy of FDI flows, the traditional view
concerning the effects of FDI flows on economic growth has been favorable in
that a large influx of foreign investment can augment private savings and relax
capital constraints of developing countries, resulting in positive growth. Lu-
cas [2000], for instance, argues that investment flows from high-income coun-
6See Dahi and Demir [2016] for a further discussion.
7For further discussion on the China-Africa FDI flows, see Dahi and Demir [2017].
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tries to low-income countries may be favored over investments among low-income
countries since knowledge spillovers and advanced technology transfers from the
high-income countries can act as a catalyst for permanent economic growth in
low-income countries. As an empirical evidence, Borensztein et al. [1998] find
positive growth effects of FDI flows on several developing countries. The most
notable implication is that the levels of human capital and technological diffusion
of host countries are critical factors in enhancing positive growth. In addition,
Li and Liu [2005] confirm Borensztein et al. [1998]’s findings that the benefits of
FDI flows are maximized when the host country’s level of human capital devel-
opment is sufficient enough to absorb foreign investments. Theoretic models of
endogenous growth have motivated empirical studies estimating impacts of FDI
flows on long run economic performances of the host countries. Examining 46 de-
veloping countries from 1970-1985, Balasubramanyam et al. [1996] find that FDI
flows have positive effects on export-oriented countries, and negative impacts on
import-oriented countries.
In most studies, an instrumental variables (IV) approach is used to address
endogeneity between FDI and economic growth. De Mello [1999] applies a dy-
namic GMM approach in a panel setting for a group of OECD members and
non-OECD countries. The regression estimates imply that FDI flows have a pos-
itive effect on increasing GDP per capita growth for OECD nations, whereas FDI
flows have a negative effect on non-OECD countries. Similarly, Nair-Reichert and
Weinhold [2001] use the GMM approach to investigate whether the effects of FDI
flows on economic growth are causal. Due to the inability to fully address the
endogeneity issue, however, no causal relationship is found. Carkovic and Levine
[2002] compare estimates from OLS and GMM regressions and find no significant
effects of FDI flows on economic growth of the host countries. Carstensen and
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Toubal [2004] examine the bilateral FDI relationship between G7 nations, as well
as among Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Numerous multi-
national enterprises from the G7 nations make a large volume of investments in
foreign markets, while the multinationals from CEECs are on the receiving end
of the investments. FDI flows are found to have partial but positive impacts on
economic growth of CEECs. Moreover, Alfaro et al. [2004] find evidence that
financially stable nations are more likely to benefit from FDI inflows than coun-
tries with unstable financial markets. These findings are seminal by being among
the first in the literature to empirically show that the positive effects of FDI flows
are most prominent in well-developed financial markets.
Regarding heterogeneity in parameters, Dabla-Norris et al. [2010] divide the
sample countries by their income levels and geographical regions. The findings
indicate that there is a strong positive correlation between economic growth and
FDI flows for middle- and low-income countries. Doytch and Uctum [2011] dissect
the aggregate FDI flows into manufacturing and service FDI flows. These esti-
mates imply that the type of FDI flows by each industry exhibits heterogeneity
itself. Manufacturing FDI has positive impacts, whereas service FDI flows have
negative impacts on economic growth. Suleiman et al. [2013] examine countries
in Southern Africa Custom Union (SACU) using dynamic ordinary least squares
and find that there is a positive and statistically significant impact of FDI flows
on economic growth of SACU member nations.
1.1.7 FDI Flows and Income Convergence
Empirical studies examining the relationship between bilateral trade and income
convergence are abundant. There is, however, a dearth of literature studying the
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effects of bilateral FDI flows on business cycle synchronization. The literature
investigating the association between trade and business cycle synchronization is
the closest to our endeavor. Imbs [2004], for instance, shows that intra-industry
trade has a significant impact on business cycle synchronization between two
countries, whereas inter-industry trade has no consistent effects. The patterns
of specialization in trade are the major factor in affecting the relationship since
economies with similar economic structures grow concurrently through the evolv-
ing stages of diversification. Evidence show that bilateral trade and business
cycles are positively correlated but the effects are significantly bigger among in-
dustrial countries than developing countries when using annual observations for
147 countries during 1960-1999.
With the surge of multinationals from high-income countries investing in low-
income countries, and vice versa, a form of bilateral integration may occur be-
tween two countries. Co-movements in output between the North and the South
from the increased volume of bilateral FDI flows may be possible since bilateral
financial integration has an impact on business cycle synchronization. For in-
stance, Imbs [2004] finds that financially integrated regions are more likely to be
synchronized with one another, implying that coordination of international cap-
ital flows is a vital part of business cycle co-movements. Calderon et al. [2007]
also show that patterns in bilateral trade have a substantial impact on respon-
siveness of business cycle synchronization with having heterogeneous impacts on
industrial and developing countries. Similarly, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. [2013] exam-
ine the relationship between international capital flows and output co-movement,
finding heterogeneity. Our paper appends to this strand of the literature to show
the heterogeneous effects of bilateral FDI flows on business cycle synchronization
is a substantial issue.
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Income convergence between North-North is expected because of similarities
in technology process, infrastructure, and demand preferences. Perhaps the same
case could be true for the Emerging South-Emerging South and South-South
pairs where their similarities in managerial skills and technology know-how can
nurture a smoother transition of technology. The potential for productivity gains
are higher for these groups as there is more room for growth with the existing
older and underdeveloped technologies.
The introduction of the Emerging South group complicates the North-South
relationship because it has characteristics of both groups. Emerging Southern
countries are fast approaching the income and development levels of the North
while still copying characteristics of the South on institutional and physical cap-
ital development. Emerging South markets have sufficient absorptive capacity
and infrastructure to host foreign capital from the North. At the same time,
they can also nurture FDI flows from the South because they have a similar de-
mand preferences, as well as cultural and economical characteristics as the South.
1.2 Empirical Analysis
1.2.1 Bilateral FDI Flows and Economic Growth: Speci-
fications
Our first specification involves the association between bilateral FDI flows and
economic growth. We normalize investment flows from country j (source) to
country i (host) by country i’s economic size (GDP). The share of (log) bilateral
FDI flow from country j to country i at time t is denoted by fdiij,t. Our dynamic
panel consists of observations over the period of 1990-2012 with a linear regression
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model as in equation (1.1):
yi,t − yi,t−1 = (φ− 1)yi,t−1 + β ′Xi,t + ηi + i,t (1.1)
, where yi,t is the log of real GDP per capita of country i at time t; yi,t−1 is
the lag of yi,t; Xi,t is the vector of explanatory variables, including FDI flows; ηi
is the unobservable individual country-specific effect; and i,t is the error term.
Equation (1.1) can be rewritten as:
yi,t = φyi,t−1 + β
′
Xi,t + ηi + i,t (1.2)
To eliminate the country-specific effects, we take the first-difference of equation
(1.2):
yi,t − yi,t−1 = φ(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + β ′(Xi,t −Xi,t−1) + i,t − i,t−1 (1.3)
Since the new error term, i,t − i,t−1, is correlated with the lagged dependent
variable, we apply a dynamic panel approach to address the issue of serial cor-
relations [e.g., Blundell and Bond, 2000]. We include the year fixed effect, δt, to
account for international political and economic shocks that have a ubiquitous
effect on all economies but is independent of the evolution of FDI flows and the
country-pair fixed effect, δij, to address the various unobservable factors that are
unique to each country pair such that:
∆yi,t = φ∆yi,t−1 + β
′
∆Xi,t + δt + δij + ∆i,t (1.4)
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, where ∆yi,t and ∆yi,t−1 are the current and lagged growth rate of GDP per
capita.
We allow one or more lagged values of real GDP per capita and bilateral FDI
flows. This is similar to using an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model to
address the possibility of bilateral FDI flows affecting the real GDP per capita
growth over time because the capital flows may not have an immediate impact
on economic growth. A generalized version of the autoregressive moving-average
(ARMA) process of an ADL(p, q) model can be derived from equation (1.2) by
adding a lag length p for yi and a lag length q for fdiij,t with a non-stationary
process, δi,t. Then
yi,t = φ1yi,t−1 +φ2yi,t−2 + · · ·+φpyi,t−p + θ0fdiij,t + θ1fdiij,t−1 + · · ·+ θqfdiij,t−q +
ηi + δi,t + i,t
(1.5)
The non-stationary process determines the long-run growth rate of real GDP per
capita which combines the business cycle fluctuation and the general equilibrium
of long-run growth paths of a transitional growth model such that
δi,t = α + βfdiij,t + γi + εt + νi,t (1.6)
, where γi accounts for the time-invariant country-specific heterogeneity in the
growth rate; εt allows for time-varying global shocks; and νi,t refers to country-
specific time-varying common shocks. When β > 0, there exists a long-run
relationship between bilateral FDI flows and income growth. Combining the
non-stationary process in equation (1.6) with the first-difference ADL model in
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equation (1.5),
∆yi,t = α + βfdiij,t + φ1∆yi,t−1 + φ2∆yi,t−2 + · · · + φp∆yi,t−p + θ0∆fdiij,t +
θ1∆fdiij,t−1 + · · ·+ θq∆fdiij,t−q + γi + εt + νi,t + ∆i,t
(1.7)
Given some level of ∆δi,t, we can compute the cumulative level effect as β/(1−
φ1 − φ2 − · · · − φp) and the cumulative growth effect as (θ0 + θ1 + · · ·+ θq)/(1−
φ1 − φ2 − · · · − φp). The level effect is the initial impact of bilateral FDI inflows
on the cumulative GDP growth rate. The growth effect is the cumulative effect
of FDI growth on the cumulative GDP growth rate. Furthermore, we can test
the significance of the long-run relationship between FDI and GDP growth in the
following way: the null hypothesis assumes that there is no long-run relationship
between economic growth and bilateral FDI flows. The p-values of the hypothesis
test present the statistical significance of the long-run association.
Based on equation (1.7), we can determine our short-run and long-run baseline
specifications. The short-run baseline specification is one-time effect of bilateral
FDI flows on economic growth, ∆yi,t = α + φ1∆yi,t−1 + βfdiij,t + θ1∆fdiij,t +
γi + εt + νi,t + ∆i,t. The long-run baseline specification pertains to multi-period
effect of FDI flows. We choose the lag length of three because any lags longer
than three is not jointly significant. Specifically, ∆yi,t = α+βfdiij,t+φ1∆yi,t−1+
θ0∆fdiij,t + θ1∆fdiij,t−1 + θ2∆fdiij,t−2 + θ3∆fdiij,t−3 + γi + εt + νi,t + ∆i,t is our
long-run specification. Due to concerns of simultaneity bias, we also use a lagged
values of bilateral FDI flows in each of the short-run and long-run specifications.
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1.2.2 Bilateral FDI Flows and Business Cycle Synchro-
nization: Specifications
The dependent variable in the growth equation is GDP per capita growth rate.
The main explanatory variable is the (log) level of bilateral FDI flows normalized
by nominal GDP of host economies in current US dollars. The one-directional
analysis may not be adequate to capture the efficacy of bilateral flows since the
participation and the volume of FDI flows are also determined by the economic
and political characteristics of the source countries. Consequently, we turn our
attention to the income convergence literature as in Barro and Sala-i Martin
[1992], Ben-David [1993], Sala-i Martin [1996], and Rey and Montouri [1999].
The theory predicts that the increased foreign capital transactions and trade
volumes may lead to output co-movement among open economies. We consider
the following specification for estimating the impact of bilateral FDI flows on
business cycle synchronization:
Convergenceij,t = αt + αij + β0Convergenceij,t−1 + β1ln((FDIij + FDIji)/(Yi +
Yj))t−1 +X
′
ij,t−1Ψ + ij,t
(1.8)
, where Convergenceij,t is the income convergence rate between investment part-
ner countries i and j at time t; αt is the year fixed effect; αij is the country-pair
fixed effect; ln((FDIij + FDIji)/(Yi + Yj))t−1 is the (log) sum of bilateral FDI
flows as a share of sum of each country’s economic size at time t − 1; X ′ij,t−1
is the set of variables that may affect the synchronization process (e.g., govern-
ment spending as a share of GDP, inflation, productivity, and interest rate); and
ij,t is the bilateral error term. The dependent variable, Convergenceij,t, is con-
structed in the following way: the absolute value of the difference of GDP per
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capita growth between two countries is the income divergence rate. Multiplying
the income divergence rate by negative one gives us the absolute income conver-
gence rate. That is, Convergenceij,t = −|(yi,t − yi,t−1) − (yj,t − yj,t−1)|, where
(yi,t − yi,t−1) and (yj,t − yj,t−1) are the GDP per capita growth rate of country i
and j at time t.
It is important to note the expected signs of β1 and β2 in equation (1.8) in
relation to the dependent variable. If β1, β2 > 0, then a rise in bilateral FDI
and trade flows increases income convergence between two countries. Although
we expect that β2 > 0 [e.g., Imbs, 2004], the sign of β1 is the coefficient of
interest. The explanatory variables are constructed in the manner where the
vector of X
′
ij,t−1 is the absolute difference of each explanatory variable. For
instance, |Inflationi− Inflationj|t−1 measures the absolute inflation divergence
rate between two countries, and therefore a negative coefficient implies that a
lower divergence in inflation rate may lead to more similarity in incomes between
two countries.
Furthermore, we adopt the ADL model proposed in equation (1.7) to the anal-
ysis of the association between bilateral FDI and business cycle synchronization
to examine the cumulative effect of β1. Accordingly,
Convergenceij,t = α+β1ln((FDIij+FDIji)/(Yi+Yj))t−1+φ1Convergenceij,t−1+
· · · + φpConvergenceij,t−p + φ0∆ln((FDIij + FDIji)/(Yi + Yj))t + · · · +
φq∆ln((FDIij + FDIji)/(Yi + Yj))t−q + γij + εt + νij,t + ∆ij,t
(1.9)
, where γij accounts for time-invariant country-pair-specific heterogeneity in in-
come convergence and νij,t is the country-pair-specific time-varying common shocks.
Based on equation (1.9), we derive the baseline specification for the long-run
association between bilateral FDI flows and income convergence as the following:
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Convergenceij,t = α+β1ln((FDIij+FDIji)/(Yi+Yj))t−1+φ1Convergenceij,t−1+
· · ·+φpConvergenceij,t−p+φ0∆ln((FDIij+FDIji)/(Yi+Yj))t+· · ·+φq∆ln((FDIij+
FDIji)/(Yi + Yj))t−q + γij + εt + νij,t + ∆ij,t
1.2.3 Data
We use a unique data on non-resident bilateral FDI flows, compiled from UNC-
TAD, OECD, and statistical offices of individual countries over the period of
1990-2012. Approximately 18,000 country pairs are available for analysis among
240 host and home countries. Merging observations from the UNCTAD and
OECD data sources can be cumbersome since each country has different miss-
ing values over the sample period. We take the following steps to mitigate the
inconsistency in the data when merging observations. First, we give priority to
OECD data over UNCTAD data since OECD often has more complete and re-
liable observations on FDI flows. Similarly, if the host country is non-OECD
but the home country is OECD then we use the home country data. Second,
we give priority to the host country’s data over home country’s data when there
is an inconsistency between bilateral FDI inflows and outflows. For instance, if
the United States reports an inflow of $US 28.14 billion from United Kingdom in
2004, but United Kingdom reports an outflow of $US 10.49 billion to the United
States in 2004, then, we use the United States’ reported inflow value. Third, we
mirror the home country’s data for the full period if the host country’s inflow
data has missing observations but the home country’s outflow data is available
for a longer time period.
Real GDP per capita is measured in constant-price international dollars in
2005 and obtained from World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI,
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2015). Human capital, which measures the average years in schooling for each
country, and total factor productivity (TFP), which measures the productivity
levels of each country relative to the U.S. productivity (i.e., USA = 1) are re-
trieved from PWT 8.1. Inflation rate is calculated as the log difference of the
consumer price index and obtained from IMF’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS, 2015). Total government expenditure and total investment rate are normal-
ized as a share of GDP. Trade openness is calculated as the sum of exports and
imports as a share of GDP. Total government expenditure, total investment rate,
and trade openness are retrieved from Penn World Table (PWT) 8.1 and WDI
(2015). Moreover, we obtain bilateral trade volumes from Feenstra et al. [2005]
and its updated version from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) to
range the observation periods from 1990-2012. Geographic information and grav-
ity model variables, such as distance between two countries, common languages,
and colonial ties are retrieved from CEPII’s database. These are relevant control
variables when examining income convergence between two partnering countries.
Geographical distance heavily affects trade volumes while cultural ties may af-
fect foreign investment decisions. Substantial trade volumes between European
countries [e.g., Imbs, 2004] and the importance of migrant networks on FDI flows
[e.g., Javorcik et al., 2011] are apparent reasons why we may need geographic
variables when investigating the convergence story.
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics of relevant variables. For our bench-
mark specification and for the values shown here, we exclude the top and bottom
one percentile of observations of bilateral FDI share. The average (both mean
and median) economic growth is around 2.1%. For examining the relationship
between bilateral FDI flows and economic growth of country i (i.e., the host coun-
try), we use the (log) FDI flows from country j to country i as a share of country
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i’s GDP, denoted by fdiij,t. Due to extreme outliers, we remove the bottom 1
th
and top 99th of our raw data. Some FDI flows are negative if the net FDI outflow
exceeds the net inflow. To account for negative values, we add an intercept (i.e.,
a positive integer of 1) to all observations such that all values are positive.8 The
mean of fdiij,t is 0.035 with the standard deviation of 0.159, which indicates that
there is a high variation in the cross-country observations. The growth rate of
bilateral FDI flows is computed as the difference of fdiij,t, which is simply the
log differenced growth rate. The average growth rate of the bilateral FDI flows,
∆fdiij,t, is around 0.1% with the standard deviation of 0.066.
For investigating the association between bilateral FDI flows and income con-
vergence between two countries, we use (log) FDI flows from country j to country
i plus FDI flows from country i to country j as a share of both country i and
j’s economic sizes. Thus, ln((FDIij + FDIji)/(Yi + Yj))t denotes the bilateral
FDI flows for the income convergence regression. The average value of the bi-
lateral FDI flows for income convergence is 1.4% with the standard deviation of
0.114. Since the share variable is natural logs, we can obtain the growth rate
of bilateral FDI flows, ∆ln((FDIij + FDIji)/(Yi + Yj))t, as the difference of
ln((FDIij +FDIji)/(Yi+Yj))t. The average value of the growth rate of bilateral
FDI flows is .2% with the standard deviation of 0.113.
1.2.4 Trends in Bilateral FDI Flows
Our main data source for bilateral FDI flows is UNCTAD and OECD which re-
quires a secondary examination. Garrett [2016] presents evidence that using the
missing, zero, and positive FDI observations in bilateral FDI data can lead to
8This is a common practice in the literature. For instance, Borensztein et al. [1998] add the
intercept to the black market premium values when examining the association between FDI
flows and economic growth.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Obs Mean S.D. Min Max P25 P50 P75
∆yi,t 108,771 .021 .035 -.093 .121 .003 .021 .042
Convergenceij,t 101,563 -.039 .043 -1.194 -1.00e-06 -.053 -.029 -.013
fdiij,t 108,771 .035 .159 -.329 2.882 0 0 .003
∆fdiij,t 108,771 .001 .066 -.418 .432 -4.77e-07 0 0.00002
ln((FDIij + FDIji)/(Yi + Yj))t 58,916 .014 .114 -3.125 14.307 0 0 .002
∆ln((FDIij + FDIji)/(Yi + Yj))t 56,023 .002 .113 -3.275 14.046 -.0001 0 .0003
ln(
∑12
k=1 ICRG
k
i,t) 85,593 4.269 .197 3.45 4.533 4.136 4.299 4.445
ln(GovExpi,t/GDPi,t) 101,512 2.796 .332 .716 4.242 2.55 2.888 3.025
ln(Tradei,t/GDPi,t) 102,254 -.369 1.193 -7.548 5.623 -.625 -.295 .091
ln(Inflationi,t) 97,662 -.014 .807 -5.384 6.971 -.333 .012 .378
ln(Crediti/GDPi) 95,399 4.044 .901 -.711 5.767 3.414 4.256 4.715
HumanCapitali,t 86,955 1.013 .195 .121 1.286 .939 1.062 1.153
|TFPi,t − TFPj,t| 53,917 .34 .25 0 2.514 .134 .301 .502
|Inflationi,t − Inflationj,t| 76,752 .699 .737 0 7.262 .214 .48 .913
|Interesti,t − Interestj,t| 52,363 .789 .641 0 6.113 .312 .651 1.103
|GovExpi,t −GovExpj,t| 84,606 .394 .319 0 2.509 .142 .321 .577
Notes: The sample is based on the period 1990-2012. ∆yi,t refers to economic growth of
country i ; Convergenceij,t refers to the absolute income convergence between countries i
and j ; fdiij,t is the log share of bilateral FDI flows normalized by the host economy; and
∆fdiij,t is difference of fdiij,t. ln(
∑12
k=1 ICRG
k
i,t) refers to the log sum of all twelve of
ICRG index; ln(GovExpi,t/GDPi,t) is the log of government expenditure as a share of GDP;
ln(Tradei,t/GDPi,t) is the log of openness to trade; ln(Inflationi,t) is the log of inflation;
ln(Crediti/GDPi) is the log of domestic credit available in country i as a share of GDP; and
HumanCapitali,t is the human capital index measuring education levels. |TFPi,t − TFPj,t| is
the absolute difference between two country’s TFP levels; |Inflationi,t − Inflationj,t| is the
absolute difference between two country’s inflation rate; |Interesti,t − Interestj,t| is the abso-
lute difference between two country’s interest rate; and |GovExpi,t−GovExpj,t| is the absolute
difference between the two country’s government expenditures as a share of each respective
country’s GDP. P25 refers to the first quartile of the distribution; P50 is the median; and P75
is the third quartile.
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biased estimates if the sample selection problem is not addressed. As of 2012,
we find that over 60% of the country-pairs still have not established a foreign
investment partnership. As a further analysis, we provide a trend in the bilat-
eral FDI relationship in Table 1.2, categorizing the investment volume into four
different types: missing, zero (i.e., presumably recorded but the value is zero),
negative (i.e., the total volume of outflows exceeds the total volume of inflows),
and positive FDI flows. While we separated the missing and zero observations,
the zero observations are technically missing, meaning there are no FDI flows.
The investment balance of zero is very rare for any given country-pair.
Of the 379,186 observations possible for all country pairs between 1990 and
2012, 63.13% are missing and 18.36% are zero observations. Thus roughly 81.49%
of the total observations are either unobservable or non-existent. Despite the re-
cent evidence that the total volume of bilateral FDI flows has increased over the
years, Table 1.2 shows that the number of new country-pairs has not necessary
increased by the same magnitude. Only a few selective country pairs account
for the total global financial activities. Of the non-missing and non-zero obser-
vations, approximately one-fourth of them are negative and three-fourth of them
are positive, implying a majority of the realized bilateral FDI flows are greater
than zero. We also analyze the trend in bilateral FDI flows by income group,
the North and the South. Whether the host is the North or the South, more
than 60% of the total possible observations are missing and approximately 20%
of them are zero observations. One notable difference between the North and the
South, however, is that the ratio of positive to negative bilateral FDI flows of the
South (host) is higher than that of the North (host).
When we examine the bilateral FDI flows between the North (i.e., North-
North), there is a stark difference in the percentage of missing and zero obser-
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vations. Only 26.01% and 3.95% of all possible North-North pairs are either
missing or zero observations, which is significantly lower than any other income
groups. Most of the realized FDI flows within the North is attributed to a posi-
tive direction (i.e., inflows exceed outflows, both by non-residents), a trend that
is consistent with the increased North-North financial transaction volume. On
the other hand, when we examine the North-South or the South-North group, the
missing and zero observations ratios are analogous to the ratios in all countries.
The trend in the South-South flows is worth mentioning as the ratio of positive
to negative FDI flows is almost one. This implies an investment imbalance in
global financial transactions as most capital is flowing into developing countries
with less outflows.
1.2.5 Addressing Sample Selection Bias
As evident from Table 1.2, the decision regarding the participation and the vol-
ume of bilateral FDI flows are not randomly determined. Eicher et al. [2012]
also find that bilateral FDI data suffers from sample selection bias. Given strong
evidence for a systematic pattern of FDI flows, we apply the Heckman [1979]
two-step sample selection approach to address the possibility of sample selection
bias in the following ways:
1. First stage: estimate a probit model to obtain the probability of participa-
tion in bilateral FDI relations.
Step 1. We generate an indicator variable, Iij, for observing non-zero and non-
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missing bilateral FDI flows from country j to country i:
Iij =

1, if FDIij > 0 or FDIij < 0
0, otherwise
where FDIij is the latent variable of bilateral FDI flows.
Step 2. Estimate a probit model for the indicator variable, Iij. In our probit
model, we include exogenous variables that may affect selection. The
exogenous determinants of bilateral FDI flows include the economic
size of both host and source countries, geographic contiguity, common
language, and colonial ties.
Step 3. Generate an inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) from the previous step. The
IMR is the fraction of the probability density function over cumulative
density function.
2. Second stage: IV regression
Step 1. Include the generated IMR in the regression equation. The gener-
ated IMR can be one of the instrumental variables for the endogenous
growth regression.
Step 2. Estimate the two-stage IV regression. The sample selection bias ad-
justed and endogeneity bias addressed estimates are obtained in the
final step.
1.2.6 Addressing Endogeneity
The use of an instrumental variables approach is indispensable since the endoge-
nous relationship between bilateral FDI flows and economic growth is inevitable.
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Reverse causality presents a significant challenge when estimating the effects of
FDI flows on economic growth. Countries with a higher rate of output growth
may receive more FDI flows than slow growing economies. It is unclear, therefore,
if FDI flows promote growth or fast-growing countries are more likely to receive
FDI flows. The reverse causality issue is also apparent for the association between
bilateral FDI flows and business cycle synchronization: it is highly possible that
the multinationals may decide to invest in countries with similar income levels
and similar development conditions as their home countries. In this case, the
direction of the impact is confounding, making it difficult to isolate the actual
impacts of bilateral FDI flows on business cycle synchronization.
To address reverse causality, we use a set of instrumental variables in both
the growth and convergence regressions. The validity of the instrument set can
be assessed with the exogeneity condition and the relevancy condition. We check
the exogeneity condition using an over-identification restrictions test of Sargan-
Hansen (SH) and the relevancy condition with an under-identification test of
Kleibergen-Paap (KP). The null hypothesis of SH test is that the instrument set
as a group is exogenous, where the orthogonality test checks whether the instru-
ment set is correlated with the endogenous variable. Hence, an instrument set is
said to be valid when we fail to reject the null. Similarly, the null hypothesis of
KP test is that the instrument set is not correlated with the endogenous variable,
where the KP statistics determine the under-identification of the instrument set
as a whole when more than one regressor is endogenous.
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1.2.7 Addressing Cross-Sectional Dependency
Foreign direct investment and the real GDP per capita are known to have a unit
root problem. When investigating the long-run relationship between bilateral FDI
flows and economic growth, addressing the unit root issue and the co-integration
issue is crucial since the estimates are inconsistent when a non-stationary time
series variables are used in the regression model. To test for a unit root, we first
compute the sample mean for each year such that y¯1 = (1/N)Σ
N
i=1yi1 for the
log of real GDP per capita and ¯FDI1 = (1/N)Σ
N
i=1FDIi1 for FDI flows.
9 We
subtract these sample mean values for each year from the original observations
to eliminate the common trend. The purpose of the subtraction is to reduce the
possibility of cross-sectional dependency when examining time-series properties.
After testing each of the individual sample countries for both the level and
the first-difference of real GDP per capita and bilateral FDI flows using the aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test, we determine that both variables are an integrated
order of one. Moreover, we test each variable separately with a trend option to
account for an upward time trend in the observations, but the fact that FDI flows
and real GDP per capita are I (1) does not change. Since the main explanatory
variable and the dependent variable are both I (1), we also test whether there
is a co-integrating relationship between the two. Using heterogeneous panel co-
integration tests (e.g., Im-Pesaran-Shin test), we find no co-integrating relation-
ship between FDI flows and real GDP per capita.10
9We aggregate the FDI flows by each country such that FDIit = Σ
n
ij=1FDIij .
10The findings are robust to the number of lag lengths up to 8.
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1.2.8 North-Emerging South-South Framework
The changes in the origin and destination of foreign capitals can complicate the
FDI and business cycle synchronization relationship because bilateral FDI flows
between northern and southern countries lead to mixed results in output co-
movements. Due to a dissimilarity in patterns of specialization, FDI flows from
the North to South may not have any effects on output co-movement. A negative
correlation between FDI flows and business cycle synchronization is possible if
a significant share of FDI flows from the North to South consists of agricultural
sector investments while the economies of the North focus mainly on manufac-
turing and financial sector. On the other hand, bilateral FDI flows can lead to
synchronization in business cycle if the South catches up to the technology level
of the North given it has sufficient absorptive capacity. FDI flows from southern
countries to northern countries may have an insignificant impact since the volume
of FDI flows is relatively marginal and the quality of FDI flows are often low. Our
predictions are similar to Kalemli-Ozcan et al. [2013], which makes two possible
theoretical predictions when examining the relationship between international
capital flows and output co-movement. First, bilateral financial integration and
business cycle synchronization are positively associated when there are dominant
shocks to the financial sector. Second, the relationships are negatively associated
when there are dominant shocks to the real sector’s productivity and collateral.11
Dividing countries by two income groups, the North and the South, is no
longer sufficient for capturing the heterogeneity in parameters because of the in-
creasing variation between fast-growing and slow-growing developing countries.
11Since the second effect dominates the first effect, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. [2013] find that finan-
cial integration and business cycle synchronization are often negatively correlated, particularly
for the global banking sector.
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Within the South group, treating China, a fast-growing country, and Kenya, a
relatively slow-growing country as the same economy would be invalid. Conse-
quently, we further divide the South into two different income groups—Emerging
Southern and non-Emerging Southern countries. In all, our analysis focuses on
the heterogeneity in the coefficients of interest within the North-Emerging South-
South framework. The traditional definition of the North includes high-income
OECD countries, making the rest of the world as the South; however, in our pa-
per, the South group does not include the Emerging Southern countries.12 Table
1.3 lists the countries by their income groups.
In Table 1.4, we analyze the mean and standard deviation of (log) GDP per
capita and (log) FDI flows (not normalized by the economic size) from 1990-
2012 to emphasize the importance of dividing the South into Emerging South
and non-Emerging South. For the full sample, the mean and standard deviation
of (log) GDP per capita are 9.153 and 1.467, respectively. The mean value for
the North (i.e., 10.477) is much higher than the full sample average, whereas
the North’s standard deviation of 0.322 is substantially lower than that of the
full sample. The implication is that the sample countries in the North are of
similar income characteristics and comprise a relatively homogeneous group. On
the other hand, the traditional South (i.e., Emerging South and non-Emerging
South) has a standard deviation of 1.318, which is more than four times larger
than the standard deviation of the North. Considering the lower value of average
(log) GDP per capita of the South, the South’s coefficient of variation (CV)
of 15.7% (i.e., 1.318/8.388) is much larger than the North’s CV of 3% (i.e.,
12The list of countries can be robust in that an inclusion or exclusion of certain countries
does not significantly change the overall outcome. However, there is a core group of countries
that must be included in the Emerging Southern country group, namely China due to their
fast-growing economies.
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0.322/10.477), implying a greater variability in parameters within the South.
Due to a substantial difference in income levels among the South, therefore,
obtaining a single coefficient is inadequate for any sub-sample analysis. When
we decompose the traditional South into Emerging South and non-Emerging, the
composition of the Emerging South group is relatively more homogeneous than
the non-Emerging South as the CV of Emerging South is 10% (i.e., 0.891/8.9) and
19.2% (i.e., 1.532/7.974) for the South. The high variation within the ES group
is largely due to a high variation in the South group as the standard deviation
for the Emerging South group decreases to 0.891 while the standard deviation of
the non-Emerging South increases to 1.532.
After dividing the full sample by income levels, we can analyze the three-by-
three multi-directional FDI flows of the North, Emerging South, and the South.
For instance, North-North refers to the FDI flowing from a northern country
to another northern country. Emerging-North refers to the FDI flowing from
an Emerging Southern country to a northern country. South-North refers to a
southern country investing in a northern country. As expected, North-North has
the highest mean value of the nominal (log) level of FDI of 4.872 compared to any
other investment directions, suggesting that the foreign investment between high-
income countries has the highest intensive margin. The most extensive margin
of the bilateral FDI flows, on the other hand, exists between North-Emerging
with 7,695 observations. North-South has an average (log) FDI of 2.285 and
a standard deviation of 2.158. This implies that the South receives the lowest
amount of FDI from an average northern investor and this trend is quite normal
among the North-South pair.
The average volume of intra-regional FDI flows is the highest for the North and
the South as North-North and South-South have the highest average log (FDI)
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value out of all investment from each region. However, the average log (FDI)
of Emerging-Emerging is not the highest for all investment originating from the
Emerging South. Rather, Emerging-North has the highest intensive margin of
2.311, meaning investors from the Emerging Southern countries mainly allocate
a relatively larger share of capital into high-income countries on average. How-
ever, this does not imply that these investors are risk-averse as the volume of
Emerging-South is higher than the volume of Emerging-Emerging. The over-
all implication is that the investors from the Emerging Southern countries are
aggressively searching for lucrative investment opportunities regardless of the in-
come levels of the host countries. This emphasizes the vitality of decomposing
the traditional definition of the South into Emerging South and non-Emerging
Southern countries.
Table 1.5 reports the sub-sample summary statistics for the main variables
used in the baseline regression. North-North has the highest average volume
of fdiij,t out of all country pairs. On the other hand, North-Emerging has the
highest average growth rate of bilateral FDI share, ∆fdiij,t among all country
pairs. This implies that while the volume of FDI flows between two northern
countries is often large, more northern investors are depositing foreign capital in
Emerging Southern markets at a faster rate.
Comparing the investment destinations from the North, the average value of
fdiij,t of North-Emerging is higher than that of North-South. This implies that
the Emerging South receives a higher volume of FDI flows from northern investors
on average. The growth rate of GDP per capita is also higher for the Emerging
Southern country than the non-Emerging South, meaning that the Emerging
economy is growing at a faster rate.
For the investment from the Emerging South (i.e., Emerging-North, Emerging-
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Emerging, and Emerging-South), the Emerging-South pair has the highest aver-
age volume of FDI share. This trend is different than the Northern home country
where the North-North flows were the highest. For the Emerging South, the
Emerging-Emerging flows are not as prevalent as the Emerging-South flows. The
implication is that the investors from the Emerging Southern markets may seek
a higher investment return from the less developed South, away from the already
capital saturated North.
For the investors from the South, the South-South FDI flows dominate their
global capital transactions. Their average of 4% is much higher than the average
values of the South-North and South-Emerging flows. The South-South sample
has the highest rate of economic growth as well compared to the South-North
and South-Emerging groups. The evidence suggest that there may be a positive
association between the South-South FDI flows and economic growth.
1.3 Empirical Results
1.3.1 Bilateral FDI and Economic Growth: Long-run As-
sociation
In Table 1.6 we analyze the relationship between FDI flows and economic growth
for the full sample using the empirical specification from equation (1.7), correcting
for cross-sectional dependency and endogeneity by using demeaned variables (i.e.,
demeaned by aggregate mean values) and the 2SLS IV approach.13 The regres-
sion results are from the annual observations between 1990-2012. The endogenous
variables are ∆yi,t−1 and fdiij,t or fdiij,t−1, as well as ∆fdiij,t. The correspond-
13Throughout our regression analysis, we use the code ivreg2 in Stata 14.
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ing instrument set includes ∆yi,t−3, fdiij,t−2, ∆log((Exportij + Exportji)/(Yi +
Yj))t−2, and IMR, where using lagged variables of the endogenous variables as
an instrument is a standard practice, the inclusion of outside instrument needs
more justification. Adding IMR to the instrument set is justifiable as IMR is the
inverse Mill’s ratio generated from the sample selection model, making it relevant
to the endogenous variables but not directly affecting the dependent variable.14
∆log((Exportij + Exportji)/(Yi + Yj))t−2 is the growth rate of bilateral trade
flow between two countries at time t− 2, where the bilateral trade relationship is
relevant to the endogenous variables but the lag 2 of bilateral trade growth does
not directly affect the current level of economic growth. In addition to intuitively
making sensing, the instrument set passes the validity tests of over- and under-
identification. The p-values of SH and KP tests are reported at the bottom of
each column. We fail to reject the null of SH test and we reject the null of KP
test, both tests indicate validity of the instrument set. Moreover, whereas we
include both year and host country fixed effect in all specifications, we explore
various number of lag lengths and the inclusion of both host and home country
fixed effects to test for robustness.
The first two columns show the 2SLS IV estimates from the short-run speci-
fication of one lag length of each the level and growth rate of bilateral FDI flows.
Column (2) which has the lagged values is the baseline regression specification
for the short-run. The coefficient of fdiij,t is positive and statistically significant.
The interpretation is that a one percent increase in bilateral FDI share increases
the growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.01 percent. Quantitatively, if we change
bilateral FDI share by 100 percent, we would expect economic growth to change
14We run a probit model for observing non-zero (i.e., positive and negative) and non-missing
observations between country-pairs on different combinations of exogenous variables that are
determinants of bilateral FDI flows.
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by 1 percent. The growth rate of bilateral FDI share also has a positive effect
on economic growth with the coefficient of 0.016. Quantitatively, a 100 percent
increase in the growth rate of bilateral FDI share would lead to an increase of
1.6 percentage points in economic growth.
The findings from columns (1) and (2) show the short-run effect. The find-
ings in columns (3)-(6) are new and alternative ways to examine the long-run
relationship between bilateral FDI flows and income growth. The difference be-
tween columns (3) and (4) versus columns (5) and (6) is that the latter include
home fixed effects while the former does not. We find that including both the
host country and source country fixed effects is crucial for capturing the bilateral
relationship: the explanatory variables in columns (3) and (4) are statistically
insignificant for longer lags, whereas the ones in columns (5) and (6) are statis-
tically significant. This difference implies that the unobservable factors that are
unique to home countries are important in determining the efficacy of bilateral
FDI flows on growth. Thus our finding supports the argument that the source
country’s motivation and other relevant unobserved variables play a role in the
bilateral growth relationship.
The results from the baseline long-run specification are reported in column
(6). The initial (lag) impact of the share of FDI flows (i.e., fdiij,t−1) is positive
with the coefficient of 0.015. The magnitude of the level effect is higher than the
short-run specification result in column (2). The cumulative level effect value is
calculated as 0.015/(1− 0.092) = 0.016, which is also higher than the cumulative
level effect in column (2).15 To statistically examine the validity of the long-run
relationship, we present a p-value for the null hypothesis that assumes no long-
15Refer to the last paragraph in Section 1.2.1 for how to calculate the cumulative long-run
effects.
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run relationship between bilateral FDI flows and economic growth. In rejecting
the null, we find a strong evidence of a long-run association between the share of
FDI flows and economic growth.
Moreover, we analyze the long-run relationship between the growth rate of
FDI flows and economic growth. The intuition is that a continuous and steady
foreign investment relationship is as vital for sustainability of economic growth
as an initial increase in the share of FDI flows. That is, positive growth in
FDI flows over the years can be a good indicator of the durability of the long-
run relationship. Continuing with the working example in column (6), we find
estimates of four different lags of FDI growth from time t to t−3.16 Individually,
each coefficient has a positive and statistically significant impact on economic
growth, with values ranging from 0.005 to 0.123. To aggregate the growth effect
over the multiple periods, we obtain a cumulative growth effect as (0.123+0.03+
0.013 + 0.005)/(1− 0.092) = 0.189. We reject the null hypothesis of no long-run
relationships. When combined, the effect of FDI flows on economic growth is
substantial and economically significant in the long run.
Using the long-run baseline specification of column (6) in Table 1.6, we in-
dependently include one period lagged values of government spending as a share
of GDP, trade openness (i.e., exports and imports as a share of GDP), inflation,
domestic debt as a share of GDP), human capital, and total factor productivity,
as well as their lagged growth rate. This robustness test determines whether our
empirical specification is sensitive to additional explanatory variables. Zi,t−1 is
the level of each additional variable and ∆Zi,t−1 is the first differenced values.
Table 1.7 reports the robustness analysis results. All of year, host, and source
16We choose p = 1 and q = 3 for the ADL model since any higher lag lengths are jointly
insignificant.
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fixed effects are included in each specification. Focusing on the sensitivity of the
cumulative long-run effects, we find that the main result of positive and statisti-
cally and economically significant impacts of FDI flows on growth is robust to the
inclusion of additional control variables. High inflation and domestic debt have
a negative and significant impact on growth, whereas more trade openness and
better human capital have a positive effect. The long-run level effects range from
0.012 to 0.017 and the long-run growth effects range between 0.139 and 0.201,
with the highest effects observed in a regime with high openness to trade.17
We also examine whether our main results are sensitive to the inclusion of the
host country’s political and economic environment. Multinational investors assess
risk in foreign countries to determine the intensiveness and extensiveness of FDI
volumes based on the host country’s level of political development. Consequently,
we adopt the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) political risk index to
measure the efficacy of FDI flows as a growth enhancing variable in the presence of
various political and economic factors. ICRG reports twelve measures associated
with investment risk. Scores range from 0 to 6 or 0 to 12, where a more politically
stable country has a higher score.18 It follows that a higher ICRG index value of
the host country means that the country has a relatively more stable environment
for investment.
Table 1.9 reports results from the 2SLS IV estimates, using the same in-
strument set as our long-run baseline specification and including year, host, and
home fixed effects. To assess the impact of a comprehensive investment risk
environment on growth, we calculate the total ICRG index by adding up each
17We also include all of the explanatory variables in one regression. Table 1.8 reports the
results, and the results are consistent with the main findings.
18The ICRG variables are government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile,
internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and
order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality.
39
ICRG index, k, for each host country i at time t as ln(
∑12
k=1 ICRG
k
i,t) and re-
port the estimation result in column (1).19 As expected, political stability and
economic growth are positively associated. Under a politically stable regime, the
cumulative level and growth effects of FDI flows are 0.02 and 0.276, respectively.
Furthermore, we individually introduce eight of the twelve ICRG variables that
are closely related with foreign investment decision into the regression model to
determine whether risk assessments, political environments, and socioeconomic
circumstances have a substantial impact on the relationship between FDI and
growth. The cumulative level effects of FDI flows range between 0.016 and 0.018
and the cumulative growth effects range between 0.187 and 0.213. The highest
values are observed when the investment profile index is included.
Once we find that the long-run relationship between bilateral FDI flows and
economic growth for the full sample is positive and statistically significant and
robust to additional explanatory variables, we can examine the heterogeneity in
parameters by decomposing the sample by the income groups of North, Emerg-
ing South, and South. Following the short-run baseline specification of column
(2) in Table 1.6, we report the sub-sample analysis of three-by-three multilateral
directional FDI flows in Table 1.10. The first three columns consist of country
groups that receive FDI flows from the North. As predicted by the theory and
observed in the literature, FDI flows from the North have a positive and statis-
tically significant impact on growth of another Northern country, whereas the
same flows do not have any impact on growth in the South. On the other hand,
our new finding suggests that FDI flows from the North may have an impact in
enhancing economic growth of Emerging Southern countries as the coefficient of
(∆(fdiij/Yi))t−1 is positive and statistically significant. We further explore this
19Using a lagged value of the total ICRG index generates a similar result.
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relationship in the long-run specification.
When we examine the effect of FDI flows from Emerging Southern countries
to the rest of the world which are reported in columns (4)-(6), we find striking
evidence of a positive association conditional on the direction of flows. Although
weak evidence of positive growth in Emerging-North is not uncommon, the strong
and positive association between FDI flows and growth of Emerging-South and
Emerging-Emerging is a new finding. In particular, FDI flows from the Emerging
South has an initial level effect of 1.5% and the growth effect of 2.1% in enhanc-
ing growth of the South. These effects are approximately twice as high for the
Emerging-Emerging pair where the level effect is 2.9% and the growth effect is
4.6%. The aggregate effects in Emerging-Emerging can be partially explained by
the Linder Hypothesis where countries with similar income levels engage in more
foreign transactions with each other, which in turn results in a higher growth
effect. However, the same parallel explanation does not directly apply to the ef-
fects of FDI flows from the South to the rest of the world as reported in columns
(7)-(9). Both the Emerging South and the South experience positive economic
growth when there is a positive level of FDI flows is present, meaning an initial
injection of foreign capital is enhancing the economic system of both regimes.
Unfortunately, the growth effect is only statistically significant for the recipients
of the Emerging South. One possible explanation for the phenomenon is that
the Emerging South has the necessary absorptive capacity for growth compared
to a poor investment-thriving environment in the South. The South does not
have any noticeable impact in enhancing growth of the North because either the
investment volume is too small or of low quality and their income differences are
too far apart.
Given the evidence of short-run relationship in bilateral FDI flows and eco-
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nomic growth, we further analyze the long-run relationship to determine the
cumulative impact of FDI flows on growth. Using the baseline long-run specifica-
tion of column (6) from Table 1.6, we report the long-run sub-sample estimates in
Table 1.11. Columns (1)-(3) present the estimates of FDI flows from the North to
the rest of the world. The North-North flows has a positive and significant level
effect on economic growth. However, the growth rate of bilateral FDI flows is
insignificant. This implies that while an initial level of capital has a short-run ef-
fect, the cumulative growth effect is marginal. The long-run association between
the level and growth rate of bilateral FDI flows and economic growth are positive
and statistically significant for the North-Emerging pair. The North-South pair
also has a significant level effect, but there is no evidence of capital accumulation
(i.e., insignificant growth effects) between two countries.
When investigating the effects of the Emerging South FDI flows (columns
(4)-(6)), it is also evident that the recipients of the Emerging South is the only
regime that most benefits from the influx of foreign investment. That is, both the
cumulative level and growth effects for the Emerging-Emerging pair are positive
and statistically significant. Other groups, Emerging-North and Emerging-South,
have positive relationships, but their associations are statistically and economi-
cally weak.
The case for FDI flows from the South (columns (7)-(9)) is the same where the
Emerging South has a positive and statistically significant long-run association
with the cumulative level effect of 0.056 and the growth effect of 0.273. Com-
bining the evidence from the North-Emerging South-South framework, it can
be inferred that the positive and significant impacts of FDI flows on economic
growth seen in the full sample are driven by the North-North and mainly by the
positive growth from the Emerging Southern countries regardless of the origin
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of the FDI flows. The Emerging South has the income level that is not so dis-
tinctly apart from either the North or the South while having a sufficient enough
political stability to attract investment from the North and enough absorptive
capacity to nurture investment from the South. Our finding contributes to the
literature by emphasizing the importance of heterogeneity within the South. For
instance, using the same dataset, Demir and Duan [2018] do not find any signifi-
cant relationship between South-South FDI flows and TFP. This is partly due to
not dividing the South into Emerging and non-Emerging.
The following analysis examines the sensitivity of findings from our North-
Emerging South-South framework in Table 1.11. First, we re-estimate the first-
stage of the probit model using different combinations of exogenous variables that
determine the participation and the intensity (in terms of volume) of bilateral
FDI flows. In particular, Table 1.12 reports the estimates when colonial ties
are removed. The estimation result does not change. Second, we eliminate the
outliers and re-estimate the 2SLS IV regression to examine whether the outliers
are driving the results. Thus, we drop the 5th and the 95th percentile observations
of bilateral FDI flows and re-estimate the results. Table 1.13 reports the estimates
and the overall conclusion of our analysis does not change. Third, we use the
two-step system GMM approach to examine whether the results are robust to
different econometric tools. Table 1.14 reports the estimation result from the
GMM estimation.20.
20Furthermore, the robust test results for using the GMM approach in each empirical table
are reported in the following tables
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1.3.2 Bilateral FDI and Business Cycle Synchronization
Because we find evidence that bilateral FDI flows and economic growth have
an economically and statistically significant relationship, we examine whether
the two country-pairs experience business cycle synchronization. The starting
point of our empirical analysis is equation (1.8), where the dependent variable,
Convergenceij,t = −|(yi,t − yi,t−1) − (yj,t − yj,t−1)|, measures the convergence
in income levels of two countries. Since Convergenceij,t−1 and ln((FDIij +
FDIji)/(Yi + Yj))t−1 are endogenously determined, we use the instrument set
of ln((FDIij + FDIji)/(Yi + Yj))t−2, ln((Exportij + Exportji)/(Yi + Yj))t−2,
ln((Exportij + Exportji)/(Yi + Yj))t−3, ln((FDIij + FDIji)/(Yi + Yj))t−3, and
IMR, where IMR is the inverse Mill’s ratio from the first stage and included in
the second stage IV regression to account for sample selection bias. Using the
annual observations between 1990-2012, we report the 2SLS IV results for the
full sample in Table 1.21.
Column (1) shows the estimation results from the short-run specification with
only one lag of the level and growth rate of bilateral FDI share. The coefficients
are both positive and statistically significant, meaning that a high share of bi-
lateral FDI flows between two countries lead to a similarity in income levels.
These effects are quantitatively significant as the cumulative level and growth
effects are 0.284 and 0.783, respectively. That is, the growth effect has a syn-
ergy effect on income convergence as both ln((FDIij +FDIji)/(Yi + Yj))t−1 and
(∆(fdiij +fdiji)/(Yi +Yj))t−1 are positive and statistically significant. We add a
longer lag of ∆ln((FDIij+FDIji)/(Yi+Yj))t to analyze a relatively longer effect,
where column (2) has a lag length up to 2 and column (3) has a lag length up to
3 following equation (1.9). The estimates in column (3) show that the cumulative
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level and growth effects are 0.218 and 0.812, respectively.
It is important to note that a larger difference in interest rate between coun-
tries leads to a higher income convergence. And this effect is shown to be the only
control variable that has a significant impact in income convergence. Columns
(4)-(6) repeat the estimation specifications in columns (1)-(3) except only include
the interest differences as the control variable. This does not mean that other
control variables are insignificant. Rather, it implies that the bilateral FDI share
absorbs the differences in government expenditure, inflation, and total factor pro-
ductivity. The estimates in columns (4)-(6) are similar to the findings in columns
(1)-(3). In all, regardless of the lag lengths and the inclusion of different control
variables, the overall finding is that FDI flows have a positive and significant
long-run effect on the convergence of two countries’ income levels.
Given we have evidence of positive associations between income convergence
and FDI flows for the full sample, we can decompose the effects within the North-
Emerging South-South framework. The sub-sample analysis using the specifica-
tion of column (6) in Table 1.21 is reported in Table 1.22.
North-North experiences income convergence and this association is statisti-
cally and quantitatively significant throughout all lags. A similar trend is ob-
served in North-Emerging where the initial share of bilateral FDI share increases
income convergence between the two income groups. However, the coefficients
of contemporaneous and lagged growth effect are statistically insignificant. Con-
versely, there is some evidence of income convergence between Emerging-North
as a result of a positive growth in bilateral FDI share. Unfortunately, this is
only a weak relationship. These findings imply that the FDI flows from the
North may lead to income convergence with another North or Emerging South-
ern countries. On the other hand, there is no evidence of income convergence for
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all other groups. The reason for such a phenomenon could be that the income
levels among the South are so apart that FDI flows are insufficient for enhancing
income convergence considering the intensity of FDI flows are marginal.
The following analysis examines the sensitivity of findings from our North-
Emerging South-South framework in Table 1.22. First, we re-estimate the first-
stage of the probit model excluding exogenous variables that determine the par-
ticipation and the intensity (in terms of volume) of bilateral FDI flows one at a
time. The exogenous variables that we exclude are common language, contiguity,
and colonial ties. The estimation result does not change. Second, we eliminate the
outliers and re-estimate the 2SLS IV regression to examine whether the outliers
are driving the results. Thus, we drop the 5th and the 95th percentile observations
of bilateral FDI flows and re-estimate the results. The overall conclusion of our
analysis does not change. Third, we use the two-step system GMM approach
to examine whether the results are robust to different econometric tools. The
results do not change.
1.4 Conclusion
The composition of foreign investment has been evolving since the era of capital
liberalization which introduced numerous Emerging Southern countries as both
a key source and recipient of international financial transactions. We propose
a three regime framework in which the North, Emerging South, and South all
engage in multilateral FDI flows in response to an increasing income variations
within developing countries. We find that Emerging Southern countries’ income
growth dominates the positive, statistically, and economically significant effects
of FDI flows on growth for the full sample analysis. Having sufficient political
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stability for luring investments from the North and an adequate absorptive capac-
ity for nurturing investments from the South are critical factors driving income
growth in Emerging Southern countries. Also we contend that the income level
of the Emerging South is not too far apart from the income levels of neither
the North nor the South, enabling a Linder-type trend in international capital
transactions.
Moreover, we suggest a new way of examining the long-run association be-
tween bilateral FDI and economic growth using a unique dataset between 1990-
2012 to better capture the asymmetric dynamics in global economy. We find that
the cumulative growth effect of FDI flows is vital for sustainable income growth,
emphasizing the importance of maintaining a stable financial relationship to avoid
an ephemeral effect. To validate our findings, we address sample selection bias
using a Heckman-style approach, address endogeneity using either a 2SLS IV or
two-step system GMM approach, address non-stationarity using first-differenced
variables, and address cross-sectional dependency using demeaned values.
Perhaps the most important contribution of this paper is investigating the
relationship between business cycle synchronization and bilateral FDI flows. We
offer a novel investigation of this relationship. We find evidence of a positive
association for the full sample. When examining within the North-Emerging
South-South framework, however, we find that the positive effect is mainly origi-
nated from the North & North or Emerging & Emerging pair, whereas the South
& South pair has no significant impact.
Future studies can include dissecting the FDI flow data even further into
sectoral or firm level analysis to capture the specific channels that lead to het-
erogeneous outcomes of economic growth and income convergence in response to
bilateral FDI flows. Moreover, analyzing the relationships between the multi-
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nationals from the Emerging South or Southern countries can help us better
understand the dynamics of bilateral FDI flows and the outcome variables, such
as economic growth. The ways to which technological progress and productiv-
ity gains are retained in an Emerging Southern or Southern country when other
countries invest should provide some guidance on how to improve the absorptive
capacity of some Emerging Southern and Southern countries to maximize the
benefits of bilateral FDI relations.
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Table 1.2: Trend in Bilateral FDI Inflow by Income Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Group Missing Zero Negative Positive
All 63.13% 18.36% 4.47% 14.04%
(N=379,186)
North (host) 60.84% 20.86% 5.59% 12.71%
(N=122,743)
South (host) 64.23% 17.16% 3.94% 14.67%
(N=256,443)
North-North 26.01% 3.95% 17.27% 52.77%
(N=11,650)
North-South 64.49% 13.04% 5.21% 17.26%
(N=111,372)
South-North 64.49% 22.63% 4.37% 8.51%
(N=111,093)
South-South 64.03% 20.32% 2.96% 12.69%
(N=145,071)
Notes: The sample observations are from 1990-2012 using the UNCTAD FDI dataset. All refers
to all country-pairs available in our data. High-income OECD countries are defined as North
and the rest of world is defined as South. The percentage values are the share of missing, zero,
negative, and positive FDI in total observations of FDI flows in each sample. North-South
refers to FDI flows from North to South.
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Table 1.3: Sample Countries
Income Level Country list
North
(N=23)
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
Emerging South
(N=38)
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Re-
public, Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ire-
land, Korea (South), Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federa-
tion, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thai-
land, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam
South
(N=144)
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Anguilla, An-
tigua & Barbuda, Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Botswana, British, Virgin, Is-
lands, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Cayman Islands, Central African Repub-
lic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo,D.R., Cook Islands, Costa
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dji-
bouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, French Poly-
nesia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greenland, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyr-
gyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania,
Macao, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta,
Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Federated States of Mi-
cronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Montserrat, Mozam-
bique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles,
New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Palau, Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Rwanda, Samoa,
San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Ser-
bia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka,
St.Kitts and Nevis, St.Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines, Su-
dan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tan-
zania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turk-
menistan, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab
Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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Table 1.4: North-Emerging South-South Framework
log of (GDP per capita) log (level of FDI)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.
Full 108,771 9.153 1.467 39,992 2.647 2.792
North 39,826 10.477 0.322 13,070 3.149 3.002
Emerging & South (ES) 68,945 8.388 1.318 26,922 2.403 2.65
Emerging 36,849 8.9 0.891 15,960 2.541 2.949
South 34,884 7.974 1.532 11,715 2.141 2.191
North-North 6,968 10.393 0.324 5,081 4.872 2.72
North-Emerging 10,138 8.419 1.03 7,695 3.642 2.417
North-South 19,171 7.81 1.489 6,741 2.285 2.158
Emerging-North 8,136 10.449 0.338 3,842 2.311 2.306
Emerging-Emerging 7,761 8.757 0.942 3,977 1.434 2.791
Emerging-South 11,541 7.91 1.522 3,101 1.702 2.458
South-North 25,267 10.509 0.31 4,479 1.853 2.848
South-Emerging 19,573 9.195 0.643 4,614 1.528 3.203
South-South 5,899 8.609 1.525 2,139 2.067 1.961
Notes: The sample period ranges between 1990-2012. North refers to high-income OECD
countries. Emerging refers to Emerging Southern countries and South refers to non-Emerging
Southern countries. See Table 1.3 for the list of countries for each group. The country group
left of a dash is the home country, while the country group right of a dash is the host country.
For instance, North-South refers to foreign investment from the North to the South.
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics by Income Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Obs Mean S.D. Min Max P25 P50 P75
North-North
∆yi,t 6,968 .012 .023 -.082 .064 .002 .016 .027
Convergenceij,t 6,953 -.017 .016 -.111 -2.86e-06 -.023 -.013 -.006
fdiij,t 6,968 .086 .236 -.329 2.843 0 .008 .082
∆fdiij,t 6,968 .001 .114 -.418 .432 -.022 0 .021
North-Emerging
∆yi,t 10,138 .032 .036 -.091 .12 .015 .036 .054
Convergenceij,t 10,110 -.034 .026 -.176 -.00001 -.049 -.029 -.014
fdiij,t 10,138 .079 .208 -.31 2.842 .00002 .009 .065
∆fdiij,t 10,138 .003 .095 -.416 .431 -.012 0 .016
North-South
∆yi,t 19,171 .024 .037 -.093 .121 .001 .024 .046
Convergenceij,t 19,080 -.035 .028 -.194 -9.54e-07 -.051 -.028 -.013
fdiij,t 19,171 .068 .247 -.327 2.882 0 0 .021
∆fdiij,t 19,171 .001 .089 -.418 .43 -.00002 0 .0002
Emerging-North
∆yi,t 8,136 .01 .024 -.082 .064 .001 .015 .025
Convergenceij,t 7,961 -.036 .03 -.307 -.00001 -.05 -.029 -.014
fdiij,t 8,136 .006 .051 -.316 1.886 0 0 .001
∆fdiij,t 8,136 0 .033 -.41 .4 -.0003 0 .0005
Emerging-Emerging
∆yi,t 7,761 .03 .037 -.091 .12 .015 .036 .053
Convergenceij,t 7,709 -.035 .032 -.334 -9.06e-06 -.048 -.027 -.012
fdiij,t 7,761 .014 .085 -.286 2.842 0 1.28e-06 .002
∆fdiij,t 7,761 0 .043 -.392 .43 -.0002 0 .0003
Emerging-South
∆yi,t 11,541 .024 .037 -.091 .121 .002 .025 .047
Convergenceij,t 11,533 -.039 .031 -.245 -1.91e-06 -.056 -.032 -.015
fdiij,t 11,541 .041 .177 -.323 2.784 0 0 .0004
∆fdiij,t 11,541 .001 .065 -.413 .429 0 0 0
South-North
∆yi,t 25,267 .007 .027 -.082 .064 -.002 .013 .023
Convergenceij,t 21,403 -.044 .059 -1.116 -9.54e-07 -.057 -.031 -.014
fdiij,t 25,267 .003 .036 -.329 1.329 0 0 0
∆fdiij,t 25,267 0 .028 -.414 .431 0 0 0
South-Emerging
∆yi,t 19,573 .025 .041 -.091 .119 .009 .033 .05
Convergenceij,t 16,792 -.048 .059 -1.194 -1.91e-06 -.063 -.035 -.017
fdiij,t 19,573 .009 .074 -.326 2.695 0 0 0
∆fdiij,t 19,573 0 .032 -.411 .426 0 0 0
South-South
∆yi,t 5,899 .03 .043 -.091 .121 .003 .033 .061
Convergenceij,t 5,419 -.051 .049 -1.053 -6.68e-06 -.07 -.041 -.019
fdiij,t 5,899 .04 .154 -.327 2.835 0 0 .014
∆fdiij,t 5,899 .001 .072 -.418 .432 0 0 0
Notes: The sample is based on 1990-2012. S.D. refers to standard deviation; P25 refers to the
first quartile of the distribution; P50 is the median; and P75 is the third quartile. For other
variable definitions, refer to Table 1.1.
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Table 1.6: Bilateral FDI and Economic Growth: Annual, Full sample, 2SLS IV
Dependent variable: ∆yi,t
Short-run Long-run
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆yi,t−1 0.202*** 0.209*** 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
fdiij,t 0.008** 0.008*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
fdiij,t−1 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆fdiij,t 0.243** 0.067* 0.077* 0.104*** 0.123***
(0.124) (0.037) (0.040) (0.030) (0.034)
∆fdiij,t−1 0.016*** 0.021** 0.021** 0.030*** 0.030***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
∆fdiij,t−2 0.009 0.009 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
∆fdiij,t−3 0.003 0.003 0.005** 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 67,350 65,933 48,277 48,277 48,277 48,277
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home F.E. Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
KP test 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SH test 0.724 0.835 0.426 0.420 0.797 0.805
Level Effect 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.016 0.016
Level p-value 0.040 0.001 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.000
Growth Effect 0.305 0.020 0.114 0.126 0.169 0.189
Growth p-value 0.052 0.001 0.070 0.061 0.001 0.000
Notes: The sample observations observed annually over the period 1990-2012. The covariance
matrix in each column allows for heteroscedasticity and the MA(1) errors. See the text for the
instrument set. Robust standard errors are in parentheses whereas ***, **, and * represent
marginal significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. P-values are reported for the
Kleibergen-Paap (KP) and Sargan-Hansen (SH) tests. The level effect is computed as β/(1 −
φ1 − φ2) and the growth effect as (θ0 + θ1 + θ2 + θ3)/(1 − φ1 − φ2). The p-values of the
hypothesis tests for the long-run effects are reported, where the null hypothesis assumes no
long-run relationships between economic growth and bilateral FDI flows.
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Table 1.7: Bilateral FDI and Economic Growth: Annual, Full Sample, 2SLS IV,
Robustness
Dependent variable: ∆yi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Government Trade Inflation Domestic Human Productivity
Spending Openness Rate Debt Capital (USA=1)
∆yi,t−1 0.095*** 0.133*** 0.060* 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.272***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029)
fdiij,t−1 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆fdiij,t 0.121*** 0.124*** 0.132*** 0.094*** 0.090*** 0.090***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
Zi,t−1 0.00002 0.024*** -0.001*** -0.023*** 0.128*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001)
∆Zi,t−1 -0.001 0.003 0.001*** 0.024*** 0.018* 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.011) (0.003)
∆fdiij,t−1 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
∆fdiij,t−2 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.010** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
∆fdiij,t−3 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 47,412 47,604 44,016 42,413 40,878 35,024
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KP test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SH test 0.711 0.786 0.143 0.527 0.910 0.581
Level Effect 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.014
Level p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Growth Effect 0.188 0.201 0.195 0.145 0.139 0.175
Growth p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.008
Notes: The sample observations observed annually over the period 1990-2012. Year, host, and
home fixed effects are included. The covariance matrix in each column allows for heteroscedas-
ticity and the MA(1) errors. See the text for the instrument set. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses whereas ***, **, and * represent marginal significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. P-values are reported for the Kleibergen-Paap (KP) and Sargan-Hansen (SH)
tests. The level effect is computed as β/(1 − φ1) and the growth effect as (θ1 + θ2)/(1 − φ1).
The p-values of the hypothesis tests for the long-run effects are reported, where the null hy-
pothesis assumes no long-run relationships between economic growth and bilateral FDI flows.
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Table 1.8: Bilateral FDI and Economic Growth: Annual, Full Sample, IV and
GMM, Robustness
(1) (2)
IV GMM
∆yi,t−1 0.226*** 0.226***
(0.035) (0.027)
fdiij,t−1 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
∆fdiij,t 0.072** 0.072**
(0.033) (0.033)
∆fdiij,t−1 0.018** 0.018**
(0.008) (0.008)
∆fdiij,t−2 0.008* 0.008*
(0.005) (0.004)
∆fdiij,t−3 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Govi,t−1 0.005* 0.005**
(0.003) (0.002)
∆Govi,t−1 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
Tradei,t−1 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001)
∆Tradei,t−1 0.004** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
Inflationi,t−1 -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
∆Inflationi,t−1 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Debti,t−1 -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001)
∆Debti,t−1 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.001)
HumanCapitali,t−1 0.011 0.011
(0.008) (0.007)
∆HumanCapitali,t−1 0.009 0.009
(0.011) (0.012)
TFPi,t−1 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
∆TFPi,t−1 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004)
Observations 28,605 28,605
KP test 0.000 0.000
SH test 0.561 0.452
Level Effect 0.013 0.013
Level p-value 0.004 0.003
Growth Effect 0.131 0.131
Growth p-value 0.037 0.036
Notes: The sample observations observed annually over the period 1990-2012. Year, host, and
home fixed effects are included. The covariance matrix in each column allows for heteroscedas-
ticity and the MA(1) errors. See the text for the instrument set. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses whereas ***, **, and * represent marginal significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. P-values are reported for the Kleibergen-Paap (KP) and Sargan-Hansen (SH)
tests. The level effect is computed as β/(1 − φ1) and the growth effect as (θ1 + θ2)/(1 − φ1).
The p-values of the hypothesis tests for the long-run effects are reported, where the null hy-
pothesis assumes no long-run relationships between economic growth and bilateral FDI flows.
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Table 1.15: Bilateral FDI and Economic Growth: Annual, Full sample, GMM
Dependent variable: ∆yi,t
Short-run Long-run
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆yi,t−1 0.202*** 0.209*** 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
fdiij,t 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
fdiij,t−1 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆fdiij,t 0.243*** 0.067* 0.077* 0.104*** 0.123***
(0.086) (0.036) (0.040) (0.029) (0.032)
∆fdiij,t−1 0.016*** 0.021** 0.021** 0.030*** 0.030***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
∆fdiij,t−2 0.009* 0.009* 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
∆fdiij,t−3 0.003 0.003 0.005** 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 67,350 65,933 48,277 48,277 48,277 48,277
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home F.E. Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
KP test .000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SH test 0.624 0.825 0.390 0.385 0.763 0.774
Level Effect 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.016 0.016
Level p-value 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.000
Growth Effect 0.305 0.020 0.114 0.126 0.169 0.189
Growth p-value 0.005 0.001 0.065 0.057 0.000 0.000
Notes: The sample observations observed annually over the period 1990-2012. The covariance
matrix in each column allows for heteroscedasticity and the MA(1) errors. See the text for the
instrument set. Robust standard errors are in parentheses whereas ***, **, and * represent
marginal significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. P-values are reported for the
Kleibergen-Paap (KP) and Sargan-Hansen (SH) tests. The level effect is computed as β/(1 −
φ1 − φ2) and the growth effect as (θ0 + θ1 + θ2 + θ3)/(1 − φ1 − φ2). The p-values of the
hypothesis tests for the long-run effects are reported, where the null hypothesis assumes no
long-run relationships between economic growth and bilateral FDI flows.
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Table 1.16: Bilateral FDI and Economic Growth: Annual, Full Sample, GMM,
Robustness
Dependent variable: ∆yi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Government Trade Inflation Domestic Human Productivity
Spending Openness Rate Debt Capital (USA=1)
∆yi,t−1 0.095*** 0.133*** 0.060** 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.272***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024)
fdiij,t−1 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆fdiij,t 0.121*** 0.124*** 0.132*** 0.094*** 0.090*** 0.090***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033)
Zi,t−1 0.000 0.024*** -0.001*** -0.023*** 0.128*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
∆Zi,t−1 -0.001 0.003* 0.001*** 0.024*** 0.018* 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.011) (0.003)
∆fdiij,t−11 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
∆fdiij,t−2 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.010** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆fdiij,t−3 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 0.004* 0.004 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 47,412 47,604 44,016 42,413 40,878 35,024
KP test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SH test 0.666 0.748 0.083 0.460 0.899 0.497
Level Effect 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.014
Level p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Growth Effect 0.188 0.201 0.195 0.145 0.139 0.175
Growth p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.007
Notes: The sample observations observed annually over the period 1990-2012. Year, host, and
home fixed effects are included. The covariance matrix in each column allows for heteroscedas-
ticity and the MA(1) errors. See the text for the instrument set. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses whereas ***, **, and * represent marginal significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. P-values are reported for the Kleibergen-Paap (KP) and Sargan-Hansen (SH)
tests. The level effect is computed as β/(1 − φ1) and the growth effect as (θ1 + θ2)/(1 − φ1).
The p-values of the hypothesis tests for the long-run effects are reported, where the null hy-
pothesis assumes no long-run relationships between economic growth and bilateral FDI flows.
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Chapter 2
Differential Effects of Fiscal
Decentralization: Local Revenue
Share vs. Local Fiscal Autonomy
The allocation of expenditure and revenue responsibilities between the central and
sub-national governments is the fundamental concern of the fiscal decentralization
research. Despite the popularity and significance of the topic, however, only
recently has the literature noticed the fundamental distinction between taxes
collected at the federal level versus taxes collected at the sub-national level.1
Hatfield [2015], in particular, theoretically shows that fiscal decentralization is
beneficial for growth only when revenues are generated at the sub-national level.
Examining the differential effects of fiscal decentralization based on which level
of government that taxes are collected requires an adequate measure of fiscal
decentralization. Unfortunately, the existing measures of fiscal decentralization
1We use the terms local and sub-national governments interchangeably throughout the pa-
per.
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are insufficient for drawing such a comparison.
Local revenue share, which is a proxy for taxes collected at the central gov-
ernment level, is the most commonly used measure of fiscal decentralization. We
contribute to the literature by proposing a new measure of fiscal decentralization,
local fiscal autonomy, to serve as a proxy for taxes collected at the sub-national
level. Theoretically, there is a distinction between local revenue share and local
fiscal autonomy: an increase in local revenue share does not necessarily translate
to a proportional increase in budgetary autonomy. Local governments commonly
receive block grants with strings attached from the central government with little
to no discretion over the federal funding. On the other hand, a rise in local fiscal
autonomy implies that more local jurisdictions have the freedom to choose their
preferred tax instruments. Each sub-national government adopts a tax policy
that can accumulate more capital (i.e., lowering capital tax or providing invest-
ment incentives), which in turn maximizes regional growth.
Using a maximum panel of 121 countries over the period 1985-2012, we find
that local fiscal autonomy has a positive, statistically, and quantifiable impact on
economic growth, while local revenue share has only a marginally significant rela-
tionship . In addition to proposing a new measure of fiscal decentralization, our
empirical analysis contributes to the literature by introducing a long-run anal-
ysis, incorporating heterogeneity in parameters, identifying different sources of
growth-enhancing revenue channels, and considering nonlinearity. The long-run
specification is crucial since the association between fiscal decentralization and
economic growth is a gradual process; heterogeneity in parameters is inevitable
considering different federalism status and income levels across our sample coun-
tries; determining the efficacy of each tax revenue source—property, income, or
sales—is vital for policy implication; and recognizing the quadratic relationship
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is indispensable because neither complete centralization nor decentralization is
optimal.
2.1 Related Literature
2.1.1 A Theoretical Relationship
Musgrave [1959] introduces the concept of fiscal federalism to explain the role of
different tiers of government. Subsequent analyses by Oates [1972] and others
[e.g., Berglas, 1976, Wooders, 1978, Berglas and Pines, 1981, Henderson, 1985,
Hochman et al., 1995] examine the extent to which local governments are granted
autonomy over tax revenues and expenditures. Laying out the foundation of the
theory, Tiebout [1956] argues that people can “vote with their feet” and move to
a desired jurisdiction based on their preference for public goods. The Tiebout-
style literature explains the trend in fiscal decentralization and shows that a sub-
national entity can allocate its expenditures better than the central government.
In light of heterogeneity of resources and preferences for public goods, Oates
[1993] argues that the ability of local governments to invest in projects based
on the demands of local residents improves productivity and efficiency of the
targeted policy. This suggests that fiscal decentralization could be associated
with factors that affect growth outcomes.
An issue that is overlooked in the Tiebout-style literature is intergovernmen-
tal interactions that may create spillovers between different sub-national jurisdic-
tions. Spillovers in intergovernmental interactions occur when local representa-
tives learn from a neighboring jurisdiction’s policy and make utility maximizing
decisions regrading public goods accordingly. This process is possible only when
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the decision-making power is decentralized [e.g., Besley and Case, 1995]. Such
learning could lead to a more efficient policy, resulting in a positive impact on eco-
nomic growth. On the other hand, fierce intergovernmental competition could
create countervailing forces, negating the effects of positive spillovers. For in-
stance, a negative-sum game or a race to the bottom outcome could occur if
local governments lower tax rates at the expense of public goods [e.g., Zodrow
and Mieszkowski, 1986] or ignore environmental issues to lure investment from
others [e.g., Oates and Schwab, 1988].2 Thus, intensive intergovernmental com-
petition could cause inefficient resource management and have an adverse impact
on growth.
Exploring the effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth directly,
Brueckner [2004] argues that such effects depend on whether or not the growth
benefits from Tiebout sorting dominate the costs from tax competition among
sub-national entities. The costs of inter-jurisdictional tax competition increase
when a distortionary capital tax subsidizes public goods. Concerns about cap-
ital flight could distort the decision-making process regarding public goods. A
jurisdiction with more opportunistic behaviors for hosting foreign investments
may have higher economic output, resulting in more dispersion across jurisdic-
tions. Zodrow and Mieszkowski [1986], for instance, suggest that public goods
are under-provided to local residents when welfare maximizing local governments
engage in inter-jurisdiction tax competition. This in turn discourages economic
growth. Similarly, Janeba and Wilson [2011] explore the optimal level of rev-
enue allocation among different tiers of governments. A high level of regional
autonomy is inefficient because each jurisdiction competes for capital by lowering
2Similar analyses include Mintz et al. [1986], Wildasin [1988], Bucovetsky [1991]. See Wilson
[1999] for a more extensive review of the literature.
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capital tax rates which consequently reduces the appropriate level of expendi-
tures on public goods. A high level of centralization is also never optimal due to
inefficient in legislative process. Therefore, the optimal level of revenue allocation
should be derived from the trade-off between the two inefficiencies.
2.1.2 An Empirical Relationship
The empirical literature examines fiscal decentralization and economic growth
using both single country and cross-country analysis. Whereas we contribute to
the cross-country literature, conclusions from the single country studies are rele-
vant. The single country literature finds an ambiguous relationship between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth within and across countries. For instance,
Zhang and Zou [1998]’s findings of negative and statistically insignificant impacts
on economic development contrast those of Lin and Liu [2000] and Feltenstein
and Iwata [2005] who find that China’s regional autonomy enhances growth. Sim-
ilarly, mixed results are found for the United States: Akai and Sakata [2002] find
a positive and significant effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth,
whereas Xie et al. [1999] conclude that further decentralization may be harmful
for growth since the existing level of regional fiscal autonomy has already reached
the growth capacity. In other words, a further deepening of decentralization will
not lead to positive economic growth.
Studies in the cross-country literature commonly measure fiscal decentraliza-
tion with local revenue share or local expenditure share in total revenue with
a typical study using an OLS or GLS regression with year and country fixed
effects. A few studies go beyond the common approach: Iimi [2005], Va´zquez
and McNab [2006], and Gemmell et al. [2013] use an instrumental variables (IV)
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approach to address endogeneity between fiscal decentralization and economic
growth. In particular, there is a positive association between fiscal decentraliza-
tion and growth when using local revenue share, but a negative association when
using local expenditure share. To address the concern that common measures of
fiscal decentralization may overestimate the true level of fiscal autonomy of sub-
national governments, Thornton [2007] utilizes the OECD tax autonomy dataset
to measure fiscal decentralization. The association between economic growth and
decentralization is inconclusive when the OECD tax autonomy data is used.
The ambiguity in the relationship is also pervasive in the cross-country liter-
ature. For instance, Davoodi and Zou [1998], Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Krøijer [2009],
Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra [2011], and Baskaran et al. [2014] find a negative as-
sociation between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, whereas Yilmaz
[1999], Thiessen [2003], and Iimi [2005] find a positive and significant associa-
tion. The association may even be insignificant as shown in Woller and Phillips
[1998]. Heterogeneity in parameters is also documented based on the federalism
status, development level, and the use of government expenditure or revenue as
the measure of fiscal decentralization. Yilmaz [1999], for example, finds that the
positive effect is more growth enhancing for unitary states. Va´zquez and McNab
[2006] show that the impact of fiscal decentralization is positive for developing
countries, whereas the effect is negative for industrialized countries. Gemmell
et al. [2013] contend that the impact of fiscal decentralization on growth is neg-
ative when the share of government expenditure is used as a measure of fiscal
autonomy of sub-national governments, whereas the impact is positive when the
share of government revenue is used.
It is important to note that the application of fiscal decentralization is not
limited to its impact on economic growth. Martinez-Vazquez et al. [2016] pro-
75
vide an excellent literature survey on the various outcome variables that are
affected by the degree of fiscal autonomy in sub-national governments. Recent
studies explore the effects of fiscal decentralization on education quality [e.g.,
Falch and Fischer, 2012], natural disasters [e.g., Escaleras and Register, 2012],
citizens’ trust in government institutions [e.g., Ligthart and van Oudheusden,
2015], government corruption [e.g., Dell’Anno and Teobaldelli, 2015], tax morale
[e.g., Lago-Pen˜as and Lago-Pen˜as, 2010], and party systems [e.g., Harbers, 2010].
These studies indicate that fiscal decentralization has a considerable effect on
numerous outcomes, and therefore has important public policy implications.
2.2 Measuring Fiscal Decentralization
The traditional measure of fiscal decentralization, local revenue share, is defined
as the share of local government tax revenue in total central government tax
revenue. By definition, local revenue share is a proxy of fiscal decentralization for
taxes collected at the central government level. Equation (2.1) represents local
revenue share, Sharei,t, for country i at year t as:
Sharei,t =
∑
Revenuesi,t/
∑
Revenuefi,t (2.1)
, where s and f refer to sub-national (local) governments and the federal (cen-
tral) government, respectively. Simply put, the sum of all local revenue over
the sum of all central revenue is the traditional measure of fiscal decentraliza-
tion. For the United States in 2011, for instance, total local government revenue
was around US$2.515 trillion while the central government general revenue was
US$4.5 trillion, resulting in a local revenue share of 55.73%.
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Notably, a rise in local revenue share does not translate to a rise in fiscal
autonomy. This measure overestimates the autonomy of local governments be-
cause local governments have the limited ability to set tax rates on their revenue
sources in most countries. Nor do local governments have full autonomy over their
expenditure because central governments give block grants which have strings at-
tached. Consequently, this commonly used measure of fiscal decentralization can
be problematic.
For this reason, Hatfield [2015] contends that local revenue share or taxes
collected at the central government level is inadequate for capturing the true re-
lationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. Instead, fiscal
decentralization is beneficial for growth only when revenues are generated at the
sub-national level. Why is this the case? Hatfield [2015] uses an endogenous
growth model to show that local governments choose the capital tax rate that
maximizes growth, where local districts compete for capital via various tax poli-
cies. Therefore, only when local governments have the ability to set tax rates do
they choose the tax policy that maximizes growth. In the same way, Brueckner
[2006] uses an endogenous growth model and over-lapping generation (OLG) ap-
proach to show that there is an extra incentive to save under federalism because
local governments are able to make choices that better suit heterogeneous de-
mands of the young and old. This incentive increases human capital investments
which in turn enhances growth.
The hypothesis implies that tax rates have a significant impact on techno-
logical progress and long-term growth because tax competition under a fiscally
decentralized government with free capital mobility could lead to higher economic
growth. Local governments may be pressured to create a financially favorable en-
vironment for businesses by lowering tax rates, which may encourage investment
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activities and in turn promote economic growth. Particularly, fiscal decentral-
ization increases economic growth in a model that includes provision of both
productive public goods and efficient savings behavior. Benefits from Tiebout
sorting are maximized when voters have heterogeneous preferences for public
goods and head taxes are feasible.3
As shown in the theory, distinguishing between the level of government im-
posing taxes is important because a mere increase in sub-national governments
revenue as a share of total government revenue is not directly linked to sub-
national governments’ discretion over their revenue stream. We empirically test
the validity of the hypothesis. To our knowledge, we are first to take on such
an endeavor. Comparing the effect of taxes collected at different levels of the
government requires a new measure of fiscal decentralization. We borrow from
Gadenne and Singhal [2014] who propose a measure called fiscal gap, which is
the difference between total local government revenue and total local government
tax revenue as a share of total local government revenue. Total local government
general revenue includes intergovernmental and block grants, whereas the local
tax revenue includes its own source revenues and fees such as the waste, utility,
and water bills.
In the spirit of the construction of fiscal gap, we propose local fiscal autonomy
as a measure of fiscal decentralization. Assuming sub-national governments have
the ability to collect taxes, local fiscal autonomy can be measured as one minus the
share of tax revenues in total sub-national government general revenue. Equation
(2.2) represents local fiscal autonomy for country i at year t:
Autonomyi,t = 1− (
∑
Revenuesi,t −
∑
TaxRevenuesi,t)/
∑
Revenuesi,t (2.2)
3Head taxes refer to uniformly imposed taxes on each individual.
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In other words, local fiscal autonomy is the local government’s tax revenue auton-
omy. A smaller local fiscal autonomy value indicates less fiscal decentralization
because grants from other governments reduce local fiscal autonomy. In an ex-
treme case, where local governments receive 100% of their revenue from outside
sources, the fiscal autonomy variable becomes 0. On the other hand, a larger local
fiscal autonomy implies that more revenues are financed through locally imposed
taxes. For instance, the total U.S. local government general revenue in 2011 was
approximately US$2.515 trillion and tax revenue was US$1.371 trillion, resulting
in local fiscal autonomy of 54.52%.
There are two important caveats to our proposed measure. First, we focus on
the revenue share instead of the expenditure share because the revenue share is a
more conservative measure of fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments. For
instance, Gadenne and Singhal [2014] show that the local tax revenue systems (or
lack thereof) drive fiscal decentralization differences in developing and developed
countries. Developing countries are less fiscally decentralized than developed
countries because local governments have limited taxing autonomy and depend
heavily on centralized revenue sources. The ability to set tax rates and collect tax
revenues is more difficult for sub-national governments in developing countries.
Second, our measure is fundamentally disparate from any existing measures of
fiscal decentralization. For instance, Thornton [2007] attempts to measure de-
centralization in a similar way, by using a discrete variable that is observed every
five years for selective OECD nations only. Our measure, local fiscal autonomy,
is observed annually for various OECD and non-OECD countries, which allows
us to use a dynamic cross-country panel model and account for heterogeneity in
parameters.
An important assumption in our measure of local fiscal autonomy is that
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sub-national governments have the ability to collect taxes. Local fiscal auton-
omy may overestimate the true extent of fiscal decentralization if sub-national
governments do not have control over their tax revenues. Local governments, in
fact, do not have complete fiscal autonomy over all of their tax revenue because
sales and income taxes collected at the sub-national level are often levied by the
central government. For instance, sub-national governments in China can col-
lect taxes and make decisions on local expenditures at their discretion. However,
the central government still determines the local tax rates. In such a case, the
fiscal gap measure would overestimate fiscal autonomy of Chinese sub-national
governments. For this reason, we consider sources of tax autonomy. Notably,
property tax is an integral part of local governments revenue in many countries.
Sub-national governments in the United States receive a substantial amount of
revenue from levying property taxes, which varies by state. Property taxes are
the major source of the revenue for local governments in Australia and Great
Britain as well. Similar to equation (2.1), we define local revenue share from
property tax revenue for country i at year t as:
SharePropertyi,t = PropertyTaxRevenue
s
i,t/
∑
TaxRevenuesi,t (2.3)
Recognizing that a single share variable may not be appropriate for captur-
ing the true extent of fiscal decentralization, we use local fiscal autonomy from
property tax revenue as an alternative measure when property taxes are the ma-
jor source of local government revenue. Equation (2.4) represents local fiscal
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autonomy from property taxes for country i at year t :
AutonomyPropertyi,t = 1−(
∑
Revenuesi,t−PropertyTaxRevenuesi,t)/
∑
Revenuesi,t
(2.4)
For the U.S., local property tax revenue was US$ 449.1 billion and total local tax
revenue was US$ 1.371 trillion in 2011. Consequently, local revenue share from
property taxes was 32.76%. With U.S. local government revenue of approximately
US$ 2.515 trillion, local fiscal autonomy from property taxes was 17.86%.
Property taxes are often not an integral part of local government revenues
for non-OECD countries. Property taxes in China, for instance, are essen-
tially non-existent. Recently, some provinces in China have started to im-
pose local property taxes, but their economic significance is marginal. There-
fore, we repeat the same data generating process for revenues from the in-
come tax and sales tax. Local revenue share from income taxes, ShareIncomei,t ,
equals IncomeTaxRevenuesi,t/
∑
TaxRevenuesi,t, and local fiscal autonomy share
from income taxes, AutonomyIncomei,t , is calculated as 1 − (
∑
Revenuesi,t −
IncomeTaxRevenuesi,t)/
∑
Revenuesi,t. In the same way, local revenue share from
sales taxes, ShareSalesi,t , is calculated as SalesTaxRevenue
s
i,t/
∑
TaxRevenuesi,t
and local fiscal autonomy from sales taxes, AutonomySalesi,t , is calculated as
1− (∑Revenuesi,t − SalesTaxRevenuesi,t)/∑Revenuesi,t.
2.3 Empirical Specifications
2.3.1 Baseline Regression Model
Our sample consists of a maximum of 121 countries over the period of 1985-2012.
To motivate the empirical study of the relationship between fiscal decentraliza-
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tion and economic growth, we adopt an endogenous growth model following Barro
[1990] where government spending plays a vital role in determining the level of
private investment through tax rates. Central governments use taxation as the
main instrument for financing public goods, and the tax rates are affected by in-
tergovernmental tax competition from fiscal decentralization. Private investment
decisions by firms and savings behavior by consumers are sensitive to changes in
tax rates. The starting point of our dynamic panel regression model with country
fixed effects, αi, and year fixed effects, αt is:
∆lnyi,t = αi + αt + φ1∆lnyi,t−1 + β1Decentralizationi,t−1 +X
′
i,t−1Ψ + i,t (2.5)
, where yi,t is GDP per capita measured in constant-price international dollars
of country i at year t, making ∆lnyi,t the per capita rate of economic growth.
Decentralizationi,t−1 refers to the level of fiscal decentralization at year t − 1.
We measure fiscal decentralization with either local revenue share or local fiscal
autonomy to compare the efficacy of fiscal decentralization in improving economic
growth when revenues are collected at the central level versus the sub-national
level. Vector Xi,t is a set of control variables and i,t is the error term. The control
variables include consumer price inflation rate and openness to trade (measured
as the sum of exports and real imports as a share of GDP).
In addition to the impact of level of fiscal decentralization, we are also inter-
ested in the current and lagged values of growth of fiscal decentralization. Using
a distributed lag model as in Bond et al. [2010], we obtain our baseline regression
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model as
∆lnyi,t = αi+αt+φ1∆lnyi,t−1+β1Decentralizationi,t−1+θ1 ˆDecentralizationi,t+
θ2 ˆDecentralizationi,t−1 +X
′
i,t−1Ψ + i,t
(2.6)
, where ˆDecentralizationi,t is the growth rate of fiscal decentralization calculated
as (Decentralizationi,t−Decentralizationi,t−1)/Decentralizationi,t−1. Equation
(2.6) allows us to examine the cumulative impact of both the level and growth
of fiscal decentralization as lFD = β1/(1 − φ1) and gFD = (θ1 + θ2)/(1 − φ),
respectively. To statistically determine the long-run association between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth, we report the p-value for a hypothesis
test that has the null of no long-run relationships. Therefore, rejecting the null
hypothesis indicates that the cumulative level and growth effects, lFD and gFD,
are statistically significant.
2.3.2 Addressing Endogeneity: Two-step System GMM
Approach
Reverse causality presents major empirical challenges for cross-country regres-
sions. As Bardhan [2002] states, fiscal decentralization is not the only factor that
affects growth: other political and economic variables, such as elections and busi-
ness cycle fluctuations, have confounding impacts on the economy. Furthermore,
countries with more stable political structures and advanced democratic systems
are inclined to adopt policies that grant more fiscal autonomy to sub-national
governments. Political stability and economic soundness correlate with the in-
come levels, which in turn affect economic growth. Accordingly, it is unclear
if fiscal decentralization encourages growth or if more wealthy countries have a
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decentralized government: a classic example of reverse causality. Furthermore,
simultaneity bias could skew the estimation results when examining the effects
of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. If fast economic growth causes the
level of fiscal decentralization to behave differently, then it would be difficult to
determine the direction of the impact. To address reverse causality and simul-
taneity bias, we use a two-step system of generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimators for the dynamic panel regression model. The endogenous variables in
equation (2.6) are ∆lnyi,t−1, Decentralizationi,t−1, and ∆Decentralizationi,t.
The instrument set we use is lnyi,t−2, Decentralizationi,t−2.
The two-step system GMM estimator can reduce the potential biases and
imprecision associated with an usual two-stage least squares difference estimator
since there could be conceptual and statistical shortcomings with the difference
estimator. Conceptually, we would like to study the cross-country relationship
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, which is eliminated in the
difference estimator. Statistically, when the explanatory variables are persistent
over time, the lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments for the regres-
sion equation in differences. Instrument weakness influences the asymptotic and
small-sample performance of the difference estimator. Asymptotically, the vari-
ance of the coefficients rises. In small samples, the weak instrument influences
can bias the coefficients. To mitigate the conceptual and statistical problems
and to generate consistent and efficient parameter estimates, we use the moment
conditions and use instruments lagged two periods (t-2) to employ a two-step
system GMM procedure.
The validity of the instruments used in the two-step system GMM estima-
tion depends on the relevancy and exogeneity conditions. The instrument set
meets the relevancy condition since it consists of lagged values of the endogenous
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variables. For testing the exogeneity condition, we use the Sargan-Hansen test.
The null hypothesis of Sargan-Hansen test is that the instrument set as a group
is exogenous, where the orthogonality test checks whether the instrument set is
correlated with the endogenous variable. Hence, an instrument set is said to be
valid when we fail to reject the null.
2.3.3 Data and Trends
Data Source
Constructing local revenue share and local fiscal autonomy requires information
on the aggregated government revenue and revenue sources by each tier of the
government. IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (IMFGFS) provides the most
comprehensive observations for each country: the dataset dissects the revenues
into tax and non-tax, cash and non-cash, and their respective sources. In addi-
tion, we use OECD’s Revenue Statistics (OECDRS) data if there are missing
observations. In instances where both IMFGFS and OECDRS have missing
observations, we use OECD’s observations because their data often has longer
periods and fewer missing values. Moreover, the RS dataset provides expansive
observations for non-OECD members, such as Brazil. If non-OECD members
have missing observations from IMFGFS but non-missing values from OECDRS,
then we append the dataset using OECDRS.
Our dependent variables are either the growth rate of real GDP per capita
(i.e., economic growth) or the growth rate of real GDP per worker (i.e., labor
productivity). Both variables are measured in constant-price international dol-
lars and retrieved from Penn World Table 8.0. The main control variables, the
inflation rate (measured as the log difference of consumer price index) is retrieved
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from Penn World Table 8.0 and (log) openness to trade (exports plus imports as a
share of GDP) is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI). Other explanatory variables, such as government expenditure as a share
of GDP, (gross) fixed capital formation as a share of GDP, and (gross) domestic
investment share of GDP (measured in constant-price international dollars) are
also obtained from Penn World Table 8.0. Furthermore, we use political risk
rating variables, including government stability and bureaucratic quality from
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. To determine whether
a country is federal or unitary, we refer to the CIA World Fact Book.
Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for the full sample. Our main dependent
variable, the growth rate of real GDP per capita, has a mean of 2% and the me-
dian of 2.3%. The other dependent variable, the average growth rate of real GDP
per worker (i.e., labor productivity growth), has a mean of 1.5% with the me-
dian of 1.7%. Our main control variables, (log) inflation (i.e., ln(Inflation)i,t−1)
and (log) openness to trade (i.e., ln(Openness)i,t−1) have relatively high stan-
dard deviations since some countries have experienced a hyperinflation during
the sample period and some economies are heavily export-driven. Government
expenditures (i.e., GovExpi,t−1) account for 21.4% of the total economic size, on
average, with the median value of 18.5%. Besides some outliers where almost
all GDP is accounted by the government expenditure, a 20% of a typical coun-
try’s GDP is consisted of government spending. Fixed capital formation refers
to new additions of fixed assets (instead of being consumed) to the economy,
whereas domestic investment refers to all additions of physical investment, in-
cluding fixed and financial assets. Since domestic investment incorporates fixed
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capital formation, the average value of Investmenti,t−1 is higher than the mean
of FixedCapitali,t−1.
We also provide the summary statistics for each measure of fiscal decentral-
ization in their levels and growth rates. Local revenue share, Sharei,t, has the
mean of 33.9% with the median value of 27.6%, meaning that extreme values
skew the distribution of local revenue share. On the other hand, local fiscal au-
tonomy, Autonomyi,t, has very similar mean and median values of 53.7% and
53.2%, respectively. The quartile values are vital when interpreting the effects
of fiscal decentralization on the dependent variables. Each measure of fiscal de-
centralization has a range between 0 and 1, so it unclear what it means to have
an “one unit” increase or decrease. Quantitatively, a movement from the first
quartile (p25) to the median (p50) of the sample distribution is equivalent to the
one unit increase. When we discuss the economic effect of one unit increase in
Sharei,t, for instance, we refer to the increase from 13.4% to 27.6%. Similarly,
the change from 34.3% to 53.2% in Autonomyi,t is considered when we interpret
the quantitative effect of local fiscal autonomy.
Focusing on the source of tax revenues, an obvious trend is that local property
tax revenue share, SharePropertyi,t , has a substantially higher mean value than that
of local fiscal autonomy from property taxes, AutonomyPropertyi,t . The fact that
the average values of the share variables are higher than the autonomy variables
is consistently observed in our sample. This suggests that the share variables may
overestimate the true extent of fiscal autonomy. The distribution of each share
and autonomy variable is skewed to the right as the median values are always
smaller than the mean values. The distribution has a right-skewness because
most sample countries have a relatively lower share or autonomy value while
the shape of the distribution is driven by the some of the high share, autonomy
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics (Full Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Obs Mean S.D. Min Max p25 p50 p75
Real GDP per Capita Growth
∆lnyi,t 4,279 .02 .044 -.198 .156 0 .023 .044
∆lnyi,t−1 4,257 .019 .056 -.699 .637 0 .023 .045
Real GDP per Worker Growth (Labor Productivity Growth)
∆lny˜i,t 4,061 .015 .046 -.197 .174 -.006 .017 .04
∆lny˜i,t−1 3,898 .015 .058 -.697 .642 -.006 .017 .04
Control variables
ln(Inflation)i,t−1 4,685 1.914 1.419 -4.605 10.195 1.099 1.853 2.604
ln(Openness)i,t−1 3,740 -.434 .751 -5.878 1.693 -.826 -.4 .038
GovExpi,t−1 4,523 .214 .116 .021 .983 .138 .185 .256
FixedCapitali,t−1 3,611 .218 .092 .003 .957 .172 .208 .249
Investmenti,t−1 2,232 .684 .242 .004 1 .533 .746 .876
ln(
∑12
k=1 ICRG
k
i,t−1) 3,609 4.471 .295 2.597 4.941 4.326 4.51 4.682
Fiscal Decentralization (Level)
Sharei,t 1,708 .339 .269 .001 1 .134 .276 .436
Autonomyi,t 2,458 .537 .259 0 1 .343 .532 .752
SharePropertyi,t 1,600 .307 .299 0 1 .078 .181 .47
AutonomyPropertyi,t 1,542 .098 .099 0 .624 .035 .071 .125
ShareIncomei,t 1,959 .421 .284 0 1 .212 .362 .611
AutonomyIncomei,t 1,906 .243 .168 0 .94 .127 .224 .343
ShareSalesi,t 2,315 .328 .24 0 1 .114 .313 .483
AutonomySalesi,t 2,256 .188 .167 0 .892 .044 .158 .285
Fiscal Decentralization (Growth)
∆Sharei,t 1,568 .01 .115 -.408 .688 -.03 0 .035
∆Autonomyi,t 2,230 .004 .116 -.472 .695 -.035 0 .035
∆SharePropertyi,t 1,438 .032 .295 -.766 3.151 -.052 0 .049
∆AutonomyPropertyi,t 1,378 .03 .291 -.819 2.746 -.063 -.003 .061
∆ShareIncomei,t 1,670 .005 .137 -.706 .655 -.04 .002 .052
∆AutonomyIncomei,t 1,628 .007 .175 -.718 1.128 -.064 .002 .07
∆ShareSalesi,t 2,086 .022 .208 -.674 1.379 -.05 0 .057
∆AutonomySalesi,t 2,024 .023 .241 -.716 1.728 -.066 -.001 .071
Notes: Data ranges from 1985-2012 for a maximum of 121 countries. Median is equal to
p50. Observations are retrieved from IMF’s Government Finance Statistics, OECD’s Revenue
Statistics, Penn World Table 8.0, and World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Share is
equal to total local government revenue divided by total central government revenue. Autonomy
is equal to one minus the difference between total local revenue and local tax revenue as a
share of total local revenue. ∆Share and ∆Autonomy refer to the growth rates of Share and
Autonomy, respectively.
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sample countries.
Regarding the annual growth rate of fiscal decentralization, there is about 1%
growth in ∆Sharei,t and 0.4% growth in ∆Autonomyi,t. The annual growth rate
is marginal since the median value is zero. Considering the small yearly changes
in the growth rate, it is reasonable to use a distributed lagged model where the
estimates of the current and lagged of the growth rates are combined to examine
the quantitative effect of growth in fiscal decentralization. On the other hand,
the increase is substantially bigger for the growth in local property tax share,
∆SharePropertyi,t , and local fiscal autonomy from property taxes, Autonomy
Property
i,t ,
with the average of 3%. Moreover, the growth rate from income and sales taxes
are bigger for the autonomy variables, implying an increasing trend in fiscal
autonomy from these revenue sources.
The full sample reveals heterogeneity in fiscal decentralization among different
regimes. The specific regimes we focus on are the income groups and federation
status. Income levels are bifurcated by the North and the South, where the
North is defined as high-income OECD countries. The federation status is divided
into federal versus unitary states according to the CIA World Fact Book. The
intuition behind the sub-sample analysis is that there may be a strong correlation
between economic development and fiscal decentralization. Treating the estimate
of the North as the same for the South would be inadequate because their true
parameter values are disparate. Furthermore, it is reasonable to suspect that
countries that adopt a constitution of federalism are more likely to be fiscally
decentralized than unitary states because a federal state allows divisions of power
between the central and sub-national governments.4 Table 2.2 lists the sample
4We acknowledge the limitation of our sub-sample analysis. The federalism categorization is
rudimentary since the local government in India (a federal state) may have less fiscal autonomy
than the local government in China (a unitary state). In other words, a federal state does
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countries by income level and federation status. There are 7 countries which are
in the North and federal, and the list suggests that they are all economically and
politically developed countries, including the United States. On the other hand,
a majority of our sample countries (88 out of 121) belongs to the South group
and have a unitary and regime.
Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics of the measures of fiscal decen-
tralization by income and federal states. Columns (1)-(4) report the values for
the South and columns (5)-(8) report them for the North. The median value
of Sharei,t for the North (i.e., 29.1%) is higher than that of the South (i.e.,
25.9%), suggesting that high-income OECD countries generally have a higher
local revenue share. Moreover, the coefficient of variation (CV) of Sharei,t
for the North is 49.5% (i.e., 0.145/0.293), which is lower than the South’s CV
(0.314/0.364=86.3%). This implies that degree of variation of the North group is
lower than the variation of the South group. All told, the North has a higher local
revenue share and this trend is more consistently observed for the North than the
South. Similarly, the breakdown of local fiscal autonomy for the South and the
North also indicates that the North derives a higher fiscal autonomy from taxes
on property and income: the mean and median values of AutonomyPropertyi,t and
AutonomyIncomei,t are higher for the North than the South. On the other hand,
the mean and median values of Autonomyi,t and Autonomy
Sales
i,t are higher for
the South than the North. This implies that the high value of autonomy in the
South originates from the fiscal autonomy in the sales tax or taxes other than
property and income.
Columns (9)-(12) report the summary statistics of the measures of fiscal de-
not always maintain a high level of fiscal decentralization. Despite being a unitary state, for
instance, China is often considered as a highly fiscally decentralized country since some Chinese
provinces have the authority to set tax rates and levy taxes.
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Table 2.2: List of Sample Countries
Federal (N=17)
North (n=7) Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland,
United States
South (n=10) Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia
Unitary (N=104)
North (n=16) Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom
South (n=88) Angola, Armenia, Republic of Azerbaijan, Bahamas, The Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burk-
ina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Republic of Congo,
Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea,
Estonia, Fiji, The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia,
Lesotho, Lithuania, Macao, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Mau-
ritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Oman, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal,
Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
Notes: A total of 121 countries exists in the full sample. Federal refers to countries that have
a federalist system according to the CIA World Fact Book, whereas unitary refers to countries
that do not have the federalist system. North refers to high-income OECD countries, whereas
the South is the rest of the countries.
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centralization for the unitary states and columns (13)-(16) report the values for
the federal states. As expected, countries that constitutionally adopt federalism
have a higher local revenue share than the unitary states. However, there is al-
most no discernible difference between the unitary and the federal states in the
average local fiscal autonomy both are over 50%. The implication of these two
findings is that while having a federalist system results in a higher local revenue
share, there is no guarantee that this leads to higher local fiscal autonomy. Thus,
local fiscal autonomy may not dependent on federalism. A similar conclusion can
be drawn from the comparison between the unitary and federal states in terms
of AutonomyPropertyi,t .
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Main results
To visualize the differential effects of taxes collected at the central level and the
local level on economic growth, we plot the relationship between economic growth
and the growth rate of fiscal decentralization based on different measures. The
hollow circle depicts the distribution of local revenue share growth and economic
growth whereas the triangle depicts the distribution of local fiscal autonomy.
A majority of fiscal decentralization growth is concentrated between 0 and 0.1
with a few outliers ranging from -.2 to 0.5.5 Drawing the fitted values for both
local revenue share and local fiscal autonomy reveals the differential effects on
economic growth. The dashed line is the fitted value for local revenue share and
economic growth whereas the solid line is the fitted value for local fiscal autonomy
5The representation is similar even when removing more outliers.
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Figure 2.1: Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: Differential Effects of
Local Revenue Share versus Local Fiscal Autonomy
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Notes: The sample period ranges from 1985-2012 for a maximum of 121 countries.
and economic growth. The 95% confidence intervals are also presented. The
slope of local fiscal autonomy trend is steeper than the slope of local revenue
share, implying a stronger positive correlation between local fiscal autonomy and
economic growth.
The differential effects are hypothesized in Hatfield [2015] but have never
been empirically uncovered in the literature because an adequate measure for a
comparison was non-existent. Our proposed measure of local fiscal autonomy
enables us to compare its effect with that of local revenue share. The steeper
slope of the fitted value for local fiscal autonomy indicates that the ability of
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local jurisdictions to set tax rates, lure outside investments, and increase saving
has a potentially synergistic effect. This effect is much stronger than a mere
revenue allocation between the federal and local governments. Given the clear
motivation for analyzing the heterogeneous effects of local revenue share and local
fiscal autonomy, we delve into a more precise examination of different magnitudes
of impacts on our dependent variables.
Using a two-step system GMM approach, Table 2.4 reports the estimates
from our baseline specification of dynamic panel in equation (2.6). Fiscal de-
centralization can be measured in two different ways: local revenue share and
local fiscal autonomy. As discussed before, local revenue share is well used in
the literature and mostly represents revenues collected at the central level. On
the other hand, fiscal autonomy is our proposed measure of fiscal decentraliza-
tion to represent revenues collected at the sub-national level. We compare the
estimates of local revenue share and local fiscal autonomy to gauge the efficacy
of fiscal decentralization on economic growth depending on the difference of rev-
enue autonomy. Columns (1) and (3) show the estimates from local revenue
share, whereas columns (2) and (4) are from local fiscal autonomy. The baseline
results that we will use throughout the paper are from columns (3) and (4). The
p-values for the Sargan-Hansen test indicate that the instrument set satisfies the
exogeneity condition for each specification.
First two columns show the contemporaneous effects of level and growth of fis-
cal decentralization. The coefficients of Decentralizationi,t−1 indicate that main-
taining a high local revenue share does not promote economic growth, whereas
fiscal autonomy has a positive and statistically significant impact on economic
growth. A similar finding can be shown with fiscal decentralization growth, where
an increase in local revenue share has no effects, whereas an increase in fiscal au-
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tonomy has a positive and statistically significant impact on enhancing economic
growth. One major concern with the specification in columns (1) and (2) is that
the association between fiscal decentralization and economic growth is a long-run
process, where the changes in fiscal decentralization do not have an immediate
impact in the current growth rates. Also as shown in the summary statistics,
the magnitude of the growth rate of fiscal decentralization is small for each year.
Therefore, we use columns (3) and (4) as the baseline specification.
As shown in columns (3) and (4), the level of fiscal decentralization, whether
measured by local revenue share or local fiscal autonomy, has a positive and sta-
tistically significant impact in economic growth. The discussion of the economic
significance of these estimates is necessary since it is unclear what it means to
have one unit increase in fiscal decentralization when each variable ranges be-
tween 0 and 1. Quantitatively, an increase from the first quartile of local revenue
share (i.e., 13.4%) to the sample median (i.e., 27.6%) has a permanent increase in
economic growth of 1.2 percentage point. The economic effect is even greater for
local fiscal autonomy with an 1.8 percentage point increase. However, the growth
rate of fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on economic growth only when
measured with local fiscal autonomy. To further examine the cumulative effects
of fiscal decentralization we turn our attention to the level and growth effects.
The cumulative level effect is 2.3 % and 3.4% for local revenue share and local
fiscal autonomy. However, there is no long-run relationship between local revenue
share and economic growth. The p-value of 0.111 indicates that we fail to reject
the null of no long-run associations. On the other hand, we reject the null of no
long-run associations between local fiscal autonomy and economic growth. The
same trend also holds for the cumulative growth effect where there is a long-
run relationship between the growth rate of local fiscal autonomy and economic
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growth only and not between local revenue share and economic growth.
We test the robustness of our baseline specification (i.e., columns (3) and (4)
of Table 2.4) by adding extra explanatory variables. Derived from equation (2.6),
the following equation provides a basis for the robustness analysis:
∆lnyi,t = αi+αt+φ1∆lnyi,t−1+β1Decentralizationi,t−1+θ1 ˆDecentralizationi,t+
θ2 ˆDecentralizationi,t−1+γ1ln(Inflation)i,t−1+γ2ln(Openness)i,t−1+γ3Zt−1+i,t
(2.7)
, where Zt−1 individually refers to government expenditure, fixed capital forma-
tion, and domestic investment all as a share of GDP, as well as ln(
∑12
k=1 ICRG
k
i,t).
The last variable is the (log) weighted sum of each of the ICRG index. A total of
12 ICRG indexes are available, so we aggregate each index k for country i at time
t. The score of an index ranges either from 0 to 12, 0 to 6, or 0 to 4. We multiply
the second and third categories by 2 and 3, respectively to be compatible with
the 0 to 12 category. The aggregated scores indicate the overall bureaucratic,
political, and economic stability of each country, where the higher the index, the
more stable the country is in terms of these indexes.
Table 2.5 reports the robust analysis results. Adding government expendi-
ture as a share of GDP (i.e., columns (1) and (2)) does not change the main
result: the level of fiscal decentralization has a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect (although the economic effect of local fiscal autonomy is much higher
than the economic effect of local revenue share). Notably, the growth rate of
fiscal decentralization enhances economic growth only when measured using the
local fiscal autonomy measure. The statistically insignificant coefficients of gov-
ernment expenditure do not mean that spending from government has no effect
in economic growth. Instead, when controlling for local revenue share and local
fiscal autonomy, fiscal decentralization sufficiently captures the effects of govern-
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Table 2.4: Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: Baseline Specification:
Annual, Two-step System GMM, Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share Autonomy Share Autonomy
∆lnyi,t−1 0.497*** 0.480*** 0.490*** 0.481***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.053) (0.050)
Decentralizationi,t 0.010 0.019*
(0.008) (0.010)
Decentralizationi,t−1 0.012* 0.018*
(0.007) (0.009)
∆Decentralizationi,t -0.001 0.006*** 0.003 0.008***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
∆Decentralizationi,t−1 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
ln(Inflation)i,t−1 -0.017*** -0.025*** -0.019*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
ln(Openness)i,t−1 -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Level Effect 0.0202 0.0359 0.0230 0.0339
[0.224] [0.0611] [0.111] [0.0647]
Growth Effect -0.00274 0.0112 0.00528 0.0173
[0.765] [0.00153] [0.397] [0.0610]
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,223 1,510 1,223 1,510
Number of Countries 88 121 88 121
Sargan-Hansen 0.926 0.244 0.905 0.228
Notes: The sample period ranges from 1985-2012. The covariance matrix in each column
allows for heteroscedasticity and moving-average order of 1 or MA(1) errors. Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses whereas ***, **, and * represent respectively marginal signifi-
cance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. Endogenous variables are ∆lnyi,t−1, Decentralizationi,t (or
Decentralizationi,t−1), and ∆Decentralizationi,t. The instrument set includes ∆lnyi,t−2 and
Decentralizationi,t−2. Level effect is calculated as β1/(1− φ1) and growth effect is calculated
as (θ1 + θ2)/(1− φ) from equation (2.6). The p-values of level and growth effects are reported
in the brackets. The p-values are reported for the Sargan-Hansen test.
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ment spending on economic growth. This is consistent with the theory which
states that there is a growth-maximizing level of fiscal decentralization when
public spending is carried out by different tiers of governments. The same trend
can be observed when we add fixed capital (columns (3) and (4)) and domestic
investment as a share of GDP (i.e., columns (5) and (6)) as extra explanatory
variables.
When the aggregated ICRG index is included as an additional control variable
(i.e., columns (7) and (8)), however, coefficients of both the level and growth rate
of local revenue share and local fiscal autonomy become statistically significant.
Accordingly, the cumulative level effect of 1.6% for local revenue share and of
4% for local fiscal autonomy are shown to have long-run impacts on economic
growth. When we examine the cumulative growth effects, however, the p-value of
0.6 of local revenue share indicates that there is no long-run association between
the growth rate of local revenue share and economic growth. On the contrary,
the growth rate of local fiscal autonomy and economic growth has a long-run
relationship with the magnitude of 1.89%. Focusing on local fiscal autonomy
(i.e., column (8)), the aggregated ICRG has a positive and statistically signifi-
cant impact on growth. The interpretation of this finding is that maintaining a
stable political and economical environment leads to economic growth and has a
substantial impact even when controlling for fiscal decentralization.
As another robustness test, we check the sensitivity of estimates to different
instruments, particularly to different lags of fiscal decentralization measurements.
Recall that the instrument set includes ∆lnyi,t−2 and Decentralizationi,t−2. We
introduce IVs of the third and fourth lags ofDecentralization to see if a longer lag
of the instrument set has any effects on the outcome of the main result. Columns
(1) and (2) of Table 2.6 use the instruments ∆lnyi,t−2 and Decentralizationi,t−3,
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and columns (3) and (4) use the set of ∆lnyi,t−2 and Decentralizationi,t−4. The
overall conclusion that local fiscal autonomy has positive and statistically signif-
icant effects on economic growth is robust to using different instrument sets.
Given the robustness of our baseline specification, we further examine whether
the effects of local revenue share and local fiscal autonomy from property, income,
and sales taxes have the same impact as the total government revenue. Columns
(1) and (2) of Table 2.7 report our baseline specification estimation results (i.e.,
the same as columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.4) as a reference point. Recall that
the main conlcusion from the baseline regression result is that only local fiscal
autonomy has a positive, statistically and quantitatively significant impact on
economic growth, whereas local revenue share has only a marginal impact. When
we compare the effects of local revenue share of property taxes and local fiscal
autonomy of property taxes, the level of fiscal decentralization does not have any
discernible impacts on economic growth. The same trend is true of both the
income and sales taxes. The results make sense considering a marginal degree of
the fiscal decentralization level of these revenue sources.
On the contrary, the growth rate of local fiscal autonomy appears to have some
measurable impacts on economic growth whereas the growth rate of local revenue
share does not. The coefficients of the current and lag growth rates of local fiscal
autonomy from property taxes in column (4) are positive and significant. The
economic significance is small considering the corresponding cumulative growth
effect of 0.6%. A similar trend is also observed for local fiscal autonomy from
income and sales taxes (i.e., columns (6) and (8)) with the cumulative growth
effects of 1.48% and 0.85%, respectively. Taken together, the findings suggest
that local fiscal autonomy from property, income, and sales taxes has a positive
effect on economic growth, but the magnitude of the impact may be negligible.
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Table 2.6: Robust Analysis to Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.4: Additional
Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share Autonomy Share Autonomy
∆lnyi,t−1 0.511*** 0.472*** 0.511*** 0.517***
(0.056) (0.052) (0.058) (0.056)
Decentralizationi,t−1 0.014 0.018** 0.014** 0.024**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
∆Decentralizationi,t 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.003 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
∆Decentralizationi,t−1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Inflation)i,t−1 -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.015*** -0.025***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
ln(Openness)i,t−1 -0.015** -0.012* -0.010* -0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Level Effect 0.0283 0.0344 0.0282 0.0499
[0.132] [0.0453] [0.0427] [0.0218]
Growth Effect 0.0104 0.0138 0.00232 0.0200
[0.233] [0.0608] [0.755] [0.0503]
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,134 1,400 1,057 1,303
Number of Countries 84 115 82 111
Sargan-Hansen 0.918 0.350 0.940 0.431
Notes: The sample period ranges from 1985-2012. The covariance matrix in each column
allows for heteroscedasticity and moving-average order of 1 or MA(1) errors. Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses whereas ***, **, and * represent respectively marginal signifi-
cance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. Endogenous variables are ∆lnyi,t−1, Decentralizationi,t (or
Decentralizationi,t−1), and ∆Decentralizationi,t. The instrument set includes ∆lnyi,t−2 and
Decentralizationi,t−3 (columns (1) and (2)) or Decentralizationi,t−4 (columns (3) and (4)).
Level effect is calculated as β1/(1 − φ1) and growth effect is calculated as (θ1 + θ2)/(1 − φ)
from equation (2.6). The p-values of level and growth effects are reported in the brackets. The
p-values are reported for the Sargan-Hansen test.
102
T
ab
le
2.
7:
F
is
ca
l
D
ec
en
tr
al
iz
at
io
n
an
d
E
co
n
om
ic
G
ro
w
th
:
A
n
n
u
al
,
T
w
o-
st
ep
S
y
st
em
G
M
M
,
F
u
ll
sa
m
p
le
,
D
iff
er
en
t
T
ax
R
ev
en
u
e
S
ou
rc
es
T
ot
al
T
ax
P
ro
p
er
ty
T
ax
In
co
m
e
T
ax
S
al
es
T
ax
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
S
h
ar
e
A
u
to
n
om
y
S
h
ar
e
A
u
to
n
om
y
S
h
ar
e
A
u
to
n
om
y
S
h
ar
e
A
u
to
n
om
y
∆
ln
y i
,t
−1
0.
49
0*
**
0.
48
1*
**
0.
48
6*
**
0.
45
7*
**
0.
45
9*
**
0.
43
9*
**
0.
45
9*
**
0.
47
4*
**
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
56
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
53
)
D
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
on
i,
t−
1
0.
01
2*
0.
01
8*
-0
.0
00
0.
00
0
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
0.
00
0
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
01
)
∆
D
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
on
i,
t
0.
00
3
0.
00
8*
**
0.
00
1
0.
00
2*
0.
00
2
0.
00
3
0.
00
1
0.
00
3*
*
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
02
)
∆
D
ec
en
tr
a
li
za
ti
on
i,
t−
1
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
1*
*
0.
00
3
0.
00
5*
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
ln
(I
n
f
la
ti
on
) i
,t
−1
-0
.0
19
**
*
-0
.0
24
**
*
-0
.0
13
**
-0
.0
13
**
-0
.0
17
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
19
**
*
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
08
)
ln
(O
pe
n
n
es
s)
i,
t−
1
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
11
0.
01
4
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
19
*
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
11
)
L
ev
el
E
ff
ec
t
0.
02
30
0.
03
39
-0
.0
00
13
2
0.
00
07
49
-3
.6
9e
-0
5
-6
.3
7e
-0
6
-2
.7
4e
-0
5
0.
00
07
39
[0
.1
11
]
[0
.0
64
7]
[0
.4
69
]
[0
.1
36
]
[0
.4
69
]
[0
.9
68
]
[0
.9
05
]
[0
.5
92
]
G
ro
w
th
E
ff
ec
t
0.
00
52
8
0.
01
73
0.
00
40
4
0.
00
62
4
0.
00
86
8
0.
01
48
0.
00
19
0
0.
00
84
7
[0
.3
97
]
[0
.0
61
0]
[0
.2
11
]
[0
.0
41
0]
[0
.2
29
]
[0
.0
92
5]
[0
.5
05
]
[0
.0
69
6]
Y
ea
r
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
ou
n
tr
y
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
1,
22
3
1,
51
0
1,
13
9
1,
08
5
1,
03
3
1,
00
3
1,
39
9
1,
34
7
N
u
m
b
er
of
C
ou
n
tr
ie
s
88
12
1
79
79
90
90
11
4
11
4
S
ar
ga
n
-H
an
se
n
0.
90
5
0.
22
8
0.
97
3
0.
59
3
0.
79
4
0.
87
9
0.
32
5
0.
35
4
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
ra
n
ge
s
fr
om
19
85
-2
0
1
2
.
T
h
e
co
va
ri
a
n
ce
m
a
tr
ix
in
ea
ch
co
lu
m
n
a
ll
ow
s
fo
r
h
et
er
o
sc
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
a
n
d
m
ov
in
g
-a
v
er
a
g
e
or
d
er
of
1
or
M
A
(1
)
er
ro
rs
.
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
a
re
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
w
h
er
ea
s
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
re
p
re
se
n
t
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
m
a
rg
in
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
ve
ls
of
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
.
E
n
d
og
en
ou
s
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
∆
ln
y i
,t
−
1
,
D
ec
en
tr
a
li
z
a
ti
on
i,
t
(o
r
D
ec
en
tr
a
li
z
a
ti
on
i,
t−
1
),
a
n
d
∆
D
ec
en
tr
a
li
z
a
ti
on
i,
t
.
T
h
e
in
st
ru
m
en
t
se
t
in
cl
u
d
es
∆
ln
y i
,t
−
2
an
d
D
ec
en
tr
a
li
z
a
ti
on
i,
t−
2
.
L
ev
el
eff
ec
t
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
β
1
/
(1
−
φ
1
)
a
n
d
g
ro
w
th
eff
ec
t
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
(θ
1
+
θ 2
)/
(1
−
φ
)
fr
om
eq
u
at
io
n
(2
.6
).
T
h
e
p
-v
a
lu
es
o
f
le
ve
l
a
n
d
g
ro
w
th
eff
ec
ts
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
th
e
b
ra
ck
et
s.
T
h
e
p
-v
a
lu
es
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
fo
r
th
e
S
ar
ga
n
-H
an
se
n
te
st
.
103
As discussed in Table 1.5, heterogeneity in parameters based on the federation
status and the income level, meaning the findings from the full sample analysis.
Using the baseline specification (i.e., columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.4) we di-
vide our samples into federal, unitary, South, and North. Table 2.8 reports the
sub-sample estimation results. Using local revenue share as a measure of fiscal
decentralization, a higher local revenue share has a positive effect in growth only
for the unitary states as shown in columns (1) and (2). The growth rate of lo-
cal revenue share is also growth-enhancing for the unitary states: the coefficient
of ∆Decentralizationi,t is significant only for the unitary states. However, the
growth effect found in local revenue share does not have a long-run impact as
the p-value for the cumulative growth is 0.553. On the other hand, local fis-
cal autonomy of a unitary state has a quantifiable impact on economic growth.
Comparing the estimates between columns (3) and (4), only the unitary state’s
local fiscal autonomy has significant effects in both the level and growth rates.
The p-values of the cumulative level and growth effects also indicate that the
level effect of 4.5% and the growth effect of 1.9% have a permanent impact in
economic growth.
Regarding heterogeneity in income levels, estimates from column (5) sug-
gests that maintaining a high level of local revenue share can be detrimental for
economic growth of the North as the coefficients are negative and statistically
significant. For the South, the cumulative level and growth effects suggest that
local revenue share and economic growth does not have any long-run association
for the low-income countries either. When measured with local fiscal autonomy,
the cumulative estimation results indicate that only in the South does local fiscal
autonomy have a long-run association with economic growth.
To explain why fiscal decentralization creates positive impacts only for unitary
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states, we examine whether the North and unitary (see Table 2.2) countries, such
as Denmark and Finland are driving the results found in columns (2) and (4) of
Table 2.8. However, we do not find any evidence that the high-income OECD
countries with a unitary system alter the findings. This suggests that the South
and unitary states (a total of 88 countries in the sample) may benefit the most
from a high degree of local fiscal autonomy. Similarly, to identify the finding from
the North-South framework is purely from the South and not from the federation
status, we exclude the countries that are categorized as the South and federal.
However, we do not find any evidence that the federalism alters the estimates in
columns (6) and (8). The most reasonable explanation for such an insignificant
result is due to the noise in the data. It is possible that a few outliers may be
driving the result.
The findings from the sub-sample analysis indicate that the revenue-sharing
structure of a country has significant implications for its development, especially
for low-income countries. Fiscal decentralization may reduce the likelihood of
planning errors by the central government, resulting in more efficient public ex-
penditures. Chaudhury et al. [2006], for instance, show that the management of
social programs by sub-national governments is essential for schooling and health
improvements in developing countries because centralization of education and
health services is likely to increase the absence rate of teachers and doctors. At
the same time, we do not claim that this positive effect always holds because
unsupervised fiscal decentralization can be detrimental to growth. For example,
if sub-national governments mismanage their revenues and expenditures, this
misallocation of resources can cause a significant underdevelopment.
If fiscal decentralization leads to more efficient public expenditures on school-
ing and health improvements, then we may see a positive impact on labor produc-
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tivity. Denoted by ∆lny˜i,t−1, the growth rate of GDP per worker measures the
growth rate of labor productivity. Using the same framework as equation (2.6)
except changing the dependent variable from economic growth to labor produc-
tivity, we can examine the long-run relationship between fiscal decentralization
and labor productivity. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.9 report the estimation
results.
The results suggest that when measured with local revenue share, the level of
fiscal decentralization does not have a significant impact on labor productivity
growth. The coefficient of Decentralizationi,t−1 for local revenue share is statisti-
cally insignificant. On the other hand, a high level of local fiscal autonomy has a
positive and significant impact on labor productivity growth. Quantitatively, an
increase from the first quartile of local revenue share (i.e., 34.3%) to the sample
median (i.e., 53.2%) has a permanent increase in labor productivity growth by
2.2 percentage point. The growth rates of local revenue share and local fiscal
autonomy have positive effects in the short-run. The magnitude of the impact is
more than two times bigger for local fiscal autonomy. When examining a longer
run framework, the p-values of the cumulative effects indicate that only local
fiscal autonomy has a permanent relationship with labor productivity growth.
Based on the baseline regression model of labor productivity growth, we de-
termine how each of the revenue sources have different effects on the growth
path. Table 2.10 reports the estimates using different revenue sources. Columns
(1) and (2) are identical from the main result in Table 2.9 and repeatedly shown
here as a point of reference. As shown in column (3), neither the level nor the
growth rate of local revenue share has a significant impact on enhancing labor
productivity growth. On the other hand, the coefficients of local fiscal auton-
omy have both positive and statistically significant effects on labor productivity
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Table 2.9: Fiscal Decentralization and Labor Productivity: Annual, Two-step
System GMM, Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share Autonomy Share Autonomy
∆lny˜i,t−1 0.432*** 0.415*** 0.427*** 0.417***
(0.046) (0.048) (0.045) (0.047)
Decentralizationi,t 0.011 0.020**
(0.008) (0.010)
Decentralizationi,t−1 0.011 0.022**
(0.007) (0.010)
∆Decentralizationi,t 0.001 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
∆Decentralizationi,t−1 -0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.002)
ln(Inflation)i,t−1 -0.015*** -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(Openness)i,t−1 -0.015** -0.016** -0.014*** -0.016***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Level Effect 0.0188 0.0343 0.0193 0.0371
[0.172] [0.0448] [0.143] [0.0313]
Growth Effect 0.000929 0.0104 0.00663 0.0159
[0.870] [0.00202] [0.293] [0.0177]
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,195 1,482 1,195 1,482
Number of countries 88 121 88 121
Hansen 0.854 0.346 0.810 0.330
Notes: The sample period ranges from 1985-2012. The covariance matrix in each column
allows for heteroscedasticity and moving-average order of 1 or MA(1) errors. Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses whereas ***, **, and * represent respectively marginal signifi-
cance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. Endogenous variables are ∆lnyi,t−1, Decentralizationi,t (or
Decentralizationi,t−1), and ∆Decentralizationi,t. The instrument set includes ∆lnyi,t−2 and
Decentralizationi,t−2. Level effect is calculated as β1/(1− φ1) and growth effect is calculated
as (θ1 + θ2)/(1− φ) from equation (2.6). The p-values of level and growth effects are reported
in the brackets. The p-values are reported for the Sargan-Hansen test.
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growth. The cumulative level and growth effects also concur with this finding.
For income and sales taxes, the effects are almost negligible for either measure of
fiscal decentralization.
So far we have shown that local fiscal autonomy has a positive and substan-
tial impact on economic growth and labor productivity growth. This means
that fiscal decentralization is growth enhancing only when taxes are collected at
the sub-national levels. As theory suggests, we empirically show that the local
government’s decision-making regarding savings and investment becomes more
aggressive when it has the ability to levy taxes and set the tax rates. This move-
ment affects positive savings and investment behavior, which in turn impacts
growth. A natural question follows as to what should be the policy implication
considering the positive and permanent association between local fiscal auton-
omy and economic growth and labor productivity growth. That is, how much
autonomy should be relegated to sub-national government?
To answer this crucial question, we introduce nonlinearity to the baseline
regression estimation and refrain from the linearity assumption. Thiessen [2003]
and Thornton [2007], for instance, find a nonlinear relationship between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth. Failing to consider the nonlinearity may
result in insignificant estimates. Furthermore, Faguet and Po¨schl [2015] suggest
that although sub-national governments are better at fulfilling local demands
and preferences, central governments still play an integral part in redistributing
wealth and implementing broader-based tax programs. This implies a limited
role for local governments in affecting economic growth: an extremely high level
of local revenue share may not be ideal beyond a certain threshold. Another
implication is that, perhaps, the government budgets affecting the entire nation,
such as the military spending and social welfare, should be not determined at the
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local level.
Building on equation (2.6), the following equation accounts for the nonlin-
ear relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth or labor
productivity growth.
∆lnyi,t = αi + αt + φ1∆lnyi,t−1 + β1Decentralizationi,t−1 +
β2Decentralization
2
i,t−1 + θ1 ˆDecentralizationi,t + θ2 ˆDecentralizationi,t−1 +
X
′
i,t−1Ψ + i,t.
(2.8)
Equation (2.8) implies that nonlinearity is introduced in the level of fiscal decen-
tralization only because an extremely high value of fiscal decentralization (e.g.,
local revenue share or local fiscal autonomy close to 1) can be inefficient as shown
in Janeba and Wilson [2011]. Consequently, the calculation for the cumulative
level effect can be modified to lFD = (β1 + β2)/(1− φ1).
Table 2.11 reports the estimation results from the nonlinear specification. The
dependent variable of the first two columns is economic growth. As expected, lo-
cal revenue share does not have any quantifiable effects on economic growth. On
the other hand, the coefficient of the level of local fiscal autonomy has a positive
sign, while its squared-term has a negative sign. This is a classic example of non-
linearity, where too much local fiscal autonomy can be harmful for growth. Using
the cumulative level effect, the marginal effect of local fiscal autonomy is 3.45%.
This magnitude is almost identical to the linear specification as the cumulative
level effect of local fiscal autonomy is 3.39% (i.e., column (4) of Table 2.4). A
similar finding can be shown with the association between fiscal decentralization
and labor productivity growth. The estimates from columns (3) and (4) also
suggest that only local fiscal autonomy has a measurable effect on the dependent
variable. The nonlinear specification has the cumulative level effect of 2.67%,
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which is slightly lower than the cumulative level effect of 3.71% from the linear
specification (i.e., column (4) of Table 2.9).
Focusing on the findings from local fiscal autonomy, we are interested in the
net marginal effects of fiscal decentralization when the quadratic term is included
in the regression analysis. To highlight our finding, we plot the net marginal
effect of local fiscal autonomy on economic growth in Figure 2.2a and on labor
productivity in Figure 2.2b. In both graphs, local fiscal autonomy is centered at
the mean since a graph without centering will imply that the predicted economic
growth rate is zero when the level of fiscal decentralization is zero. Therefore, local
fiscal autonomy is centered at the mean such that zero on the x-axis corresponds
to the average. That is, a value of 0 in the x-axis is equal to the mean of local
fiscal autonomy, which is 0.537. Considering the minimum and maximum values
of local fiscal autonomy, the values of -.5 and .5 on the x-axis correspond to 0
and 1 of local fiscal autonomy. The x-axis is in an increment of one standard
deviation of the distribution, where -.1 and .1 refer to the one standard deviation
from the mean.
The nonlinear figures resemble an inverse-u shape, which implies that the net
marginal effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth or labor productivity
is non-monotonic. The underlying implication from the figures is that extremely
high levels of fiscal decentralization can have an adverse impact on growth. The
findings make an intuitive sense: relegating “too much” fiscal autonomy to the
local governments is harmful for the overall economy. For a typical country in
our sample, the growth maximizing level of local fiscal autonomy occurs about
two standard deviations to the right of the mean for economic growth. For labor
productivity growth, that value is near the mean.
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Table 2.11: Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth and Labor Productiv-
ity, Annual, Two-step System GMM, Full sample, Nonlinear
Economic Growth Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share Autonomy Share Autonomy
∆lnyi,t−1 0.499*** 0.450***
(0.050) (0.056)
∆lny˜i,t−1 0.429*** 0.375***
(0.045) (0.054)
Decentralizationi,t−1 0.008 0.311* -0.006 0.374**
(0.010) (0.183) (0.030) (0.185)
Decentralization2i,t−1 0.002 -0.292 0.018 -0.358*
(0.003) (0.181) (0.027) (0.187)
∆Decentralizationi,t 0.003 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
∆Decentralizationi,t−1 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
ln(Inflation)i,t−1 -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.023***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
ln(Openness)i,t−1 -0.020*** -0.015* -0.015** -0.013*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Level Effect 0.0198 0.0345 0.0202 0.0267
[0.237] [0.198] [0.110] [0.349]
Growth Effect 0.00297 0.0239 0.00641 0.0221
[0.647] [0.00895] [0.350] [0.00168]
Observations 1,223 1,510 1,195 1,482
Number of Countries 88 121 88 121
Sargan-Hansen 0.900 0.298 0.796 0.277
Notes: The sample period ranges from 1985-2012. The covariance matrix in each column
allows for heteroscedasticity and moving-average order of 1 or MA(1) errors. Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses whereas ***, **, and * represent respectively marginal signif-
icance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. Endogenous variables are ∆lnyi,t−1, Decentralizationi,t
(or Decentralizationi,t−1), and ∆Decentralizationi,t. The instrument set includes ∆lnyi,t−2
and Decentralizationi,t−2. Level effect is calculated as (β1 + β2)/(1 − φ1) and growth effect
is calculated as (θ1 + θ2)/(1− φ) from equation (2.6). The p-values of level and growth effects
are reported in the brackets. The p-values are reported for the Sargan-Hansen test.
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Figure 2.2: The Nonlinear Association Between Fiscal Decentralization and Eco-
nomic Growth (retrieved from Columns (2) and (4) in Table 2.11 using Local
Fiscal Autonomy
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Notes: The sample period ranges from 1985-2012 for a maximum of 121 countries. The mean
value of local fiscal autonomy for the full sample is 0.537.
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2.5 Conclusions
We analyze the effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, highlighting
the notion that fiscal decentralization itself is not sufficient for enhancing growth
if taxes are collected at the central level. Instead, we find that the growth impact
is magnified when tax autonomy is relegated to sub-national governments. To
draw a such a comparison, we propose a new measure of fiscal decentralization,
local fiscal autonomy, which approximates the ability of a local jurisdiction to set
tax rates and control fiscal decision. Furthermore, we establish a long-run associ-
ation between local fiscal autonomy and economic growth and labor productivity
growth using a distributed lag model.
The long-run relationship varies by the federalism status and development
levels. Unitary states and developing countries benefit most from the positive
effects of local fiscal autonomy. The heterogeneous findings imply that growth
in fiscal decentralization is vital for unitary and under-developed countries which
currently have sub-optimal levels of local fiscal autonomy. There is also evidence
of heterogeneity based on different tax instruments, particularly for property
taxes. High-income countries benefit most from local fiscal autonomy in property
taxes. In other words, the ability of sub-national governments in rich countries
to set property tax rates is the most effective tool for enhancing regional growth.
All of these heterogeneous findings imply that there is no universal threshold of
local revenue share that maximizes economic growth given unique fiscal systems
across countries.
Whereas a rise in fiscal decentralization is helpful for economic growth and
labor productivity growth when taxes are collected at the local level, we empha-
size that complete decentralization is never optimal. Our finding is consistent
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with Janeba and Wilson [2011] who show that some public goods and services
should be provided by local governments. Even though economic growth can be
enhanced when countries share fiscal autonomy with their local governments, the
end goal of the policy should not be granting full fiscal autonomy to the local
governments. Some fiscal items, such as the national defense budget, may not
be suitable for the discretion of the local governments. Therefore, it is crucial
to acknowledge the importance of revenue-sharing structure when policy-makers
consider fiscal decentralization.
One practical policy implication from our findings is that central govern-
ments should restructure the revenue-sharing system such that it relegates more
fiscal autonomy to sub-national governments via locally autonomous taxes. Block
grants, intergovernmental transfers, and grants from international organizations
will not necessary ensure that the revenue is allocated accordingly to the local
needs. The fiscal decentralization process also involves other types of decen-
tralization, such as political and administrative decentralization. If sub-national
governments do not efficiently manage their revenues or if they abuse their au-
tonomy, then fiscal decentralization may not enhance growth. We speculate that
the coordination among different branches and levels of the governments would
be an essential cornerstone of effective decentralization.
We have provided a comprehensive analysis on fiscal decentralization. There
is however room for future to investigate specific channels through which lo-
cal fiscal autonomy enhances growth. Furthermore, using our measure of fiscal
decentralization, a related study can examine how local fiscal autonomy may af-
fect political outcomes, such as government quality, corruption, and bureaucratic
process. Moreover, as discussed in Treisman [2007], the interaction between the
expenditure and revenue is an integral study of the political science literature. In
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particular, the relationship between the revenue raising capacity and the actual
implementation of these revenues (i.e., authorized expenditure) given the market
and political constraints is an important strand of future work.
117
Chapter 3
An Efficient Sequential Learning
Algorithm in Regime-switching
Environments
A linear state-space model with Markov switching is widely used in the appli-
cation where a dramatic change in model parameters is prevalent. Kim [1994],
for instance, estimates the model with a Kalman filter-based technique. The
traditional linear model is no longer adequate, however, because of the presence
of non-linearity in many modern day applications. Another feature of current
time-series observations is a surge in real-time data, compounding at a rapid
rate. A more refined model, consequently, requires two areas of improvement:
first, consideration of non-linearity and non-Gaussian shocks in the state-space
model under a regime-switching environment; and second, the inclusion of se-
quential parameter learning and state filtering methodology to accommodate the
high rate of real-time data update. We propose a sophisticated sequential pa-
rameter learning algorithm that can be used in a generalized regime-switching
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environment. Then we test the estimation accuracy of our algorithm against a
popular alternative method.
The foundations of our proposed approach are novel works of Liu and West
[2001] and Carvalho and Lopes [2007]. In their seminal paper, Liu and West
[2001] introduce a sequential parameter learning method by combining the aux-
iliary particle filter (APF) of Pitt and Shephard [1999]1 with a kernel smoothing
approach that approximates the posterior distribution of model parameters. Ex-
tending the method of Liu and West [2001], Carvalho and Lopes [2007] develop
a widely applicable and easily implementable particle learning algorithm to esti-
mate a regime switching state space model. Our main contribution is improving
the estimation performance of the algorithm in Carvalho and Lopes [2007], which
is a culmination of several seminal works in the Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC)
literature.
We improve the estimation accuracy and the computational efficiency by care-
fully designing a particle re-sampling procedure and a candidate generating dis-
tribution for a regime index variable (i.e., st). Under the framework of Carvalho
and Lopes [2007], the particle re-sampling process and the candidate generating
distribution are mainly determined by the regime transition probability. Specifi-
cally, a particular regime state that has the highest regime transition probability
is selected at time t given the regime state at time t − 1. Based on the chosen
regime state at time t, the predictive density of the current data (i.e., yt) is cal-
culated. The predictive density, which is largely determined by the transition
probability, is the main factor in the particle re-sampling step. Unfortunately,
1Gordon et al. [1993] introduce the bootstrap filter to draw samples from unobserved states
based on a sampling importance re-sampling strategy. Building off the bootstrap filter, Pitt
and Shephard [1999] construct the APF, which adopts a sequential importance sampling with
re-sampling particle filters.
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the existing approach cannot efficiently identify regime-switching because any
regime transition probability higher than 0.5, for instance, would indicate that
there is no change in regimes between the two time periods in the re-sampling
step. Moreover, the existing approach can be inefficient since the regime transi-
tion probability is the only factor that determines particles of the regime index
variable at time t.
To mitigate the strong dependence on the regime transition probability, we
combine the re-sampling step and the particle drawing step of the regime index
variable, while utilizing the information set available up to the current period. By
using both the regime transition probability and the current data in the combined
step, the estimation performance is no longer sensitive to the regime transition
probability. Given a reasonable number of particles, the SMC simulation results
indicate that the estimation accuracy in Carvalho and Lopes [2007] is greatly com-
promised when regimes are frequently changing, whereas our estimation strategy
performs well regardless of the regime persistence.
For an empirical illustration, we apply the proposed algorithm to investigate
the dynamics of U.S. excess stock market returns. In particular, we focus on
whether a dramatic regime change exists in the leverage effect, the conditional
mean, and the conditional variance process. Based on marginal likelihood values,
we find that the model with a regime change in volatility can best explain the
underlying dynamics of the process. Our finding suggests a regime change in
volatility. We do not, however, find any evidence that a regime change also exists
in the conditional mean. Moreover, we highlight that the leverage effect itself
is an integral element of the stock return analysis even though the model with
regime changes in both volatility and the leverage effect is not selected as the
best model.
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3.1 Sequential Estimation of Markov Switching
State-Space Models
A nonlinear and non-Gaussian state-space model with regime-switching for a
N -dimensional time series, yt, and state vector, xt, generally adopts the following
specification:
yt = h(xt, st, t) (3.1)
xt = g(xt−1, st, ηt) (3.2)
, where the error terms t and ηt are i.i.d. random variables and their means are
assumed to be zeros. The measurement equation, h(·), relates the state vector xt
to the observed data, while the transition equation, g(·), shows the dynamics of xt.
Both the measurement and transition equations are determined by the parameter
set, βst , whose values depends on the regime state, st ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K − 1}. The
dynamic system changes between K regimes over time, while the latent variable
that determines the current regime, st, follows a first-order Markovian process as
given below:
pik,j = p(st = j|st−1 = k) (3.3)
, where
∏K−1
j=0 pik,j = 1. Let pi be the set of transition probabilities. The main
goal of our proposed estimation strategy is to sequentially estimate the unknown
model parameters, θ = [β′0, β
′
1, . . . , β
′
K−1, pi]
′, and the latent states, [st, xt], by
incorporating new observations at each time period.
Liu and West [2001] combine the auxiliary particle filter with kernel smoothing
methods, which is the foundation of our sequential parameter learning approach.
We summarize the Liu-West (LW) filter in Algorithm 1 with the inclusion of the
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distribution for st.
2
Algorithm 1: Liu-West (LW) Filter for Markov Switching State Space Models
i. Generate {s(i)0 , x(i)0 , θ(i)0 } with the importance weight, ωˆ(i)0 = 1N for i =
1, 2, . . . , N .
ii. Compute the re-sampling weight ωˆ
(i)
t−1|t for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
iii. Re-sample N particles {sˆ(i)t−1, xˆ(i)t−1, θˆ(i)t−1}Ni=1 from {s(i)t−1, x(i)t−1, θ(i)t−1}Ni=1 and
draw {s(i)t , x(i)t , θ(i)t } conditional on {sˆ(i)t−1, xˆ(i)t−1, θˆ(i)t−1} for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
iv. Compute the normalized importance weight, ωˆ
(i)
t , for the particle set
{s(i)t , x(i)t , θ(i)t } for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
v. Iterate steps (ii), (iii), and (iv) at t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
In Algorithm 1, N represents the number particles of the latent variables. At step
(i) of Algorithm 1, the particle set {s(i)0 , x(i)0 , θ(i)0 } is orderly drawn from p(θ(i)0 ),
p(s
(i)
0 | θ(i)0 ), and p(x(i)0 | s(i)0 , θ(i)0 ). Note that p(s(i)0 | θ(i)0 ) and p(x(i)0 | s(i)0 , θ(i)0 )
are the unconditional distribution of s
(i)
0 and x
(i)
0 . To estimate the unknown
parameter set θ = [β′0, β
′
1, . . . , β
′
K−1, pi]
′ at time t − 1, the LW filter incorporates
the following mixture of multivariate normal distributions:
p(θ|y1:t−1) ≈
N∑
i=1
ωˆ
(i)
t−1f(θ;m
(i)
t−1, h
2Vt−1) (3.4)
, where f(θ;m
(i)
t−1, h
2Vt−1) is a normal distribution with the mean, m
(i)
t−1, and
the variance, h2Vt−1. Note that m
(i)
t−1 = αθ
(i)
t−1 + (1 − α)θ¯t−1, where θ¯t−1 =∑N
i=1 ωˆ
(i)
t−1θ
(i)
t−1. Also h
2Vt−1 = h2
∑N
i=1 ωˆ
(i)
t−1(θ
(i)
t−1 − θ¯t−1)(θ(i)t−1 − θ¯t−1)′, where
h2 = (1 − α2). The tuning parameter, α, appears in the mean through m(i)t−1
(i.e., a shrinkage factor) and in the variance through h2 (i.e., a smoothing fac-
tor).
2We have added the regime-switching state space model to the original work of Liu and
West [2001].
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Carvalho and Lopes [2007] extend the LW filter by including the regime-state,
st. An important feature of their algorithm is that the estimation of st is heavily
dependent on the previous state through the prior transition density. We modify
Carvalho and Lopes [2007]’s approach in Algorithm 2. Notice that the derivation
in Algorithm 2 starts from step (ii.1) because the first step is the same as step
(i) of the LW filter derivation in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2: Carvalho and Lopes [2007]
1.21 Compute posterior mean and variance statistics, m
(i)
t−1 and h
2Vt−1.
1.22 Generate s˜
(i)
t = argmaxk∈{0,...,K−1} p(st = k | s(i)t−1;m(i)t−1) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
1.23 Compute x˜
(i)
t = g(x
(i)
t−1, s˜
(i)
t , ηt = 0;m
(i)
t−1) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
1.24 Compute the re-sampling importance weight, ωˆ
(i)
t−1|t =
ω
(i)
t−1|t∑N
j=1 ω
(j)
t−1|t
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , where ωt−1|t(i) ∝ p(yt|x˜(i)t , s˜(i)t ;m(i)t−1)ωˆ(i)t−1, and
p(yt|x˜(i)t , s˜(i)t ;m(i)t−1) is the conditional density of yt given x˜(i)t , s˜(i)t , and m(i)t−1.
1.31 Re-sample the particle set, {sˆ(i)t , xˆ(i)t , sˆ(i)t−1, xˆ(i)t−1, θˆ(i)t−1, mˆ(i)t−1}Ni=1 from
{s˜(i)t , x˜(i)t , s(i)t−1, x(i)t−1, θ(i)t−1,m(i)t−1}Ni=1 using {ωˆ(i)t−1|t}Ni=1. Define s˜(i)t = sˆ(i)t ;
x˜
(i)
t = xˆ
(i)
t ; s
(i)
t−1 = sˆ
(i)
t−1; x
(i)
t−1 = xˆ
(i)
t−1; θ
(i)
t−1 = θˆ
(i)
t−1; and m
(i)
t−1 = mˆ
(i)
t−1 for
i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
1.32 Generate θ
(i)
t from N(m
(i)
t−1, h
2Vt−1) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
1.33 Generate s
(i)
t from p(st | s(i)t−1; θ(i)t ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
1.34 Generate x
(i)
t from p(xt | s(i)t−1, s(i)t , x(i)t−1; θ(i)t ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
iv.1 Compute the importance weight ωˆ
(i)
t =
ω
(i)
t∑N
j=1 ω
(j)
t
, where ω
(i)
t ∝ p(yt|x
(i)
t ,s
(i)
t ;θ
(i)
t )
p(yt|x˜(i)t ,s˜(i)t ;m(i)t−1)
.
It is important to note that s˜
(i)
t , which is solely determined by the regime
transition probability, p(st | s(i)t−1), is used to generate x˜(i)t and to compute the
re-sampling weight ωˆ
(i)
t−1|t. Moreover, the new particle, s
(i)
t , is generated from the
same transition probability. Because of the heavy dependency of Algorithm 2 on
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the transition probability, we conjecture that its performance is substantially in-
fluenced by the degree of persistence in each regime. A small number of particles,
in particular, would exacerbate the problem.
To mitigate the problem, we relax the restriction of relying on the regime tran-
sition probability as a main factor that determines the re-sampling weights and
st in the proposal distribution. Instead, we utilize all of the available information
set, including the current observation yt in the merged process that combines the
step for re-sampling particles at time t − 1 with the step of generating new st
particles. Algorithm 3 summarizes of our approach.3 Notice that the derivation
in Algorithm 3 starts from step (ii.1) because the first step is the same as step
(i) of the LW filter derivation in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 3: Proposed Algorithm
ii.1 Compute posterior mean and variance statistics, m
(i)
t−1 and h
2Vt−1.
ii.2 Compute x˜
(i)
t|k = g(x
(i)
t−1, st = k, ηt = 0;m
(i)
t−1) for k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 and
i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
ii.3 Compute the importance weight ωˆ
(i)
t−1|t,k =
ω
(i)
t−1|t,k∑K−1
k=0
∑N
i=1 ω
(i)
t−1|t,k
for k =
0, 1, . . . , K − 1 and i = 1, 2, . . . , N , where ω(i)t−1|t,k ∝ p(yt | x˜(i)t|k, st =
k;m
(i)
t−1)p(st = k|s(i)t−1;m(i)t−1)ωˆ(i)t−1.
iii.1 Draw {s(i)t }Ni=1 and re-sample the particle set, {xˆ(i)t|k, sˆ(i)t−1, xˆ(i)t−1, θˆ(i)t−1, mˆ(i)t−1}Ni=1
simultaneously using ωˆ
(i)
t−1|t,k. The re-sampling is preformed on
{x˜(i)t|k, s(i)t−1, x(i)t−1, θ(i)t−1,m(i)t−1}Ni=1. Define x˜(i)t|k = xˆ(i)t|k; s(i)t−1 = sˆ(i)t−1; x(i)t−1 = xˆ(i)t−1;
and θ
(i)
t−1 = θˆ
(i)
t−1.
iii.2 Generate θ
(i)
t from N(m
(i)
t−1, h
2Vt−1) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
iii.3 Generate x
(i)
t from p(xt | s(i)t , x(i)t−1; θ(i)t ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
3The incremental target density of the proposed algorithm is given below:
p(xt, st, θ | y1:t) ∝ p(yt | xt, st; θ)p(xt | xt−1, st; θ)p(st | st−1; θ)p(θ|y1:t−1)
, where y1:t = [y1, y2, . . . , yT ]
′.
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iv.1 Compute the importance weight ωˆ
(i)
t =
ω
(i)
t∑N
j=1 w
(j)
t
,
where ω
(i)
t ∝ p(yt|x
(i)
t ,s
(i)
t ;θ
(i)
t )p(s
(i)
t |s(i)t−1;θ(i)t )
p(yt|x˜(i)
t|s(i)t
,s
(i)
t ;m
(i)
t−1)p(s
(i)
t |s(i)t−1;m(i)t−1)
.
The main difference between the existing particle learning algorithm in Carvalho
and Lopes [2007] (i.e., Algorithm 2) and our proposed approach in Algorithm 3
lies on steps (ii), (iii), and (iv). Specifically, at step (iii.1) of Algorithm 3, we com-
bine the re-sampling step for the existing particles at time t−1 and the sampling
step for st. This step is the key to understanding how the proposed algorithm
can overcome the aforementioned problem of the existing algorithm. First, our
approach does not require the generation of deterministic s˜
(i)
t , which critically
depends on the transition probability. Second, our approach employs more in-
formation contained in the current observation yt in generating st compared to
Algorithm 2.
3.2 Simulation Study
We consider a two-state (i.e., K=2) Markov Switching Stochastic Volatility
(MSSV) model proposed in So et al. [1998] to evaluate the performance of the
two described online estimation algorithms:
yt = β + exp(
xt
2
)t, t ∼ N(0, 1) (3.5)
xt = αst + φ(xt−1 − αst−1) + ηt, ηt ∼ N(0, τ 2) (3.6)
, where αst = α0 + αdst and st ∈ {0, 1} for t = {1, 2, . . . , T}. Without loss of
generality, regime 0 or st = 0 refers to a low-volatility state, whereas regime 1 or
st = 1 refers to a high-volatility regime. Following the data generating process
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in equations (3.5) and (3.6), we use the parameter values of {α0 = 1, αd =
3, φ = 0.5, σ2 = 0.5} with T = 1, 000 over a set of 100 simulation studies. We
explore two different sets of transition probabilities. Case 1 considers a volatility
process that experiences a relatively frequent regime switch. The corresponding
transition probability values are pi00 = 0.9 and pi11 = 0.85 with the expected
regime duration of 10 and 7 for regimes 0 and 1, respectively.4 On the other
hand, Case 2 considers a volatility process that has a more persistent state and
uses the probability values of pi00 = 0.99 and pi11 = 0.9. The corresponding
expected regime duration is 100 for regime 0 and 10 for regime 1. For both
cases, we generate the entire sequence of true values of st based on the computed
expected regime duration.
To compare the estimation accuracy of the simulation results, we define the
Mean Squared Error (MSE) for volatility as MSE
(j)
V =
1
T
∑T
t=1(Vt− Vˆt
(j)
)2, which
represents the difference between the real volatility process (i.e., Vt = exp(xt))
and the filtered process (i.e., Vˆt = exp(xˆt)) in the j-th simulation. We compute
the average volatility MSE (i.e., ¯MSEV =
1
100
∑100
j=1MSE
(j)
V ) to summarize all
simulation results.
Moreover, to compare how well each algorithm is able to correctly capture
a change in regimes and successfully recognize the current state, we define the
Quadratic Probability Score (QPS) for the j-th simulation asQPS(j) = 1
T
∑T
t=1(st−
Pˆ r(st = 1)
(j))2 × 100, where Pˆ r(st = 1) is the filtered probability of the high
volatility regime (i.e., estimated state) and st is the true value. We can sum-
marize the QPS by averaging over the repeated simulation number of 100 (i.e.,
¯QPS = 1
100
∑100
j=1QPS
(j)). The score ranges between 0 and 100. QPS is equal
4The expectation of regime duration is computed by 11−pikk for k = {0, 1}. For the simulation
purpose, when the computed regime duration is not an integer, we round it up to the nearest
integer.
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to 0 if the online estimation algorithm is able to perfectly capture and recognize
the regime changes, while 1 being the other side of the extreme.
To compare the performance of the parameter estimation, we define the
MSE for model parameters5 as MSE
(j)
P =
1
T
∑T
t=1(p − pˆt(j))2 where p is the
true parameter value and pˆt is the estimated parameter path. Similar to the
volatility MSE and QPS, the average MSE for each parameter can be written as
¯MSEP =
1
100
∑100
i=jMSE
(j)
P .
We compare the performance of each algorithm under different regime frame-
works based on the average values of MSEV , QPS, and MSEP in Table 3.1. For
a direct comparison, each filter utilizes the same number of particles (N = 5, 000).
We use non-informative priors for the model parameters in the simulation.6
Columns (1) and (3) are from Carvalho and Lopes [2007] and columns (2) and
(4) are from our proposed algorithm.
When there is a high turnover rate in regime-switching (i.e., Case 1), the
proposed algorithm clearly outperforms the existing algorithm in estimation ac-
curacy. The average MSEV value is significantly lower for the proposed approach
than the existing approach, which implies that the new approach can better es-
timate the volatility process given the same number of particles. Furthermore,
The average QPS value of the proposed filter is nearly twice as small as that
of the existing algorithm. Because a lower value of the average QPS equates to
less erroneous state estimations, the proposed algorithm can better determine
the position of the current state with the reasonable number of particles. On the
other hand, when regime-switching is stagnant (i.e., Case 2), the average MSEV
5The parameter set is θ = {α0, αd, φ0, σ2, pi00, pi11}.
6The priors for α0, αd, and φ are normal distributions. The variance parameter τ
2 takes
an inverse gamma distribution as a prior. For the transition probabilities, we assume beta
distributions.
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and the average QPS values of the proposed approach are not very different from
those of the existing approach.7
Figure 3.1: Top: Box plots of the MSE of the estimated volatility process com-
pared to the real simulated volatility process for each filter. Bottom: Box plots
of the QPS for each filter.
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Notes: All plots present the results for the MSSV k=2 model with the parameter set of {α0 =
1, α1 = 3, φ = 0.5, σ
2 = 0.5}. Case 1 uses the transition probability of {pi00 = 0.9, pi11 = 0.85}
and Case 2 uses {pi00 = 0.99, pi11 = 0.9}. The total simulation runs are 100. Each simulation
uses 5,000 particles in 1,000 time periods.
7The average MSE and QPS for each algorithm can also be compared with a box plot rep-
resentation. Figure 3.1 presents the distribution of observed MSEV and QPS values obtained
from 100 simulations.
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Table 3.1: Averages of MSEV , QPS, and MSEP for the 2-state MSSV model.
Case 1: pi00 = 0.9, pi11 = 0.85 Case 2: pi00 = 0.99, pi11 = 0.9
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Carvalho and Lopes [2007] Proposed Carvalho and Lopes [2007] Proposed
¯MSEV 3,811 3,787 640.67 644.72
¯QPS 34.773 16.081 6.254 6.075
¯MSEP : α0 1.535 0.974 0.0641 0.0636
¯MSEP : αd 0.540 0.421 0.489 0.440
¯MSEP : φ0 0.0231 0.0161 0.0238 0.0242
¯MSEP : σ
2 0.990 0.205 0.0369 0.0206
¯MSEP : pi00 0.00203 0.00108 0.00062 0.00059
¯MSEP : pi11 0.0124 0.0026 0.00110 0.00109
Notes: ¯MSEV refers to the average mean squared error for volatility. ¯QPS refers to the average
quadratic probability score. The QPS index ranges between 0 and 100, with 0 being the case
of correct assignment of the state variable for all time periods and 100 being the opposite case.
¯MSEP refers to the MSE of each parameter. The results are based on the 2-state MSSV model
with α0 = 1, αd = 3, φ = 0.5, σ
2 = 0.5 using 5,000 particles, averaged over 100 simulations.
The parameter estimation accuracy of the proposed approach is also signif-
icantly better than the existing algorithm given N = 5, 000 in Case 1. For in-
stance, regime-dependent volatility means (i.e., α0 and αd) are better estimated
with the proposed approach with the average MSE value of 0.974 and 0.421 com-
pared with values of 1.535 and 0.540 of the existing filter, respectively. Moreover,
the existing filter produces a higher average MSE for σ2. This result can be
explained by the fact that Algorithm 2 often spuriously attributes variations in
volatility to the shock, ηt, because it fails to capture regime changes in the mean
of the volatility process. On the other hand, the values of average MSE for the
model parameters under persistent regimes (i.e., Case 2) are similar between the
two approaches.8
One important implication from the findings is that the existing algorithm
performs very differently depending on time series characteristics of regimes. No-
tably the new algorithm constantly performs well. In many different empirical
8We show box plots for the distribution of MSE for each parameter in Figures 3.2 and 3.3
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of Parameter MSE: Case 1: Box plots of the MSE of
each parameter for each filter
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Notes: All plots present the results for the MSSV k=2 model with the parameter set of {α0 =
1, αd = 3, φ = 0.5, σ
2 = 0.5}. The total simulation runs are 100. Each simulation uses 5,000
particles in 1,000 time periods.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of Parameter MSE: Case 2: Box plots of the MSE of
each parameter for each filter
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analyses, we may observe various transition probabilities for regimes. The pro-
posed algorithm will be useful in practice regardless of underlying persistence of
regimes.
3.3 Application
3.3.1 Empirical Specification
For an empirical illustration, we apply the proposed algorithm to investigate
whether the dynamics of U.S. stock market excess returns can be well character-
ized by a model with abrupt regime changes.9 For our analysis, we employ the
value-weighted portfolio returns of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms minus
the one-month Treasury bill rate.10 The data are observed at the weekly level
from the week of January 4, 1980 to the week of May 26, 2017, a total of 1,952
observations.
We consider the following model of excess stock returns:
ret = µ
r
t + σtt, t ∼ NID(0, 1) (3.7)
, where the excess stock returns, ret , are made up of the expected value of excess
returns, µrt , and an unexpected random shock, σtt. An economic agent forms her
expectations of ret at time t− 1 using the information available up to time t− 1.
However, µrt is assumed to be a latent variable and is estimated within the model
because the information set available to a researcher is substantially smaller than
the amount of information available to the economic agent. The unobserved (log)
9So et al. [1998], for instance, highlight the appropriateness of a time-varying stochastic
volatility model with regime-switching using the Standard and Poor’s 500 weekly return data.
10The data is retrieved from the CRSP database.
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mean, mt, and the (log) volatility, xt, of excess returns are determined by the
following latent vector autoregressive (VAR) process:
mt = µ
m
smt
+ φ11(mt−1 − µmsmt−1) + φ12(xt−1 − µ
x
sxt−1
) + emt , (3.8)
xt = µ
x
sxt
+ φ21(mt−1 − µmsmt−1) + φ22(xt−1 − µ
x
sxt−1
) + φ23,sxt t−1 + e
x
t , (3.9)emt
ext
 ∼ NID(
0
0
 ,
 σ2m ρσmσx
ρσmσx σ
2
x
) (3.10)
, where µmsmt = µ
m
0 + µ
m
d s
m
t ; µ
x
sxt
= µx0 + µ
x
d s
x
t ; s
m
t ∈ {0, 1}; and sxt ∈ {0, 1}.11
Under the VAR representation, the conditional mean and volatility are specified
as µrt = exp(mt) and σ
2
t = exp(xt). We are extending the latent VAR model in
Brandt and Kang [2004] by incorporating abrupt but recurring regime changes in
µm and µx with the regime indicator variables smt and s
x
t .
12 The regime-dependent
parameter, φ23,sxt , plays an important role in capturing the leverage effect. For
example, the leverage of a firm increases when negative news lowers the market
value of the firm. An increase in leverage leads to a higher risk of holding the
equity claims, which results in a rise in the volatility.13 By allowing for the regime
switching in φ23,sxt , we can test for whether the magnitude of the leverage effect
depends on the high and low volatility regimes.
11We also consider a case in which φ13t is included in equation (3.8). However, the pos-
terior distribution of φ13 is narrowly disperse around zero and the more general model is not
preferred by our Bayesian model selection criterion. For the sake of brevity, we do not report
the corresponding result.
12We have considered another comparable model in which all VAR coefficients,
{φ11, φ12, φ21, φ22} change according to regimes. We do not report the results here because
the marginal likelihood of the model is too low compared to others.
13Christie [1982] provides a comprehensive analysis of the importance of the leverage effect.
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The discrete state variables follow a first-order Markovian process of
pim00 = p[s
m
t = 0 | smt−1 = 0], pim11 = p[smt = 1 | smt−1 = 1], (3.11)
pix00 = p[s
x
t = 0 | sxt−1 = 0], pix11 = p[sxt = 1 | sxt−1 = 1] (3.12)
For the purpose of identifying regimes, we assume that µmδ > 0 and µ
x
δ > 0.
Accordingly, smt = 0 (s
x
t = 0) represents a state of low conditional mean (low
volatility), whereas smt = 1 (s
x
t = 1) represents a state of high conditional mean
(high volatility). Algorithms 1 and 3 allow us to estimate the above nonlinear
state space model with regime-switching. The priors that we employed are re-
ported in Table 2.14 In estimation, we use 100,000 particles to ensure that our
method fully explores the parameters and state spaces.
3.3.2 Empirical Results
Our empirical analysis accounts for various possibilities of innovations under
which the conditional mean and volatility may perform. In particular, the gener-
alized environment can be categorized into three broad cases: a regime change in
volatility, a regime change in the conditional mean, and a regime change in the
leverage effect. Model A assumes no regime changes at all. All other cases assume
regime-switching either in the conditional mean and volatility of the market ex-
cess return. For instance, Model B assumes a regime change in µs only; Model D
assumes regime changes in both µs and µm; and Model C assumes regime changes
in µs and φ23 to incorporate a possibility of a regime change in the leverage effect.
To determine which model best fits with the data in a parsimonious model setup,
14We impose weakly informative priors for other parameters while using informative priors
for regime transition probabilities following the literature.
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we compute the log marginal likelihoods (log(ML)) at the terminal time period
of each case.15
Comparing the log(ML) of Model A against Models B, C, D determines if a
regime switching occurs and where it occurs in the excess return process. Table
3.2 presents the log(ML) values. The log(ML) value of -4,105.9 in Model A is
smaller than other two models except Model D, which is evidence that the regime
change exists only in the conditional volatility process. Comparing Model B (i.e.,
a change in volatility only) and Model D (i.e., changes in the conditional mean
and the volatility) can identify which model can better estimate the underlying
process of the excess return. The log(ML) value of -4,101.3 in Model B is higher
than the log(ML) value of -4,107.2 in Model D. Again, this finding suggests that
the regime change occurs only in the volatility process.
Given the evidence in favor of regime-switching in volatility, we can examine
whether a regime-switching occurs in both the volatility process and the leverage
effect. Comparing Model B (i.e., the leverage effect is constant) versus Model C
(i.e., the leverage effect changes according to the volatility regimes) allows us to
determine whether the leverage effect changes over time. The log(ML) of -4,101.3
in Model B is greater than the log (ML) of -4,105.5 in Model C, which implies
that the regime switching in the leverage effect is not a main feature of the excess
market return. However, this evidence does not discount the importance of the
leverage effect in the model. Rather, the leverage effect itself is an integral element
of the stock return analysis, as φx23,0 is significant across all model specifications.
15The marginal likelihood estimator of the auxiliary particle filter is defined by:
pˆ(y1:t) = pˆ(y1)
T∏
t=2
pˆ(yt | y1:t−1)
, where pˆ(yt | y1:t−1) = ( 1N
∑N
i=0 ω
(i)
t )(
∑K−1
k=0
∑N
i=1 ω
(i)
t−1|t,k).
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Note that according to the model comparison criterion suggested by Kass and
Raftery [1995] and Raftery [1995], Model B is strongly or very strongly preferred
to other models.16
We depict the movements of the weekly excess return, the filtered stochastic
volatility, E[σ2t | y1:t], and the filtered probability of the high-volatility regime,
Pr(st = 1 | y1:t), from the week of January 4, 1980 to the week of May 26, 2017
in Figure 3.4 using the specification from Model B, the best model. The weekly
return (i.e., top graph) oscillates quite violently throughout the sample period.
The degree of fluctuation is particularly large for periods between the years of
’87-’89, -’99-’01, and ’09-’11 (i.e., periods of the second oil shock, the dot-com
boom, and the global financial crisis, respectively). When matching the weekly
market return with the volatility graph (i.e., the mid graph), it is evident that the
cycles with high fluctuations are closely associated with the periods that exhibit
high volatility. The volatility is at its peak during the recent financial crisis.
When we compare the volatility graph with the filtered regime state graph (i.e.,
the bottom graph), it is evident that the level of volatility and the probability of
the high-volatility regime exhibit strong co-movements. Note that the volatility
regime is not well identified in the early sample periods due to the insufficient
number of observations. However, since the mid-1990s, when observations are
accumulated, the volatility regime is more accurately estimated by incorporating
more observations that contain regime switching signals.
Continuing from the working example of Model B, we compare the one year
average excess return and the estimated µrt in Figure 3.5. The red dotted line is
16The difference between the log(ML) value for the two compared models is multiplied by
two to compute the model comparison criterion. When the value is between 6 and 10, the
corresponding model is strongly preferred. When it is larger than 10, the model is very strongly
preferred.
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Table 3.2: Parameter Comparisons by Model Specification
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Regime ∆ in Vol. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regime ∆ in Mean No No No No No No Yes Yes
Regime ∆ in Leverage No No No No Yes Yes No No
Prior Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
µm0 N (lnMˆ − 1, 22) -2.314 0.376 -2.040 0.306 -2.022 0.325 -4.036 0.385
µmd T N (2, 22) - - - - - - 2.235 0.298
µx0 N (lnVˆ − 1, 22) 1.269 0.082 0.852 0.069 0.804 0.076 0.776 0.078
µxd T N (2, 22) - - 0.995 0.121 1.114 0.114 1.191 0.101
φm11 N (0.9, 0.52) 0.528 0.131 0.502 0.113 0.827 0.042 0.859 0.034
φm12 N (0, 12) -0.218 0.090 -0.064 0.120 0.035 0.090 0.067 0.120
φx21 N (0, 12) -0.205 0.073 0.003 0.100 -0.063 0.086 -0.023 0.089
φx22 N (0.9, 0.52) 0.830 0.052 0.838 0.046 0.876 0.026 0.814 0.044
φx23,0 N (0, 0.12) -0.198 0.020 -0.245 0.024 -0.187 0.031 -0.255 0.024
φx23,1 N (0, 0.12) - - - - -0.223 0.031 - -
ρ T N (0, 12) -0.026 0.217 -0.195 0.258 -0.026 0.255 -0.085 0.298
σ2m IG(5, 0.05) 0.042 0.010 0.043 0.011 0.015 0.003 0.016 0.004
σ2x IG(5, 0.05) 0.068 0.013 0.054 0.013 0.015 0.005 0.013 0.004
pim00 Be(98, 2) - - - - - - 0.979 0.006
pim11 Be(98, 2) - - - - - - 0.980 0.006
pix00 Be(98, 2) - - 0.986 0.004 0.987 0.005 0.988 0.004
pix11 Be(98, 2) - - 0.982 0.005 0.983 0.005 0.978 0.006
log(ML) -4,105.9 -4,101.3 -4,105.5 -4,107.2
Notes: Refer to Eqs. (3.8), (3.9), (3.11), and (3.12). Model A assumes no regime changes.
Model B assumes a regime change in µs only. Model C assumes regime changes in µs and
φx3 . Model D assumes regime changes in µ
s and µm. The value of log(ML) refers to the log
of marginal likelihood. The sample period ranges between the week of January 4, 1980 and
the week of May 26, 2017. A total of 100,000 particles are used to obtain the estimates. The
values of lnMˆ and lnVˆ represent the logs of the sample mean and variance of yt. The truncated
normal distributions for µmd and µ
x
d are defined between 0 and infinity. The truncated normal
distribution ρ is defined between -1 and 1.
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Figure 3.4: Time series of the stock return, volatility, and regime probability
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Notes: The sample period ranges from the week of 1980/01/04 and 2017/05/26. Stochastic
volatility refers to the extracted exp(xt). High volatility regime depicts the probability of the
estimated switches in regimes.
138
the average excess return, whereas the blue solid line is the extracted µrt from the
data. For a better comparison of the movements in the average excess return and
the estimated µrt , we report the result for the latter sample period from the week
of August 12, 2011 to the week of May 26, 2017. Given that the sample period
starts from 1980, we conjecture that there is sufficient information to accurately
estimate µrt by August of 2011. Using a slightly earlier or slightly later date
than August 2011 does not substantially change our finding. Figure 3.5 shows
that there is a similarity in the long-term movements between the two series.
Even though the magnitude of fluctuation may be different, the overall vertical
movements of these two series co-align with each other.17 The overall comparison
result indicates that the estimated µrt can accurately capture the behaviors of the
average excess return.
In addition, we report the posterior means and standard deviations of model
parameters at the terminal time period in Table 3.2. While the parameters
that represent persistence, φ11 and φ22, are significant, other parameters that
govern inter-temporal relationships between the conditional mean and volatility,
φ12 and φ21, are not significant. Even if the trade-off between risk and return
is not our direct concern, the empirical result may be the consequence of the
intrinsically inconclusive evidence on the risk-return relation in the return data,
which has been actively discussed in the previous literature. For instance, Ghysels
et al. [2005], Lundblad [2007], and Ludvigson and Ng [2007] show a positive risk-
return trade-off, whereas Nelson [1991], Glosten et al. [1993], and Brandt and
Kang [2004] present a negative risk-return trade-off.
17We also experiment with the monthly excessive return instead of the yearly, and the result
does not change.
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of Yearly Average Excess Return and Filtered µrt
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Notes: The solid blue line is for the estimated µrt , while the red dashed line is the for the yearly
average excess return. The graph depicts the periods between August 12, 2011 and May 26,
2017.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel online estimation method for regime-switching
state space models. Particularly, we improve the estimation performance of the
existing method developed by Carvalho and Lopes [2007] by utilizing all of the
available and most recent information when re-sampling existing particles and
generating new particles. Empirically, we apply the proposed method to under-
stand the dynamics of the conditional mean and volatility of U.S. excess stock
market returns under a regime switching framework. Our empirical findings in-
dicate that the model that incorporates regime-switching (particularly in the
volatility process) is the most viable candidate for correctly capturing the stock
return movement.
Our new approach opens doors for future research. Namely, a combination of
a full parameter learning approach (e.g., sufficient statistics) in Carvalho et al.
[2010] with our proposed approach of handling the regime index variable may
offer a more reliable estimation method for various regime switching models. Ad-
ditionally, it would be interesting to merge more refined SMC smoothing methods
of Yang et al. [2017] with our proposed algorithm.
141
Bibliography
Staffan Burenstam Linder. An essay on trade and transformation. Almqvist &
Wiksell Stockholm, 1961.
Juan Carlos Hallak. Product quality and the direction of trade. Journal of
International Economics, 68(1):238–265, 2006.
Robert C Feenstra and John Romalis. International prices and endogenous qual-
ity. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012.
Jonathan I Dingel. The determinants of quality specialization. The Review of
Economic Studies, 84(4):1551–1582, 2016.
Pablo Fajgelbaum, Gene M Grossman, and Elhanan Helpman. A linder hypoth-
esis for foreign direct investment. The Review of Economic Studies, 82(1):
83–121, 2014.
Eduardo Borensztein, Jose De Gregorio, and Jong-Wha Lee. How does foreign
direct investment affect economic growth? Journal of International Economics,
45(1):115–135, 1998.
Anne-Ce´lia Disdier and Keith Head. The puzzling persistence of the distance
effect on bilateral trade. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(1):37–48,
2008.
Chih-Chiang Hsu, Jyun-Yi Wu, and Ruey Yau. Foreign direct investment and
business cycle co-movements: The panel data evidence. Journal of Macroeco-
nomics, 33(4):770–783, 2011.
Paul Krugman. Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of trade.
The American Economic Review, 70(5):950–959, 1980.
Jeffrey H Bergstrand. The heckscher-ohlin-samuelson model, the linder hypoth-
esis and the determinants of bilateral intra-industry trade. The Economic
Journal, 100(403):1216–1229, 1990.
142
James R Markusen and Anthony J Venables. The theory of endowment, intra-
industry and multi-national trade. Journal of International Economics, 52(2):
209–234, 2000.
Laura Alfaro and Andrew Charlton. Intra-industry foreign direct investment.
The American Economic Review, 99(5):2096–2119, 2009.
Elhanan Helpman, Marc Melitz, and Yona Rubinstein. Estimating trade flows:
Trading partners and trading volumes. Technical report, National Bureau of
Economic Research, 2007.
Karl Shell. Toward a theory of inventive activity and capital accumulation. The
American Economic Review, 56(1/2):62–68, 1966.
J Benson Durham. Absorptive capacity and the effects of foreign direct invest-
ment and equity foreign portfolio investment on economic growth. European
Economic Review, 48(2):285–306, 2004.
Sourafel Girma. Absorptive capacity and productivity spillovers from fdi: a
threshold regression analysis. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 67
(3):281–306, 2005.
Omar S Dahi and Firat Demir. South–south and north–south economic ex-
changes: Does it matter who is exchanging what and with whom? Journal of
Economic Surveys, 31(5):1449–1486, 2017.
Arvind Panagariya. Preferential trade liberalization: the traditional theory and
new developments. Journal of Economic literature, 38(2):287–331, 2000.
Maurice Schiff and Yanling Wang. North-south and south-south trade-related
technology diffusion: How important are they in improving tfp growth? The
Journal of Development Studies, 44(1):49–59, 2008.
Paul Krugman, Richard N Cooper, and TN Srinivasan. Growing world trade:
causes and consequences. Brookings papers on economic activity, 1995(1):327–
377, 1995.
Chuck CY Kwok and Solomon Tadesse. The mnc as an agent of change for host-
country institutions: Fdi and corruption. Journal of International Business
Studies, 37(6):767–785, 2006.
Firat Demir. Effects of fdi flows on institutional development: Does it matter
where the investors are from? World Development, 78:341–359, 2016.
Alice Hoffenberg Amsden. The rise of the rest: challenges to the west from late-
industrializing economies. Oxford University Press, USA, 2001.
143
Nathan Nunn. Relationship-specificity, incomplete contracts, and the pattern of
trade. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 569–600, 2007.
Laura Alfaro, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Vadym Volosovych. Why doesn’t
capital flow from rich to poor countries? an empirical investigation. The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2):347–368, 2008.
Andre´ Burgstaller and Neantro Saavedra-Rivano. Capital mobility and growth
in a north-south model. Journal of Development Economics, 15(1):213–237,
1984.
Amitava Krishna Dutt. Southern primary exports, technological change and
uneven development. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 20(1):73–89, 1996.
William Darity and Lewis S Davis. Growth, trade and uneven development.
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 29(1):141–170, 2005.
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A Robinson. The colonial origins
of comparative development: An empirical investigation. American economic
review, 91(5):1369–1401, 2001.
Mariya Aleksynska and Olena Havrylchyk. Fdi from the south: The role of
institutional distance and natural resources. European Journal of Political
Economy, 29:38–53, 2013.
Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra and Mehmet Genc. Transforming disadvantages into ad-
vantages: developing-country mnes in the least developed countries. Journal
of International Business Studies, 39(6):957–979, 2008.
Firat Demir and Chenghao Hu. Institutional differences and the direction of
bilateral foreign direct investment flows: Are south–south flows any different
than the rest? The World Economy, 39(12):2000–2024, 2016.
Jeffrey H Bergstrand and Peter Egger. What determines bits? Journal of Inter-
national Economics, 90(1):107–122, 2013.
Alessia Amighini and Marco Sanfilippo. Impact of south–south fdi and trade on
the export upgrading of african economies. World Development, 64:1–17, 2014.
Omar S Dahi and Firat Demir. Preferential trade agreements and manufactured
goods exports: does it matter whom you pta with? Applied Economics, 45
(34):4754–4772, 2013.
Ian Scoones, Kojo Amanor, Arilson Favareto, and Gubo Qi. A new politics
of development cooperation? chinese and brazilian engagements in african
agriculture. World development, 81:1–12, 2016.
144
Jaime Ros. Latin americas trade and growth patterns, the china factor, and
prebischs nightmare. Journal of Globalization and Development, 3(2):1–16,
2013.
Herbert Jauch. Chinese investments in africa: twenty-first century colonialism?
In New Labor Forum, volume 20, pages 49–55. SAGE Publications Sage CA:
Los Angeles, CA, 2011.
Firat Demir and Yi Duan. Bilateral fdi flows, productivity growth, and conver-
gence: The north vs. the south. World Development, 101:235–249, 2018.
Omar Dahi and Firat Demir. South–South Trade and Finance in the Twenty-
First Century: Rise of the South Or a Second Great Divergence. Anthem Press,
2016.
L´ıdia Cabral, Arilson Favareto, Langton Mukwereza, and Kojo Amanor. Brazils
agricultural politics in africa: more food international and the disputed mean-
ings of family farming. World Development, 81:47–60, 2016.
Robert E Lucas. Some macroeconomics for the 21st century. The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 14(1):159–168, 2000.
Xiaoying Li and Xiaming Liu. Foreign direct investment and economic growth:
an increasingly endogenous relationship. World Development, 33(3):393–407,
2005.
Venkataraman N Balasubramanyam, Mohammed Salisu, and David Sapsford.
Foreign direct investment and growth in ep and is countries. The Economic
Journal, pages 92–105, 1996.
Luiz R De Mello. Foreign direct investment-led growth: evidence from time series
and panel data. Oxford Economic Papers, 51(1):133–151, 1999.
Usha Nair-Reichert and Diana Weinhold. Causality tests for cross-country panels:
a new look at fdi and economic growth in developing countries. Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics, 63(2):153–171, 2001.
Maria V Carkovic and Ross Levine. Does foreign direct investment accelerate
economic growth? U of Minnesota Department of Finance Working Paper,
2002.
Kai Carstensen and Farid Toubal. Foreign direct investment in central and east-
ern european countries: a dynamic panel analysis. Journal of Comparative
Economics, 32(1):3–22, 2004.
145
Laura Alfaro, Areendam Chanda, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Selin Sayek. Fdi
and economic growth: the role of local financial markets. Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 64(1):89–112, 2004.
Era Dabla-Norris, Jiro Honda, Amina Lahreche, and Genevie`ve Verdier. Fdi
flows to low-income countries: Global drivers and growth implications. IMF
Working Papers, pages 1–38, 2010.
Nadia Doytch and Merih Uctum. Does the worldwide shift of fdi from manu-
facturing to services accelerate economic growth? a gmm estimation study.
Journal of International Money and Finance, 30(3):410–427, 2011.
Najat Nassor Suleiman, Shivee Ranjanee Kaliappan, and Normaz Wana Ismail.
Foreign direct investments (fdi) and economic growth: empirical evidence from
southern africa customs union (sacu) countries. International Journal of Eco-
nomics and Management, 7(1):136–149, 2013.
Jean Imbs. Trade, finance, specialization, and synchronization. Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 86(3):723–734, 2004.
Cesar Calderon, Alberto Chong, and Ernesto Stein. Trade intensity and business
cycle synchronization: Are developing countries any different? Journal of
International Economics, 71(1):2–21, 2007.
SEBNEM Kalemli-Ozcan, Elias Papaioannou, and JOSE´-LUIS PEYDRO´. Fi-
nancial regulation, financial globalization, and the synchronization of economic
activity. The Journal of Finance, 68(3):1179–1228, 2013.
Richard Blundell and Stephen Bond. Gmm estimation with persistent panel data:
an application to production functions. Econometric Reviews, 19(3):321–340,
2000.
Robert J Barro and Xavier Sala-i Martin. Convergence. Journal of Political
Economy, pages 223–251, 1992.
Dan Ben-David. Equalizing exchange: Trade liberalization and income conver-
gence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 653–679, 1993.
Xavier X Sala-i Martin. Regional cohesion: evidence and theories of regional
growth and convergence. European Economic Review, 40(6):1325–1352, 1996.
Sergio J Rey and Brett D Montouri. Us regional income convergence: a spatial
econometric perspective. Regional Studies, 33(2):143–156, 1999.
Robert C Feenstra, Robert E Lipsey, Haiyan Deng, Alyson C Ma, and Hengyong
Mo. World trade flows: 1962-2000. Technical report, National Bureau of
Economic Research, 2005.
146
Beata S Javorcik, C¸ag˘lar O¨zden, Mariana Spatareanu, and Cristina Neagu. Mi-
grant networks and foreign direct investment. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 94(2):231–241, 2011.
Jinzhuo Z Garrett. Explaining asymmetries in bilateral fdi flows. International
Review of Economics & Finance, 41:155–171, 2016.
Theo S Eicher, Lindy Helfman, and Alex Lenkoski. Robust fdi determinants:
Bayesian model averaging in the presence of selection bias. Journal of Macroe-
conomics, 34(3):637–651, 2012.
James J Heckman. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica,
47(1):153–161, 1979.
John William Hatfield. Federalism, taxation, and economic growth. Journal of
Urban Economics, 87:114–125, 2015.
Richard Abel Musgrave. Theory of public finance; a study in public economy.
McGraw-Hill, 1959.
Wallace E Oates. Fiscal federalism. Edward Elgar Publishing, 1972.
Eitan Berglas. Distribution of tastes and skills and the provision of local public
goods. Journal of Public Economics, 6(4):409–423, 1976.
Myrna Wooders. Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies
with a local public good. Journal of Economic Theory, 18(2):328–348, 1978.
Eitan Berglas and David Pines. Clubs, local public goods and transportation
models: A synthesis. Journal of Public Economics, 15(2):141–162, 1981.
J Vernon Henderson. The tiebout model: Bring back the entrepreneurs. Journal
of Political Economy, 93(2):248–264, 1985.
Oded Hochman, David Pines, and Jacques-Francois Thisse. On the optimal
structure of local governments. American Economic Review, pages 1224–1240,
1995.
Charles M Tiebout. A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political
Economy, pages 416–424, 1956.
Wallace E Oates. Fiscal decentralization and economic development. National
Tax Journal, 46(2):237–243, 1993.
Timothy Besley and Anne Case. Incumbent behavior: Vote-seeking, tax-setting,
and yardstick competition. American Economic Review, 85(1):25–45, 1995.
147
George R Zodrow and Peter Mieszkowski. Pigou, tiebout, property taxation, and
the underprovision of local public goods. Journal of Urban Economics, 19(3):
356–370, 1986.
Wallace E Oates and Robert M Schwab. Economic competition among juris-
dictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing? Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 35(3):333–354, 1988.
Jack Mintz, Henry Tulkens, et al. Commodity tax competition between member
states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency. Journal of Public Economics,
29:133–172, 1986.
David E Wildasin. Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition. Journal of
Public Economics, 35(2):229–240, 1988.
Sam Bucovetsky. Asymmetric tax competition. Journal of Urban Economics, 30
(2):167–181, 1991.
John Douglas Wilson. Theories of tax competition. National Tax Journal, pages
269–304, 1999.
Jan K Brueckner. Fiscal decentralization with distortionary taxation: Tiebout vs.
tax competition. International Tax and Public Finance, 11(2):133–153, 2004.
Eckhard Janeba and John Douglas Wilson. Optimal fiscal federalism in the
presence of tax competition. Journal of Public Economics, 95(11-12):1302–
1311, 2011.
Tao Zhang and Heng-fu Zou. Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and eco-
nomic growth in china. Journal of Public Economics, 67(2):221–240, 1998.
Justin Yifu Lin and Zhiqiang Liu. Fiscal decentralization and economic growth
in china*. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 49(1):1–21, 2000.
Andrew Feltenstein and Shigeru Iwata. Decentralization and macroeconomic
performance in china: regional autonomy has its costs. Journal of Development
Economics, 76(2):481–501, 2005.
Nobuo Akai and Masayo Sakata. Fiscal decentralization contributes to economic
growth: evidence from state-level cross-section data for the united states. Jour-
nal of Urban Economics, 52(1):93–108, 2002.
Danyang Xie, Heng-fu Zou, and Hamid Davoodi. Fiscal decentralization and
economic growth in the united states. Journal of Urban Economics, 45(2):
228–239, 1999.
148
Atsushi Iimi. Decentralization and economic growth revisited: an empirical note.
Journal of Urban Economics, 57(3):449–461, 2005.
Jorge Mart´ınez Va´zquez and Robert M McNab. Fiscal decentralization, macrosta-
bility and growth. Hacienda pu´blica espan˜ola, 0(179):25–50, 2006.
Norman Gemmell, Richard Kneller, and Ismael Sanz. Fiscal decentralization and
economic growth: spending versus revenue decentralization. Economic Inquiry,
51(4):1915–1931, 2013.
John Thornton. Fiscal decentralization and economic growth reconsidered. Jour-
nal of Urban Economics, 61(1):64–70, 2007.
Hamid Davoodi and Heng-fu Zou. Fiscal decentralization and economic growth:
A cross-country study. Journal of Urban Economics, 43(2):244–257, 1998.
Andre´s Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Anne Krøijer. Fiscal decentralization and economic
growth in central and eastern europe. Growth and Change, 40(3):387–417,
2009.
Andre´s Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Roberto Ezcurra. Is fiscal decentralization harmful
for economic growth? evidence from the oecd countries. Journal of Economic
Geography, 11(4):619–643, 2011.
Thushyanthan Baskaran, Lars Feld, and Jan Schnellenbach. Fiscal federalism,
decentralization and economic growth: Survey and meta-analysis. Technical
report, CESifo Group Munich, 2014.
Serdar Yilmaz. The impact of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic perfor-
mance. In Proceedings. Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of the
Annual Meeting of the National Tax Association, volume 92, pages 251–260,
1999.
Ulrich Thiessen. Fiscal decentralisation and economic growth in high-income
oecd countries. Fiscal Studies, 24(3):237–274, 2003.
Gary M Woller and Kerk Phillips. Fiscal decentralisation and idc economic
growth: An empirical investigation. Journal of Development Studies, 34(4):
139–148, 1998.
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Santiago Lago-Peas, and Agnese Sacchi. The impact of
fiscal decentralization: A survey. Journal of Economic Surveys, 2016. URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joes.12182.
Torberg Falch and Justina AV Fischer. Public sector decentralization and school
performance: International evidence. Economics Letters, 114(3):276–279, 2012.
149
Monica Escaleras and Charles A Register. Fiscal decentralization and natural
hazard risks. Public Choice, 151(1-2):165–183, 2012.
Jenny E Ligthart and Peter van Oudheusden. In government we trust: The role
of fiscal decentralization. European Journal of Political Economy, 37:116–128,
2015.
Roberto Dell’Anno and De´sire´e Teobaldelli. Keeping both corruption and the
shadow economy in check: the role of decentralization. International Tax and
Public Finance, 22(1):1–40, 2015.
Ignacio Lago-Pen˜as and Santiago Lago-Pen˜as. The determinants of tax morale in
comparative perspective: Evidence from european countries. European Journal
of Political Economy, 26(4):441–453, 2010.
Imke Harbers. Decentralization and the development of nationalized party sys-
tems in new democracies: Evidence from latin america. Comparative Political
Studies, 43(5):606–627, 2010.
Jan K Brueckner. Fiscal federalism and economic growth. Journal of Public
Economics, 90(10):2107–2120, 2006.
Lucie Gadenne and Monica Singhal. Decentralization in developing economies.
Annual Review of Economics, 6(1):581–604, 2014.
Robert J Barro. Government spending in a simple model of endogeneous growth.
Journal of Political Economy, pages S103–S125, 1990.
Steve Bond, Asli Leblebiciolu, and Fabio Schiantarelli. Capital accumulation and
growth: a new look at the empirical evidence. Journal of Applied Econometrics,
25(7):1073–1099, 2010.
Pranab Bardhan. Decentralization of governance and development. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 16(4):185–205, 2002.
Nazmul Chaudhury, Jeffrey Hammer, Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan,
and F Halsey Rogers. Missing in action: teacher and health worker absence in
developing countries. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(1):91–116, 2006.
Jean-Paul Faguet and Caroline Po¨schl. Is decentralization good for development?:
perspectives from academics and policy makers. Oxford University Press, USA,
2015.
Daniel Treisman. The architecture of government: Rethinking political decentral-
ization. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
150
Chang-Jin Kim. Dynamic linear models with markov-switching. Journal of
Econometrics, 60(1-2):1–22, 1994.
Jane Liu and Mike West. Combined parameter and state estimation in simulation-
based filtering. In Sequential Monte Carlo methods in practice, pages 197–223.
Springer, 2001.
Carlos M Carvalho and Hedibert F Lopes. Simulation-based sequential analysis
of markov switching stochastic volatility models. Computational Statistics &
Data Analysis, 51(9):4526–4542, 2007.
Michael K Pitt and Neil Shephard. Filtering via simulation: Auxiliary particle
filters. Journal of the American statistical association, 94(446):590–599, 1999.
Neil J Gordon, David J Salmond, and Adrian FM Smith. Novel approach to
nonlinear/non-gaussian bayesian state estimation. In IEE Proceedings F-Radar
and Signal Processing, volume 140, pages 107–113. IET, 1993.
Mike EC P So, Kin Lam, and Wai Keung Li. A stochastic volatility model with
markov switching. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 16(2):244–253,
1998.
Michael W Brandt and Qiang Kang. On the relationship between the condi-
tional mean and volatility of stock returns: A latent var approach. Journal of
Financial Economics, 72(2):217–257, 2004.
Andrew A Christie. The stochastic behavior of common stock variances: Value,
leverage and interest rate effects. Journal of Financial Economics, 10(4):407–
432, 1982.
Robert E Kass and Adrian E Raftery. Bayes factors. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 90(430):773–795, 1995.
Adrian E Raftery. Bayesian model selection in social research. Sociological
Methodology, pages 111–163, 1995.
Eric Ghysels, Pedro Santa-Clara, and Rossen Valkanov. There is a risk-return
trade-off after all. Journal of Financial Economics, 76(3):509–548, 2005.
Christian Lundblad. The risk return tradeoff in the long run: 1836–2003. Journal
of Financial Economics, 85(1):123–150, 2007.
Sydney C Ludvigson and Serena Ng. The empirical risk–return relation: A factor
analysis approach. Journal of Financial Economics, 83(1):171–222, 2007.
151
Daniel B Nelson. Conditional heteroskedasticity in asset returns: A new ap-
proach. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 347–370,
1991.
Lawrence R Glosten, Ravi Jagannathan, and David E Runkle. On the relation
between the expected value and the volatility of the nominal excess return on
stocks. The Journal of Finance, 48(5):1779–1801, 1993.
Carlos Carvalho, Michael S Johannes, Hedibert F Lopes, and Nick Polson. Par-
ticle learning and smoothing. Statistical Science, 25(1):88–106, 2010.
Biao Yang, Jonathan R Stroud, Gabriel Huerta, et al. Sequential monte carlo
smoothing with parameter estimation. Bayesian Analysis, 2017.
152
